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ABSTRACT

The question of how borders are defined and enforced has always been an
important issue both to the state and to residents between whom make and must deal with
those decisions. This project examines El Paso, Texas as a case study for shaping a
more progressive future for border and immigration enforcement. It does so by reporting
on 16 interviews with key actors in border policy discussions. El Paso offers an excellent
opportunity to study how border and immigration enforcement approaches are negotiated
between scales, including federal enforcement agencies, state government, city and
county officials, and community activists. Immigration enforcement has been marked by
massive increases in manpower, technology, and resources over the past 15 years, yet
have failed to stem the tide of migration and resulted in the deaths of thousands of
persons. This presents a particular challenge to border communities hosting both
enforcers and undocumented migrants, and that are the main place where the impacts of
border enforcement are felt, a challenge heightened by devolutionary movement of
immigration enforcement to local actors. The project focuses particularly on the
possibilities and challenges for community groups to harness the devolution of
responsibility for immigration enforcement as a means of projecting border voices into
the national debate. While still marginalized, it appears that the prospect for border
involvement in progressive reform is strong.
Keywords:
Political Geography, Devolution, Scale, Borders, Community Activism, Human Rights
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Looking for Progressive Reform
This thesis looks at the movement towards a progressive border and immigration
reform that is emerging out of El Paso and other parts of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands. It
is interested not only in reform, but particularly in ‗progressive‘ reform, defining what
that means and tracking the progress toward that goal. Specifically, it is interested in
looking at how activists and organizations pursue reform and what the chances of reform
are. It is interested in the actions that the pro-reform bloc takes, the interactions they
have with various apparati of government, local, state, or federal, the coalitions they build
locally, across the borderlands, and increasingly, across the country. It is interested in
what barriers the pro-reform bloc faces and how those might be overcome, what
advantages they have and how those might be harnessed. In doing this, the thesis hopes
to address relevant discussions of how place is constructed, truly getting at that issue of
who constructs the places of the border and how border reformers are seeking to alter
place, as well as policy. The thesis finds the role of scale in immigration and border
enforcement, emphasizing the role of devolution, and likewise the role that scale plays in
reform. In looking at scale this thesis particularly looks at the contest between the tight
link between local and national (which I refer to as ‗nlocalization‘ in this thesis) that has
defined border and immigration issues traditionally, and devolution, which forms what
Mathew Coleman describes as a ―uneven urban geography‖ of immigration policies
(Coleman 2007).

7|He y man

This thesis holds that the reform emerging out of El Paso is not a simple
immigration reform, but is a progressive reform that has several key characteristics worth
noting. Foremost, the push for reform out of El Paso is not solely seeking a reform of
immigration policy, but rather is looking for fundamental changes in both border and
immigration policy. This inclusion of border policy in the cause of reform is critical, as it
allows for policy changes addressing many pressing issues, particularly for border
residents, that immigration reform alone would overlook or exacerbate. In this regard,
border reform would represent a movement away from the increasing militarization of the
U.S.-Mexico border, a trend well documented by Timothy Dunn, creating a borderlands
more respectful of the rights of residents and migrants alike (Dunn 1996; Dunn 2009).
Furthermore, border reform would force policy makers to address human rights
catastrophes such as the deaths of hundreds of migrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico border
every year. One of the major flaws of recent immigration reform proposals is that they
have cut deals where immigration reform only occurs in exchange for increased border
enforcement, which has simply exacerbated those death rates. By explicitly considering
such human rights concerns, the reform movement out of El Paso has drawn the cause of
reform in a progressive direction.
Furthermore, the push for reform out of El Paso is progressive in that it aims to
introduce the perspectives and views of border residents to a debate that has historically
been lacking their voices. While it appears to be the aim of reformers to maintain the
close federal-local link that has traditionally defined the scalar nature of border and
immigration issues, their ability to pursue reform has been significantly aided by the
movement toward devolution. Pre-devolution (late 1990s), there was a disconnect
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between those pursuing reform at the national level, and those working at the local level,
one at least partially illustrated in the separation of border and immigration reforms and
in the willingness to exchange immigration reform for increased border enforcement.
Devolution has done two things in this regard; it has forced people operating at the
national level to pay attention to activity at the local scale, and furthermore it has created
a space for local activists to engage national conversations and trends. This latter point is
particularly important as it means that pro-reform activists operating in the local scale can
effectively shape and resist the movement toward devolution. This has opened the door
to greater coalitions between organizations within the local scale, and with the success of
such activity, to the formation of pan-border coalitions that themselves are increasingly
tied into national organizations and coalitions. Devolution has allowed this coalition
building and scaling-up that makes for more progressive and more effective pro-reform
advocacy.
Finally, the push for border and immigration reform will need to do more than
just work on policy, it will need to remake El Paso and the borderlands as a progressive
place. As Patricia Price informs us, place is not static, and not natural, but rather
constructed from competing visions of what the place could be (Price 2004, 1).
Misperceptions and misinformation currently dominate how people in the United States
view the border, a barrier that will need to change before the progressive reforms, and
lasting role, that these activists seek, can actually be secured. Pro-reform activists must
seek to, and succeed at remaking the places, and with that the practices, of the
borderlands. Where the border is currently marginalized, it will need to be recast as a
central link between two countries. This will mean confronting cultural isolation,
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poverty, political isolation, and racism, all of which have combined to prevent effective
participation by borderlands communities in broader discussions about border and
immigration policy. This is a process that is starting to happen, and confronting these
factors is something that reformers realize needs to happen in order for reform to be
successful, but it is probably the weakest area of progressive border and immigration
reform. Contesting the way that El Paso and other communities on the border are
constructed is a difficult, but crucial, step forward.
The Coming Journey—A Roadmap
This thesis will be an exploration of these themes as it puts together a picture of
how scale, place, government officials, activists, limitations, and advantages all meet in
El Paso, and what this means for the chances of progressive border and immigration
reform. In doing so, it will begin with a brief overview of border and immigration
enforcement, both nationally and in El Paso. Chapter Two aims to provide helpful
history and background on what practices are observed today, how they have emerged,
and why they are being contested. From there, the thesis moves to the Review of
Literature (Chapter Three). This section aims to describe the four lenses that are being
put together to analyze the situation in El Paso. Each lens is a subsection highlighting a
line of geographic thought that the thesis wishes to be in conversation with as it looks at
the push for reform and the final subsection is an attempt to put all of those lenses
together. The first subsection ((Re)Bordering) looks at how place is a social construct,
given to contestation and change, as it seeks to inform how the border has come to be
constructed as it has. The second subsection (Scale and Devolution) looks at how scalar
issues play out in the borderlands, highlighting a close connection between the national
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and local scales that has traditionally defined border and immigration policy, but which is
being usurped by a looser set of scalar relations in devolution. The third (Community
and Government Relationships) aims to set some expectations for how government and
community groups interact, giving a basis for comparison to be made in the analysis.
The fourth (Defining ‗Progressive‘—A Rights Framework) deals with what it means for
reform to be ‗progressive‘, expanding on the discussion above and reinforcing an
emphasis on human and civil rights. Finally, the fifth subsection (Synthesis) looks to put
the prior four together giving the reader a clear lens through which to view the coming
analysis.
The thesis then moves to a discussion of the data and methods (Chapter Four)
used in its construction, providing the reader with an overview of the case study process.
This thesis is a single case study looking at El Paso, Texas as a notable case of the
interactions that occur on the border around immigration and border issues. While the
research uses a variety of data sources, including some use of local media, government
and organizational documents, and participant observation, it is largely based on 16
interviews conducted with key actors in these interactions. These actors were chosen to
represent a cross-section of all actors involved, including federal agencies, state and local
government including both the city and county, local service providing organizations,
local policy activist organizations, and other activists and scholars looking to help shape
policy and practices around the border.
Moving forward, it shifts to the main body of the work, a statement and analysis
of the project‘s findings (Chapter Five). This broad section consists of four subsections,
the first three focusing on analyzing how different actors involved with border and

11 | H e y m a n

immigration matters interact with each other, and the last looking at barriers and
resources available to reform going forward. The first subsection (Community Groups
and Activists) deals specifically with community groups and activists pushing for reform,
largely detailing the emergence of coalitions and a division of labor between groups. The
subsection then moves on to discuss how these coalitions have begun to expand beyond
the El Paso area, how the pro-reform movement has been ‗scaling up‘ their activity,
before moving to classify this activity in a matrix developed in the review of literature.
The second subsection (Intergovernmental Activities) begins by looking at how the
activities of local federal agencies have become more focused on Washington D.C. in
recent years, a form of concentration that is an interesting counterpoint to devolution.
The thesis then turns to examine governmental responses to devolution more closely,
looking both at pressures for local government to comply with a devolutionary
framework, and at local government attempts to resist devolution.
The third subsection (Government and Activist Interactions) looks at interactions
between activists and government bodies, particularly focusing on the incorporation of
some local governmental officials into pro-reform coalitions and on how these coalitions
interact with officials in D.C. From there it aims to illuminate how these interactions fit
with some of the ongoing geographic discussions, looking at how pro-reform activists
seek to reshape the nature of the traditional ‗nlocalized‘ scalar framework for
immigration and border policy. It then touches again on the role of local federal officials
in the reform process, a role largely diminished since the creation of the Department of
Homeland Security in 2003. Finally, the subsection closes by looking at some of the
impacts of local efforts to ‗scale up‘ activities around immigration and border reform.
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The fourth and final subsection (Limitations and Advantages) of the Chapter Five looks
specifically at limitations and advantages of pursuing border and immigration reform out
of El Paso. Looking at limitations it focuses on how the border is constructed as a
marginal place and at factors such as poverty, isolation, political power, and racism that
serve to reinforce this construction. In examining these limitations, the thesis aims to
emphasize the need for reform groups to seek not only to change policy, but to change
the entire way that the border is constructed as a place. It then moves on to a discussion
of advantages, focusing on the experience that life on the border gives the reform
movement about what needs to be addressed, an expertise that is unmatched in D.C. or
elsewhere, and the root cause that a progressive vision of border and immigration reform
is emerging in the first place.
The conclusion (Chapter Six) follows, an attempt to tie up the thesis around some
of the major conversations it has engaged in and offer a final appraisal of the chances for
a progressive border and immigration reform. It looks at the organizational/power
matrix, commenting on the ways that the pro-reform movement has adapted their tactics
and organizational forms to effectively command all of these forms of power. It
concludes a lengthy appraisal of the contest between ‗nlocalization‘ and devolution as
frameworks for border and immigration enforcement, looking at how the cause of reform
favors a fundamentally ‗nlocalized‘ framework, yet operates in ways that have benefited
from having to resist devolutionary processes. Indeed, the dealings of organizations in
the borderlands with devolution offers an example for similar resistance in other parts of
the U.S. Furthermore, it touches on how reformers‘ pursuit of a ‗nlocalized‘ framework
for border and immigration affairs is not just a return to the traditional model, but rather
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an attempt to use that framework to reconstruct El Paso and the borderlands as a
progressive place, addressing some of the limitations mentioned earlier. Finally, the
thesis concludes with an assessment of the chances for progressive reform, noting both,
what has been done, and what still stands in the way.
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CHAPTER TWO
CONTEXT
Out in the West Texas Town of El Paso
Immigration is a topic that has been on the American political agenda as long as
the country has existed. It ebbs and flows in approach to the point that immigration
policy has been likened to a revolving door, sometimes welcoming people in, sometimes
aiming to keep them out. The past twenty-five years have generally seen policy
movements to close this door, a hardening of U.S. immigration and border policy that has
drastically increased the manpower, resources, and money going to border control. At
the same time, transnational economic agreements such as the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and other forms of economic globalization work to keep
these borders open. The impacts of these policies are disproportionately felt in the
communities of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands. Here residents must live with the activities
of border and immigration enforcement ever around them, and with the consequences of
this hardening, most distressingly the 5,600 deaths that have occurred since 1994 as
people try to enter the U.S, and with the need for the border to be open, as globalization
continues to reshape the local economy (Jimenez 2009, Heyman 1999, Andreas 2000).
However, policy decisions about border and immigration issues have been made at the
federal level since the late 1800s, and such decision making at the national scale all too
often has excluded the experiences, needs, and input of border communities (Jacobson
1998, 57). A situation has existed where the scales between policy-making and
enforcement are disconnected, the former national and the latter local, although through
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federal agencies. This is starting to change, however, as state and local governments
assert themselves in discussions around border and immigration policy, and as the federal
government seeks to harness local law enforcement for use in immigration and border
enforcement.
El Paso, Texas, is a perfect example of these trends. The city of 750,000 people is
the American side of a bi-national conurbation with total population estimated over two
million. It is home to a plethora of federal immigration and border enforcement agencies,
both field operations and regional headquarters. Decisions made elsewhere, play out
here, such as the construction of a border fence/wall over local opposition. Likewise,
enforcement tactics developed here can be seen across the country. The current strategy
of immigrant interdiction was first developed in El Paso as Operation Hold the Line
(originally Blockade) (see Dunn 2009 for an excellent examination of this). At the same
time, it grew up because of its transportation links into Mexico, links that are still a vital
part of the community, and which have been made more important by free trade. The
population of the area is largely of Mexican heritage, a mix of people born in the U.S.
and Mexico, and there are strong cultural ties between El Paso and northern Mexico. It is
home to the Chamizal National Monument, a Kennedy era testament to goodwill between
the U.S. and Mexico. The city then is home to two powerful and increasingly conflicting
forces, an externally imposed federal force to tighten the border, and a local force
pushing to open it.
Something is emerging out of this tension in El Paso, a pushback against the
hardening of U.S. border and immigration policy, a pushback against devolution and the
move toward local immigration enforcement, a pushback against the exclusion of border
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perspectives from national discussions of border and immigration policy. However, there
is something more here as well, not just opposing these trends in border and immigration
enforcement, but rather seeking to create a new approach to border and immigration
issues. It is a humane movement, looking to address issues such as migrant deaths at the
border and emphasize human rights more broadly. It is a just movement, calling attention
to the impacts of enforcement on the civil rights of border residents. It is a movement
that seeks to create a progressive set of border and immigration reforms aiming not only
to correct flaws with the current immigration system, but to set U.S. border and
immigration policy in a completely different direction. The aim is not to have the door
turn open, but to force it open and keep it so. For more than a century the federal
government has held authority over border and immigration affairs, but now with
pressure from devolution and border communities, the question seems to be, ―Who draws
the line?‖
A Brief History of Border and Immigration Enforcement in the United States
Border and immigration affairs are presently matters within the realm of the
federal government, which has had purview over their regulation since the mid-1800s
(Jacobson 1998, 57). This 150 year precedent is important in the present, where federal
hegemony over immigration affairs faces a challenge from devolution to state and local
authorities. For the first 70 years of U.S. history, immigration enforcement had been a
matter left to the states, and many exclusionary practices originated at the state level,
such as the barring of ‗undesirables‘: the ill, criminals, people of ‗ill moral repute‘,
among others (Kanstroom 2007, 92). A series of actions undertaken by the U.S.
Congress in the late 1800s, prompted in part by Supreme Court decisions that struck
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down state immigration regulation under the Commerce Clause, led to the development
of a federal immigration apparatus (Kanstroom 2007, 93-95). This development of
federal regulation is notable in a series of bills passed in the late 1800s, which did two
things, established the ability of the federal government to regulate immigration into the
country, and also established federal authority to remove persons already within the
country (Kanstroom 2007, 95-115). This establishment of federal authority set the stage
for the development of greater mechanisms of border and immigration control that began
to coalesce in the early 20th century.
Border control along the U.S-Mexican border and El Paso have a long intertwined
history dating back to the dawn of the 20th century. General Pershing‘s unsuccessful
pursuit of Pancho Villa across northern Mexico was based out of Fort Bliss in El Paso.
When the Border Patrol was founded in 1924, one of its first two posts was in El Paso,
the first on the southern border (CBP.gov, ―Border Patrol History‖). The earliest
incarnations of regular border enforcement agents in the U.S. were a detachment of 75
mounted inspectors out of El Paso, taxed with patrolling the entire U.S.-Mexican border
(CBP.gov, ―Border Patrol History‖). It is interesting to note that this patrol, born of the
U.S. Immigration Service had a mission of stopping undocumented migration, much as
today, but focused on stopping Chinese migration through Mexico, not Mexicans
themselves (CBP.gov, ―Border Patrol History‖). Indeed, the Border Patrol would remain
fairly small for much of the first half of the 20th century, numbering between fourteen and
fifteen hundred in the 1940s, and during that time was more focused on smuggling
operations, rather than immigration (CBP.gov, ―Border Patrol History‖). The
organization‘s focus began to change in the 1950s with the passage of a 1952 bill
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allowing the apprehension of undocumented persons in country, the Border Patrol was
given this role of immigration enforcement and bringing with it a gradual shift in
emphasis toward the southern border (CBP.gov, ―Border Patrol History‖).
While there had been concerns about the presence of Mexican immigrants in the
U.S. during the Great Depression, one of the key moments in seeing border enforcement
agencies mobilized against this population came with 1954‘s Operation Wetback. This
federally coordinated action in California, Arizona, and Texas saw the Border Patrol
work with local law enforcement to round up and deport tens of thousands of
undocumented Mexicans in the U.S. most of whom were employed in agriculture
(CBP.gov, ―Border Patrol History‖). This special deployment of federal resources,
including some military assistance, foreshadowed the future of immigration enforcement
on the southern border as large scale, involving the vast majority of the national Border
Patrol existing at the time, and acting in a quasi-military fashion (Handbook of Texas
Online, ―Operation Wetback‖). This operation seems to have set both undocumented
Mexican immigration as a national priority, and the old enforcement approach of seeking
to round people up once they had entered the country. Indeed, the shadow of Operation
Wetback is still with us today, whether as seen reflected in the many smaller scale
immigration raids that occur across the country, or in the rhetoric of many of the most
extreme anti-immigrant segments of American society who seek a repetition, or even an
expansion of such a program today.
Several important changes happened to border and immigration policy in the
1960s that set the stage for future patterns of immigration and enforcement. First was the
end of the Bracero program, a guestworker program for Mexican labor that had been in
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place since World War Two. This program had provided a legal channel for temporary
migration of laborers from Mexico into the United States, and ending had two important
consequences, it made legal migration into the United States more difficult, and made
such migration of longer duration. Following the end of the Bracero program was the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which removed the national quota system first
established in the 1920s (CBO 2006). It replaced this, however, with a hemispheric
quota system that was the first time that immigration was restricted in the western
hemisphere (CBO 2006). While this change opened migration to the U.S. from a number
of places that had been previously restricted, the hemispheric quotas were not enough to
keep up with demand to immigrate. As a result of this, undocumented immigration
emerged as a much larger trend in migration to the United States, particularly among
people from the Americas. While this trend took some time to emerge, it was a distinct
and pressing political issue by the 1980s.
With the immigration reforms of the 1960s leading, in part, to increased
undocumented migration from the Americas, this role of the Border Patrol, and general
emphasis on border control and capture of undocumented immigrants grew significantly
stronger in the second half of the century. Indeed, because of ramped up immigration
enforcement paired with President Nixon‘s War on Drugs, declared in 1969, this period
has seen much of the militarization that has occurred on the border (Dunn 2009, 15).
What one sees as a result of the combination of the expanding role for border
enforcement is a massive increase in the size of the federal customs, immigration, and
border agencies. The Border Patrol alone has over 17,000 officers as of fiscal year 2008
(CBP.gov, ―Border Patrol Overview‖). This growth has come as part of a consistent
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trend to increase a border policy of immigration deterrence and the capture of
undocumented persons. This increase in enforcement has been consistent across political
parties, whether pushed through to appease nativist sentiment, or used as a bargaining
chip to secure a liberalization of immigration policy. This growth of the police forces
such as the Border Patrol has also been met with the deployment of military or paramilitary resources to the border (Dunn 2009, 15). While these resources are often used in
support of police operations, performing tasks such as reconnaissance, the potential exists
for increased use of these resources on the front line, an unnerving prospect given their
track record.
Trends in Border Enforcement from 1993-Present
Indeed, it is the last three decades that have seen border enforcement be deployed
much more aggressively than in the past, marked both by the massive increases in agents
and resources, but also by changes in tactics. Continued concerns over immigration led
many in the early 1990s to consider the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA) legislation, which legalized millions of undocumented persons already in the
country, a failure because it did not stop future undocumented immigration (Martin 1994;
Van Den Berg 2009). Around this point, in 1993, there was the implementation of a new
strategy by the El Paso sector of the Border Patrol. Operation Hold the Line, originally
Operation Blockade, took almost all of the sector‘s resources, which had been deployed
to track down undocumented persons once they had entered the U.S., and redeployed
them directly on the border in El Paso, a tactic called linewatch, where officers sit
overlooking the Rio Grande, literally watching the border for any undocumented crossers
(Dunn 2009, 51-96). This operation was designed to deter the flow of migrants through
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urban El Paso, hopefully stopping crossers, but at the very least, moving them to much
less hospitable desert and scrubland surrounding the city (Dunn 2009, 60-61). Although
it was met with initial hostility from directors in the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS), Hold the Line presented the Clinton Administration with an excellent
political opportunity to address public concern remaining from IRCA, an opportunity
they quickly seized upon (Dunn 2009, 77-80). As a result, Hold the Line like operations
were imitated up and down the border, most notably with Operation Gatekeeper in San
Diego (Dunn 2009, 80; Nevins 2002).
And, while this shift in tactics has dominated enforcement along the southern
border since its implementation in the fall of 1993, undocumented immigration has
continued unabated. This has led to the continued, and if anything more rapid, build up
of a police presence along the U.S.-Mexican border in response to what many view as
continued policy failures rooted in the failure of IRCA. The Border Patrol more than
doubled in size during the 1990s, mostly to meet public demand for these more
manpower intensive operations (Orrenius 2001). They have since more than doubled
again to their present level of about 17,000 (CBP.gov, ―Border Patrol Overview‖). The
1990s also saw the introduction of widespread use of military forces in support of Border
Patrol operations, a tactic that has had significant public support, but turned tragic with a
1997 shooting death of a U.S. citizen teenager in rural Redford TX by U.S. Marines
supporting Border Patrol operations (Dunn 2009, 166). While military involvement in
the frontlines of immigration enforcement was greatly curtailed after this incident, it has
started to reemerge in recent years, particularly with the deployment of National Guard
units to the border, where they fill a variety of roles (Dunn 2009, 180-181).
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This buildup of a militarized police presence along U.S borders has been
extremely selective however, almost entirely focused along the U.S.-Mexican border.
Before 9/11 there were 350 Border Patrol agents deployed along the entire U.S.-Canadian
border, and five years ago only 1,000 agents were deployed there (U.S. Border Patrol
2004). This means that the vast bulk, over 80 percent of Border Patrol manpower has
been deployed against Mexico. This is even though there is little to suggest that drug
interdiction from Canada is proportionally that much smaller, and, in terms of the antiterrorism justifications used for increased border enforcement since 2001, the only
notable terrorist activity apprehended entering the U.S. by land, was apprehended along
the northern border (Leiken and Brooke 2006). These massive increases in resources for
the Border Patrol also come as there has been an underinvestment in Customs workers for
the ports of entry, meaning that lines of legal trade, commerce, and migration have been
ignored, even as the U.S. tries to make undocumented and illicit processes more difficult
(Peters 2008). While such resource decisions do not have much impact on long-term,
long-distance migration into the interior of the U.S., they have significant economic
impacts on communities based around constant cross-border trade, transport, and shortterm flows of people.
More important than the impacts on local communities, and this is certainly not to
dismiss such impacts, which go well beyond those listed above, are the impacts of these
strategic shifts and resource deployments on the migrants themselves. The fifteen year
period since the introduction of Hold the Line and Gatekeeper, has been a period of never
before seen death along the U.S-Mexican border. Death rates for migrants entering the
U.S. over the southern land border more than tripled between 1992, the last full year
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before implementation of a linewatch oriented approach, and 2002 (Massey 2007).
Indeed, estimates state that about 5,600 people have died crossing the U.S.-Mexican
border in the 15 years since Operation Gatekeeper was undertaken in San Diego (Jimenez
2009). These deaths come about as a direct result of one of the Border Patrol‘s goals
with linewatch strategies, the diversion of migrants away from urban areas and into much
more hostile terrain (Dunn 2009, 178). This diversion has left migrants at much more
risk during crossing, exposing them in the summer to extreme heat and dryness, and in
winter to deadly cold, or in south Texas forcing them to navigate the Rio Grande at much
more difficult crossings (Cornelius 2001, 670-671; Sapkota et al 2006, 1282-1287). The
conditions migrants face, and the amount of death and injury that they accrue presents an
obvious humanitarian crisis and many immigration scholars and activists would argue, a
violation of fundamental human rights as well (Dunn 2009, 177-178).
Underlying this rise in death rates is that diversion, while the main outcome of the
linewatch strategy, was only the secondary goal. The primary goal of linewatch, and of
the buildup of border enforcement, deterrence, has been a failure (Dunn 2009, 205;
among many others). While U.S. officials had hoped that the increased difficulty and
risks migrants would face to enter the country would stop some from seeking to cross,
recent academic work has shown that this is not the case. Rather, migrants tend to be
well aware of the difficulties they face in attempting to enter the U.S., but are distinctly
not deterred by such efforts (Massey 2005a; Massey 2005b; Massey 2007; GAO 1994,
23-25; Stone 2007; U.S.C.I.R. 1994, 25-26). Most migrants are driven by economic
concerns, concerns that are not outweighed by those risks (Massey 2005b). It is likely
that only by changing the base imperative driving these migrants, usually, economic
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conditions, would patterns of migration actually change, as we are seeing in the current
economic crisis. Otherwise, with increased enforcement, and the resultant greater risks
associated with crossing the southern border, the pattern that held in the 1990s and early
part of this decade, with high death totals reflecting high totals of undocumented
migration, seems likely to hold.
However, more difficult crossing conditions and the resultant deaths are not the
only ways that undocumented migration across the southern border have changed since
the early 1990s. In general, the increased difficulty in crossing has made migrants more
open to exploitation and abuse. With the increased difficulty in crossing, more migrants
turned to the use of guides or other human smugglers, known by the Mexican slang
coyotes (Cornelius 2001, 667-668; Ruiz 1998, 161). However, these coyotes are all too
frequently lacking in concern for the people they deal with. The past few years have
been littered with incidents where migrants have died in the process of being smuggled
into the U.S., such as a notable incident from 2003 where 19 people died in the back of
an unrefrigerated semi-trailer when temperatures rose as high as 173 degrees (Blumenthal
2006). The increased enforcement regimes have caused the price of hiring a coyote to
skyrocket, from a few hundred dollars a person in the early 1990s, to several thousand
dollars per person today (Ruiz 1998, 161; Massey 2007; Cornelius 2001, 668). These
exorbitant rates put migrants in a position of extreme vulnerability as many either use all
of their resources, or go into debt to finance the trip, an economic position that opens
them to unscrupulous smugglers or employers. Indeed, with such large debt obligations,
migrants can be seriously taken advantage of, put into conditions verging on slavery, as
has happened in Florida (Evans, et al 2003). In fact, given their lack of legal status, many
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undocumented immigrants face situations where they are taken advantage of, or cheated
of wages, and feel that they have little recourse to such abuse.
Furthermore, it is increasingly the case that undocumented migrants to the U.S. do
not enter the country out of status. Rather, recent estimates for undocumented migrant
entry have over half of all incoming migrants entering the U.S. legally, and going out of
status once they are in the country, a process commonly known as visa overstay (Stone
2007). The rise of visa overstay as a tactic for undocumented migrants would seem to
threaten the current approach of immigration control through border enforcement, as the
breakdown is not at that stage in the process. Indeed, this is an approach the efficacy of
which is also made questionable with the rise of professional smugglers noted above.
Some scholars have argued that the beefed up border enforcement has been responsible
for the rise of these smugglers, with migrants more likely to turn to them, to get past the
increased patrols (Cornelius 2001, 666-668). Nevertheless, and even if it has proven
inefficient, there has been one constant in American immigration policy over the past two
decades, increased enforcement along the southern border.
Increased manpower for the Border Patrol, coupled with the emphasis on
linewatch has not been the only form of increased enforcement undertaken in recent
years. Since 2005 there has been a project underway, called the Secure Border Initiative
(SBI), the main component of which, SBInet, has been an effort to create an ‗virtual‘
border (Lipowicz 2007). The contract to develop the entire SBI project was awarded to
Boeing in late 2006 (CBP.gov 2008). SBInet, in particular, has been little less than a
fiasco, with much of the technology developed for the project failing to meet quality
standards or be delivered on time (Dunn 2009, 224 ;Lipowicz 2007). At the same time,
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costs for the project have boomed, from 2-8 billion dollars in the initial contract, to an
estimated 30 billion dollars in mid 2008 (Lipowicz 2008). While such technology would
potentially reduce the need for additional manpower, and make linewatch enforcement
more effective, it does not address emerging trends such as the tendency of migrants to
use visa overstay as a means of entering the U.S.
This addition of electronic surveillance directly on the border is not the only
attempt by the government to use technology in border and migration control. Similar
efforts have been made at ports of entry with the implementation of United States Visitor
and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) and with the Western
Hemispheric Travel Initiative (WHTI). WHTI requires all persons entering the U.S. from
a western hemispheric country to present a passport, or equivalent, upon arrival as a
means of performing more thorough checks on people entering the country (State
Department 2009). This has had some issues with implementation, however, as it
requires a passport even of U.S. citizens, a burden for border residents, especially in the
relatively poor communities along the southern border, and led to delays in
implementation. US-VISIT is a more involved project that seeks to collect biometric data
from all non-U.S. citizens entering the U.S (DHS 2009a; Electronic Privacy Information
Center 2007). This data is intended to be checked against criminal and terrorist
databases, and more relevant to border and immigration issues, create a database for use
in managing exit control (Electronic Privacy Information Center 2007). Implementation
issues similarly delayed use of US-VISIT at all crossings, particularly land crossings, but
has now been put into use at those ports of entry as well. The biggest failure of USVISIT so far has been the failure to implement the exit checks that had originally been
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intended as part of the system, a date for the implementation of this part of the system has
not even been set (DHS 2009a). The system has faced criticism for problems, such as
misspellings of names that can lead travelers to be confused with a watch list and falsely
detained (Electronic Privacy Information Center 2007). Notably for the border, the
program does not require biometric identification for persons holding Border Crossing
Cards (also called a laser visa, it is the equivalent of a business or tourist visa that is good
for a ten year period) and who are traveling within the border zone for short durations
(DHS 2009b).
A related and much more controversial program instituted by the federal
government for border security is the border fencing authorized by Congress in 2006.
This fencing, commonly known as the ‗Border Wall‘ is being/has been constructed on
850 miles of the southern border, representing a significant addition to the walls that had
already been built, most of which had been constructed in urban areas (Dunn 2009, 222223, 249-250). The border fencing was met with opposition from a number of groups
across a broad spectrum, raising objections on environmental, civil and human rights, and
international relations grounds. Objections were particularly strong from border
communities in Texas, where local officials and residents felt that DHS had not
adequately allowed them to comment on the proposal. This became a point of particular
concern after former Secretary of Homeland Security Chertoff waived all applicable
federal law, such as the Clean Air, Clean Water, and National Historic Preservation Acts,
amongst others, to expedite the wall‘s construction, a decision that is not open to judicial
review (Environmental News Service 2008). Several border communities, particularly in
Texas, El Paso being one, brought suit against the Federal Government over construction.
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However, all of these suits were dismissed (Dunn 2009, 259). The lawsuit brought by El
Paso County will be something touched on again later in this thesis.
Additionally, it is important to note the legislative failures of immigration reform
since IRCA passed in 1986. With the public perception of IRCA as failing to stop
undocumented migration into the U.S., paired with security concerns after September
11th, 2001, attempts to overhaul the federal immigration system have notably failed to
gain traction in Congress. Instead, the only legislation that becomes law, if any makes it
through at all, is legislation beefing up the federal border security apparatus. On the
other hand, it is worth noting, that the harshest of the anti-immigrant legislation has met a
similar fate. Most notably, in 2005-2006, H.R. 4437 which would have felonized
undocumented migrants and those who assist them in any manner, and the McCainKennedy bill, a measure that would have opened additional avenues for migration into
the U.S. and given a path to normalization for those undocumented persons in the country
both failed (Sensenbrenner 2005; McCain 2005). Congress instead went for a political
middle ground with the passage of the Secure Borders Act, which authorized the border
wall discussed above (Dunn 2009, 222-223). Indeed, the Congress‘ approach to
immigration policy in recent years seems defined by being trapped in a stalemate, where
supporters of immigration reform, and supporters of greater immigration restrictions are
each powerful enough to stop the other side‘s agenda.
This context is also marked by significant and growing citizen activism around
these issues, in large part because so few feel that the current policy is working, whether
they critique it from the left or from the right. While both pro and anti immigrant groups
have lengthy histories with prior waves of immigrants, this is a relative peak for such
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activity. Opposition to immigration, and to the provision of public benefits to
immigrants, has been a bulwark of rightwing organizing for some time, particularly
emerging in California in the early 1990s, as with the example of Proposition 187. On
the other hand, pro-immigrant groups have been active since the emergence of the
Sanctuary Movement in the 1980s. A pro-enforcement agenda was particularly dominant
in the 1990s in the aftermath of IRCA and before it became clear that the introduction of
linewatch techniques had both serious human rights implications and was not effective at
deterrence. The past decade has seen more balance between the two sides, but in the
context of much more public activity across the board. When we look back on the
national politics of immigration in the 2000s, the two highlights will have been the rise of
the Minutemen as citizens took it upon themselves to watch the border in the face of
continued undocumented migration, and the massive pro-immigrant protests that swept
the country in the spring of 2006.
Emergence of Devolutionary Practices
While many of these trends above have focused on the practices of federal
agencies, especially the Border Patrol, and tactics they have employed, another important
trend to note in immigration and border enforcement has been the devolution of federal
authority over immigration enforcement to state and local law enforcement agencies.
These devolutionary practices generally mirror the broader devolution of governmental
authority that has occurred from the 1980s forward (Staeheli, Kodras, and Flint 1997, xiixxxiii). What is interesting, however, is that they do not represent an attempt by the
federal government to exit the arena of border enforcement; rather, these practices come
in addition to the massive expansion of the federal border control apparatus. This runs in
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contrast to other government provisions, such as social services like welfare or housing,
that have been the subject of devolution to state or local governments in which
responsibility for these services was shifted entirely to the lower tiers of government
(Kodras 1997, 79-96). This would seem to reflect an intersection of two separate sets of
dominant thinking in federal policy making over the past 30 years. The growth of the
federal border control apparatus reflects the general rise of the national security state in
the U.S. On the other hand, many devolutionary practices represent a response to similar
frustrations with government programs viewed as ineffective, in this case in response to
the inability to stop undocumented migration, as with the frustrations that drove the
devolution of social services.
We can see some of that frustration in the fact that much of this devolution has
been driven by the actions and desires of state and local governments. Since the passage
of California‘s Proposition 187 in 1994, there have been a slew of state and local
governments seeking to create and apply their own tools for immigration enforcement.
There has been near constant pressure in many communities across the country to adopt
such policies, pressure that has made its presence known in recent occurrences such as
Hazelton, Pennsylvania‘s 2006 ordinance against renting to, or employing undocumented
migrants, or Oklahoma‘s HB 1804 which denies any public services to undocumented
persons, felonizes provision of any assistance to undocumented persons, and requires
local police to check the status of anyone in the state suspected of being undocumented
(Schorn 2006; Estrada and Oppenheim 2007). Indeed, recent years have seen states
consider and pass dozens of bills each year related to regulating undocumented persons,
while dozens of localities like Hazelton have attempted to use local ordinances to such
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ends (Morse et al. 2009). These actions have been broadly welcomed by the federal
government, which has its own means of trying to engage states and local communities in
immigration enforcement, namely section 287(g) which authorizes DHS to train and
certify local law enforcement officials to enforce immigration law, a job otherwise bound
to federal enforcement only (ICE.gov 2007).
287(g) has met with criticism both from communities that have engaged with the
federal government, and from some in the law enforcement community. Indeed, the
concerns over this are reflective of broader concerns over devolutionary practices in
immigration and border enforcement. The three main concerns surrounding devolution
of immigration enforcement are: the chance of isolating undocumented communities
from local governments, especially police, risky given their vulnerability discussed
earlier; that it places an unmanageable burden upon local law enforcement; and that
immigration and border enforcement is constitutionally specified as a realm of federal
enforcement (Solis 2009). Certainly, these are concerns that communities facing
devolution of immigration would be well advised to consider, but given the, so far,
voluntary nature of this devolution, it is a matter almost entirely in a community‘s hands.
There are also some signs that the push for devolution may be fading, particularly on the
part of DHS, after going through a period of intense promotion in the aftermath of the
failed immigration reforms of 2006 (ICE.gov 2008). In a significant, and high-profile,
move, DHS has decided not to reauthorize the vast majority of its 287(g) agreement with
the Maricopa County (AZ) Sheriff‘s Department (Archibold 2009). This decision is
effectively a public rebuke of the department and Sheriff Joe Arpaio, who have gained
national notoriety for their pursuit of undocumented persons, which has drawn large
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numbers of human and civil rights complaints (Archibold 2009). Whether this move
represents a specific desire to reign in that single law enforcement agency, or represents a
slowing of the entire program is still unclear.
However, community anger over immigration is not the only factor driving the
devolution of border and immigration enforcement; money also has a significant role to
play. Much of the participation by local law enforcement agencies in immigration
activity is driven by the ability to tap state and federal grants by doing so, money that is
used to supplement what are often tight departmental budgets. Indeed, the importance of
such pressure is readily visible in how money from Texas Governor Rick Perry‘s Border
Star program has been spent. A review of all money and resources allocated to that
program showed that the Texas Department of Public Safety had been re-directing
resources allocated to border initiatives to other parts of the state for normal law
enforcement work (Grissom 2009a). Similar studies of local law enforcement agencies
also saw similar patterns of use (Grissom 2009a). It seems apparent then that part of the
success of devolution is that it can buy the participation of local law enforcement,
although apparently it does not get as much in local efforts as it pays for.
A Brief Overview of Border and Immigration Enforcement in El Paso, Texas
Many of the developments in immigration and border enforcement have been
closely tied to El Paso. Some, such as the use of linewatch tactics, started in El Paso,
others have manifested themselves in El Paso in less unique ways, like El Paso County‘s
suit against the federal government in attempt to stop the border wall. Obviously, it does
not make sense to repeat all of the information provided above, but it is certainly worth
noting how some of these trends have occurred in the case study area. If anything, it is
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worth isolating the history of border and immigration control practices in El Paso,
because of their more intense presence in this community for a longer period of time.
Indeed, this intensity in itself is notable, very few other communities, even on or near the
U.S.-Mexican border have the relationship with the border, or with border enforcement
that El Paso has developed over the past century.
The first aspect to realize when looking at the relationship between El Paso and
border enforcement is how much of the border enforcement apparatus is based, or has
been based, out of the city. As mentioned, El Paso was the birthplace of the forerunner of
the Border Patrol and its main post on the southern border upon founding. While it has
been overtaken by other sectors, such as San Diego, in terms of manpower, the El Paso
sector of the Border Patrol is still one of the country‘s largest in terms of number of
patrolmen. El Paso is also a major port of entry, and has a significant Customs
enforcement presence, as well as other federal agencies that may become involved in
criminal investigations, such as the FBI, ATF, or DEA. Furthermore, Fort Bliss, located
in El Paso, is home to the U.S. Army‘s Joint Task Force North (JTFN, formerly known as
Joint Task Force 6—JTF6), a unit set up by the U.S. military to support drug interdiction
efforts led by civilian border or law enforcement agencies. This drug and border
interdiction unit harkens back to another border oriented military unit based out of El
Paso, General Pershing‘s expeditionary force which wandered northern Mexico in search
of Pancho Villa. While this specific occurrence was some time ago, its impact lasts to the
present, helping suggest a role for the military in enforcing the border. Indeed, we can
see JTFN as a modern-day equivalent to the Pershing Expedition, helping set the
precedent for military involvement in border and immigration enforcement that has

34 | H e y m a n

become so much more prevalent, and widespread across the borderlands, over the past
few decades. Finally, beyond interdiction itself, El Paso and the surrounding area is
home to significant migrant detention facilities, and to a significant portion of the
immigration court system that hears their cases.
Beyond the presence of enforcement organizations, other approaches to border
control also have their roots here. Urbanized portions of El Paso have had fencing since
the 1970s, and while this was not unique to El Paso, nor was such fencing as
sophisticated as current approaches, it again helped set a precedent for tactics such as
fencing to be used across the borderlands. Furthermore, as Tim Dunn profiles in a recent
book, the specific set of reactions to ongoing Border Patrol practices by El Paso residents,
helped move the new local Sector Chief to adopt linewatch tactics in 1993 with Operation
Hold the Line (originally Operation Blockade), a move that was ended up quickly
emulated across the U.S.-Mexican border (Dunn 2009, 77-80). In this change in tactics
we can see trends such as the displacement of migrants from core urban to outlying rural
communities, or even further into the barren desert, and then the beginnings of
subsequent redeployments of Border Patrol resources to outlying stations to address those
changes (Dunn 2009, 166-169). In the end, almost everything that we observe as result
of current Border Patrol enforcement practices today, in places across the border, was
first evident in the aftermath of the implementation of this strategy in El Paso.
The other aspect of note in El Paso is the history and continued presence of many
non-governmental organizations active around border and immigration issues. Indeed,
this community has a lengthy, if not entirely constant history of activism around the
border, especially from the 1990s forward. As Dunn profiles, El Paso was one of the first
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communities on the border to challenge abuses that came with border enforcement,
activism that ironically contributed to the rise of current enforcement techniques, but
nevertheless a strain of activism that has continued almost constantly to the present
(Dunn 2009). Indeed, El Paso has developed a broad array of community activists and
non-governmental organizations that address each step in the migration and border
enforcement process. There are organizations focused on ports of entry and customs
issues, detention issues, rights abuses in the course of enforcement, and with the
fundamental emphasis on constantly increasing border enforcement itself. And these
organizations represent a broad range of community actors as well, from the Catholic
Church, and other local religious figures, to local immigration and civil rights attorneys,
local business leaders, to local law enforcement figures, local politicians, academics, and
people who simply are residents of communities that deal with these enforcement
regimes. As it stands, the only group that is lacking a serious presence in the current
group of actors around immigration and border enforcement are anti-immigrant groups.
While the Minutemen made some effort to enter the area in the mid part of the decade,
local participation was low and the group quickly retreated.
In the end, with this combination of local activists and a large border and
immigration enforcement presence, El Paso has developed a highly sophisticated local
discourse on these issues, many engaged actors, and complex patterns of action. It is
lasting; neither the enforcement apparatus, nor the activist groups look to be going
anywhere in the near future. Furthermore, it is a vital discourse, one with significant
implications for human and civil rights, and of importance not only to communities in the
borderlands, but across the country. With this in mind, the questions of how exactly this
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discourse and related political-organizational practices emerge, and where they can go
from here, are issues that will be tackled in the other sections of this thesis.
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CHAPTER THREE
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Overview
This thesis assesses the likelihood of a 'progressive' border and immigration
reform emerging out of the current politics of the border and immigration in El Paso.
However, this is a very broad concept to analyze, almost impossibly so in its current
configuration. What is needed then is to clarify this question, and ground it in what we
know of these debates so far. It specifically evaluates ‗borders‘, but in El Paso, as in
many other cases, the ‗border‘ is more than just a line in the sand, and the question must
entail an understanding of what borders are themselves. It looks at scale, but scale is a
broad topic by itself, with vagaries of its own that must be addressed. It answers
questions about the interactions between governments and communities, but to do so then
it must also have an understanding of what forms have been taken by prior patterns of
interactions and what these forms have entailed. It seeks to appraise the chances of a
'progressive' reform, but before that the obvious question needs to be answered, "What is
a 'progressive' reform?" The setting of the story is delineated, as is the significance of
what is at stake in its telling. What is missing though, is how to read it, the prisms and
lenses that need to be harnessed to obtain a clear, comprehensible understanding of what
is going on. These lenses then are what we can find here, the insights into what to look
for and the guide to what we look at.
The following chapter is composed of five thematic subsections. The first deals
with issues of how society constructs place and specifically applies those ideas to how the

38 | H e y m a n

border has been and could be constructed. The second examines how scalar issues have
played out in looking at border and immigration enforcement, adapting the concept of
‗glocalization‘ to the border, and then looking at the impacts of the devolution of
enforcement. The third subsection looks at how government and community groups
interact, paying particular attention to power relations where one element of society
guides the actions of another, and to how activism can counter such effects. From there,
the fourth subsection presents an idea of border and immigration enforcement and reform
through the application of a ‗progressive‘ ideal focusing on human and civil rights issues.
Finally, the fifth subsection synthesizes important points from the prior four subsections
and builds a vision of what a geography of progressive border and immigration reform
looks like. This subsection combines the lenses provided in the prior four subsections to
guide the reader going through the analysis by providing both a vision and questions to
address the opening thesis question of the thesis about the chances for a progressive
reform. While these subsections are broken up thematically, they gain power from being
in conversation with each other, something that should be kept in mind both in the final
subsection.
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(RE)BORDERING
Boundaries or Gateways?
Borders exist, in one sense, as lines on a map, delineations of authority and
control, they mark spaces. Yet borders also exist as much more, or much less, as they do
more than just mark spaces, they influence the creation of places, places both near and
far. To understand borders then is to try and understand broader ideas of how places are
formed in peoples‘ minds. While borders may use natural features as their limits, they
themselves are not natural, and the processes by which they are assembled are key.
These processes often reflect conflict and compromise, dominance and subordination,
access and barriers, among others, competing dualities, whose balances reflect different
imaginations of different communities. Yet we must understand that the processes are
not uni-directional, rather bordering and re-bordering processes reflect Edward Soja‘s
socio-spatial dialectic where places and society work simultaneously to influence and
reproduce each other (Soja 1980, 208). In doing so, we must not only be focused on the
border itself, but rather we must seek to include the communities that it shapes, and that
in return shape it, coming then to a broader concept of a ‗borderlands‘. By understanding
the processes of bordering and re-bordering, we can look at how it can be possible not
only to propose new policy for border and immigration enforcement, but imagine an
entirely new, fundamentally more progressive, U.S.-Mexican border that represents a
break from the oppressively envisioned border of the present.
Spaces, Places, and Borders
―Place…is a processual, polyvocal, always-becoming entity…The same physical
site may be dreamed, ignored, appropriated, or simply lived differently by different
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individuals or groups simultaneously‖ (Price 2004, 1). There is nothing natural, or even
simple, about the construction of place. Each person, each segment of society
experiences place differently, and while a single vision of a place may end up being
dominant, it is not alone. The interactions around the formation of place are crucial, as
through them places are imagined, landscapes constructed, results that in turn mold the
interactions that help define the place, and the cycle repeats itself dynamically. As Price
says:
Rather narratives about people‘s places in places continuously materialize
the entity we call place. In its materializations, however, there are
conflicts, silences, exclusions. Tales are retold and their meanings wobble
and shift over time. Multiple claims are made. Some stories are deemed
heretical. The resulting dislocations, discontinuities, and disjunctures
work to continually destabilize that which appears to be stable: a unitary,
univocal place. (Price 2004, 4)
This dynamic force at play in defining place is an interesting and important one, as it
allows a fundamental idea of hope at play. If place is continuously dynamic, then with
enough contestation, even oppressed groups can challenge fundamental aspects of their
communities by contesting the dominant vision of a place, fostering their own instead.
Space is a more abstract concept, linking places that may not feel immediate
connections to each other. Price, citing the work of Edward Casey, concludes ―Place is
prior to space, and indeed space is derived from place‖ (Price 2004, 11). Yet, with the
emergence of larger, more complex patterns of human organization, particularly with the
rise of the nation state, we see these broad spaces emerge as key ways of seeing the
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world, or parts of it. This idea of space as a ―pure, formal essence‖ is important to this as
it creates the idea of homogeneity that is key to the legitimate identity of the nation state
(Price 2004, 11). Spaces wipe away those characteristics that define places as unique,
leaving what remains as an indistinguishable, unitary mass. This is where borders come
in, the lines that demarcate these broad homogenous spaces of the state, that are needed
to tell the space of one state from that of its neighbors, and that allow the state to turn
these spaces that it has imposed into places of its creation. Quoting Price again,
―Geopolitical boundaries are central to the modern project of nation building precisely
because they function to purify and stabilize a collective sense of self through both the
erasure of internal difference and the demarcation of a constitutive outside through the
expulsion of Other nations‖ (Price 2004, 9). Certainly, as Price argues, geopolitical
borders are not the only way of interpreting borders, but this is the form that has become
dominant in the area around the U.S.-Mexican border, with most of the internal social
divisions rooted in, or at least drawing on, this geopolitical divide.
Indeed, the presence of this space derived boundary has a distinct role in how the
places it impacts are shaped, particularly those near its physical presence. As Price
argues, borders are important as spaces for development of identity (Price 2004, 9). To
this end, their ability to assist in constructing identity is not limited to those identities that
are in line with that of the space the border serves, they can also provide a bulwark for
the development of identities that either seek to define alternative spaces or to overcome
those spatial definitions altogether (Price 2004, 9-10). These identities in turn are crucial
to how people imagine and interact with the border, both processes combined providing a
clear example of the socio-spatial dialectic in action, as borders-in-place, and people-in-
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place impact each other in reproducing each other (Soja 1980, 208). This dynamic
interaction between borders, place, and identity is key to the matter at hand in El Paso, as
this interaction fundamentally shapes the intergovernmental interactions, and interactions
with the community that offer a potential for progressive reform.
The potential for progressivity in these dynamic interactions comes from the fact
that spaces are fundamentally comprised of an aggregation of places, even if the space
tries to impose a degree of uniformity over those constituent places. Indeed, through the
lens of the socio-spatial dialectic, we see further linkages between social structure,
through identity, and the places and borders that comprise these spaces. Since it is
possible to re-imagine places, the basic spatial unit of this structure, it is possible to reimagine the entire construct, place, space, and borders alike. As Price says, ―boundaries
and meaningful physical features of the land in question depend to a great extent on
whose vision is prioritized…such [precise] boundaries do not exist because a stable sort
of place itself does not exist [emphasis in original]‖ (Price 2004, 7). This is powerful in
its implications for reform, especially reform driven by border communities. Inherent in
this is an idea that reform is not limited to altering current practices; it is not limited to
merely making enforcement better. Rather, it provides the potential for the border to be
re-imagined, and re-created in a way that moves it away from those practices, as a
conduit rather than a barrier. The implications of such a re-creation of the border as a
place suggests a much better long term ability to shape a progressive borderlands.
Certainly, we can see examples of this contestation of place succeeding, at least
partially, both on the border and elsewhere. The art of Marcos Ramírez ERRE is a
prominent example of how the places of the border are becoming contested. His work
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examining the U.S.-Mexico border forces the viewer to at the very least call into question
the common perceptions of place that have been created to separate the two countries.
Perhaps his best known work in this regard, the 1997 installation Toy-an Horse y Trojan
Horse, a double headed Trojan horse placed on the border at the crossing between
Tijuana and San Ysidro, forced the viewer to consider the relationship between the two
countries and how the other country is perceived by its neighbor (Ramírez 1997).
Although Ramírez‘s art is only an opening shot in the contestation of a place, it is
certainly a demonstration of the potential to create something different and of the fact that
a desire to do so exists in the borderlands. For an example of where the contestation of a
place has gone far enough to result in changes to the definition of a place, we can look at
Lexington, Kentucky, which has seen successful efforts to acknowledge the history of the
Black community in the city (McCann 1999). In Lexington, the shooting death of an
eighteen-year-old Black man, led a series of protests and riots in ―White‖ spaces of the
city, such as Downtown, that eventually led to the greater acknowledgement and
inclusion of Black Lexingtonians in this space (McCann 1999).
Trends in Bordering and Re-Bordering
As scholars have noted, there appears to be a fundamental paradox in the current
trends shaping the U.S.-Mexican border. Three major trends are apparent, each bringing
their own pressures on how the border operates, pressures that tend to contradict each
other, contradictions that cause confusion and waste. These trends, as Price identifies and
summarizes them, reflecting the general typologies of other border scholars, are
―globalization‖, the idea of a ―borderlands‖, and that of the ―nativist reprise‖ (Price 2004,
88). ―Globalization‖ as a trend related to borders de-emphasizes the nation state in favor
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of specific places of production and consumption and seeks to reduce barriers between
those places (Price 2004, 88-89, Heyman 1999, 288-289). The idea of a ―borderlands‖,
different but related to how it is used above, is a place where the border is not a divide,
but a source of a culture in-between those of the U.S. and Mexico existing as a link
between the two, a gradient between two spaces on either side (Price 2004, 89-90, Vila
(2000) offers an interesting and important complication on this perspective). Lastly, the
―nativist reprise‖ is a trend that seeks, even through use of force, the maintenance of the
border as a boundary between two non-intersecting homogeneous spaces, and is the trend
which has dominated the national conversation within the U.S. in recent years (Price
2004, 91; Heyman 1999, 89; Nevins 2002, 111-122; Andreas 2000, 7-9).
An emphasis on a borderlands culture, as Price defines it, is essentially an
extension of the possibility for border communities to question the existing definition of
the border, and propose their own definition that was discussed earlier. This thrives off
the movement between the two countries that brings cultural blending between the two
respective interiors (Price 2004, 98). It essentially is a celebration of the role of the
border area as a gradient between the two countries. It also comes as a rejection of a U.S.
society that has broadly oppressed the border, and its residents, politically and
economically. Instead, it is an attempt to create an area that connects the U.S. and
Mexico, while simultaneously existing outside the mainstream of both (Price 2004, 9799). As such, it has been a largely cultural movement, fostering a significant artistic
community (Price 2004, 98). It is an attempt to re-imagine the spaces of the two
countries not as discrete, separate entities, but rather as part of a continuum, one joined,
not separated at the border. While this movement has successfully shaped the identities
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of many places along the border, although this is also not as deep as many promoters of a
borderlands ideal would like to think. Vila, in particular, sees many practices in
borderland culture that serve to reinforce the separation between the U.S. and Mexico,
often outcompeting the drive for a more open, transnational border culture. Given this
internal conflict, it has not been able to, as of yet, affect significant changes to
enforcement practices along the border itself (Vila 2000, 1-20).
In sharp contrast to the potential transnationality of the borderlands culture is a
resurgent nativism, that shows its presence not only on the border, but across the United
States. That this feeling is not limited to, or even focused on the border, does not do
much to limit its effects there, as over the past 15 years it has led in shaping national
discourse and policy about borders and immigration (Price 2004, 91, 113-117; Heyman
1999, 289, 292-295; Nevins 2002, 111-122; Andreas 2000, 7-9, 85-89, 93-100). In many
respects this is a reaction to a combination of two factors, the systemic failure of past and
current enforcement approaches to successfully deter undocumented migration or border
crossing, and a reaction to economic upheaval caused by globalization (Heyman 1999,
289, 292-295; Andreas 2000, 7-9, 85-89). Notably, although Nevins sees similar
outcomes, he sees a slightly different cause, not that globalization is provoking short or
medium term bursts of nativism, but rather that it is a core essence of the nation-state to
pursue and naturalize such endeavors at control (Nevins 2002, 10-14).
Either way, this trend has sought to alter the border in that it wishes to make it
even more of an impermeable barrier than it ever has been, and likely could be. This is
the envisioning of a border with little to no room for any movement across it, even legal
movement, but rather a barrier between two idealized discrete nation state units. This
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intense belief in the desire to maintain a discrete, controlled nation state has fueled the
intensification of border enforcement, desiring more patrolmen, more equipment, more
militarization until the border is impenetrable, the nation state a fortress (Price 2004, 91,
113-117; Heyman 1999, 289, 292-295; Nevins 2002, 111-122; Andreas 2000, 7-9, 85-89,
93-100). This sentiment has fueled public anger over past immigration policy, such as
IRCA, leading political figures on all scales to see stricter enforcement as good political
strategy, even if ineffective tactically, and has contributed to the devolution of
immigration and border enforcement (Heyman 1999, 289, 292-295; Nevins 2002, 111122; Andreas 2000, 7-9, 85-89, 93-100).
In many ways the trends of globalization and the emergence of a borderlands
culture go hand in hand, if unintentionally. These trends, with a shared de-emphasis on
the border as an active barrier, seek rather to make it more permeable, to emphasize
linkages across, the opposite of what is desired by the nativists. This is not meant,
however, to conflate the two, especially as the end result each movement seeks is vastly
different both in goal and scale. For globalization there is visible progress towards the
de-emphasis of the border with the 1994 ratification of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), an accord that made the transport of goods across the continent,
and with that the flow of capital, a much easier task. The overarching concern with a free
flow of trade has led to a trend of light inspection regimes, and has sought to provide
resources to ports of entry to facilitate increased flows, not to provide increased
interdiction (Andreas 2000, 100-106). Indeed, these increased goods flows with
globalization have helped open the spaces inside the borders up to smugglers, both of
people and drugs, as well as to the legal cargos being carried (Andreas 2000, 96-98).
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Globalization, while it has not dominated U.S. domestic conversations over the border,
has certainly been a main driver of policy, visible in the fact that ports of entry, and
workplaces of undocumented migrants, have been able to escape the enforcement
regimes put into place along other parts of the border (Andreas 2000, 100-106).
Government officials, while eager to show voters that they are tough on border issues,
know better than to actually enact policy that would interfere with big capital‘s push to
get rid of the border.
Obviously, there are conflicts between these trends, they do not exist in a vacuum,
but rather interact with each other in ways that are often unexpected. To begin with,
there is an interesting feedback between the nativist and globalization trends, where the
impacts of the globalization trend serve to reinforce the nativist trend (Heyman 1999,
289, 292-295; Andreas 2000, 85-100). As a result, even as we see globalist tendencies
grow stronger at the border, with easier movement of goods and people across, we see
those actions provoke intensified efforts to make the border impermeable, at least
between ports of entry, even though those efforts are at the same time undercut by
globalization. We see a borderland culture develop, and emphasis on transborder
identities and interactions grow, even as in many border cities and towns, the
enforcement apparatus and supporting industries provide a major source of employment
and economic growth for these communities. Nor are border places uniquely constituted
of one trend or another, but rather, as elaborated by Price, are polyvocal, representing to
some extent the presence of all of these forces interacting and competing for the ability to
reproduce the spaces, places, and the border itself, in their own image (Price 2004, 1).
The efforts to create a more progressive borderlands, and with it more progressive border
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and immigration policy, must start in border communities themselves, a contest between
these three forces, and even as Vila notes, within those forces.
Place—Looking Forward
As Price and Soja each elaborated, places are dynamic, given to change, and
constantly reproducing both themselves and the social structures they support (Price
2004, 1; Soja 1980, 208). As such, it is possible to contest the way a place is constructed,
and to actively seek to create a better place. Through activism and imagination it is
possible to promote and create progressive places that seek to improve people‘s lives.
Borders can also be shaped through this process, as they are part of a spatial structure
fundamentally rooted in constructions of individual places. As a result, we can imagine a
way in which the entire place-border unit can be contested, a much more powerful chance
for a progressive future than one where it is only possible to change enforcement policy,
and not the underlying structures. Indeed, we see three current trends in this re-bordering
process, globalization, cultural borderlands, and neo-nativism. While these are not the
only possible futures for the border, they hold the dominant paths for its near-term future,
creating a border place increasingly marked by a paradox of ties economically and
culturally to the places across the border, a state of transborderism, and a state of seeking
increasing impermeability and intense enforcement, looking to create a fortress nation
state. What needs to be looked at is how local communities and different levels of
government interact with these trends, and negotiate them in the possibility of shaping a
more progressive future for the border.
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SCALE AND DEVOLUTION
The U.S.-Mexico Border—Intersecting Nations, Intersecting Scales
One of the defining areas this project explores is the impact of scale on the
political interactions that define border and immigration enforcement in El Paso, Texas.
The role of scale as demonstrated below complicates our understanding of immigration
politics in the United States. International migration is obviously a global process, and
while most of the movement through El Paso is dominated by just two nations, the U.S.
and Mexico, these are not the only countries involved, something even more the case
elsewhere. Yet even with migration comprising this global process of movement it is
important to keep in mind that it still occurs in specific places, and has impacts in specific
places. Whether it is through the flow of remittances to communities in El Salvador, an
increased Border Patrol presence in El Paso, or an influx of Mexican immigrants in
Liberal, Kansas, the impacts of migration are felt by people in discrete places across the
world. On the surface, such interactions between localities and global processes would
seem to fit nicely into the language of globalization.
However, in the context of the politics of immigration and border enforcement in
El Paso we can complicate it further. Foremost, as mentioned earlier, U.S. immigration
and border policy has been set by the Federal Government for over a century. This
Federal role means that policy making largely happens at a national scale, involving
national level discourses and setting practices for the entire border. This picture of
Federal control is complicated in itself by the turn of the U.S. government from the 1980s
to the present to increased devolution of federal authority. This trend towards devolution,
discussed earlier, has introduced state and local governments into the border and
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immigration policy making picture. Indeed, devolution has created the new great
battlefield over immigration policy, with the legitimacy of state and local roles in the
process hotly contested. Nor, as mentioned earlier, has devolution removed the Federal
role in all of this, rather what emerges is a very messy picture of a plethora of federal,
state, and local actors all taking their own policy approaches to border and immigration
issues. It is an even messier picture when considering that these scales can, in practice,
be mixed. For instance, you may have a pro-reform organization working at the local
scale in one case acting on local enforcement, and in another on federal enforcement.
Actors looking to shape policy need to be able to engage at all of these levels, and it is
certainly the case that gains at one scale can be undercut by losses at another.
With all this going on, it is essential to have a fundamental grasp of concepts of
scale in order both to understand the actions governments and activists are taking, and to
be able to judge the chances of progressive immigration reform. For the purposes of this
thesis we will largely be ignoring the global context of migration, instead focusing on the
national, state, and local processes at play in El Paso. With this in mind, this section will
focus on two scalar concepts that can help shape our understanding of border and
immigration issues: glocalization, a concept that allows us to connect a broad scalar
context to a narrower one, and devolution, a policy process by which policy set at a broad
scale comes to demand a local level of enforcement.
What Geographers Mean When They Talk About Scale
Scale is not a given. There is nothing about the world that naturally sorts it into
the national, state, and local levels that this thesis will discuss, something particularly
evident when thinking about the local. For how should local be defined in this case? At
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the county, or at the city? Maybe something smaller, such as a neighborhood, or larger,
and include all of southern New Mexico and Ciudad Juarez? What one must recognize in
looking at scale is that, much like the concept of place, it is a socially constructed entity,
varying from context to context (Marston 2000). Furthermore, the way that scale is
constructed has material impacts on the spaces and places it both includes and excludes
(Marson 2000, 221). Much recent work in geography has focused on how scale is shaped
by global capitalism, a line of thought that serves to inform this thesis, particularly the
role of globalization on the border as discussed in the prior section (Marston 2000, 221).
However, the derivation of the scales used in this thesis is relatively straightforward, as
they are the scales of political operations that encompass El Paso, Texas: local—the city
and county, state/region—the State of Texas, and nation—the United States. There is one
other that will also be discussed, the region, in this case consisting of the ‗borderlands‘, a
constructed scale that will be useful to deconstruct here.
While the other three scales discussed all derive from the practices of local
government, the emergence of the ‗borderlands‘ gives a good idea both how scale is
constructed and the implications of how scale matters in the possibility of ‗progressive‘
reform. To quote Marston:
…the particular ways in which scale is constructed – are tangible
and have material consequence. In other words, scale-making is not only a
rhetorical practice; its consequences are inscribed in, and are the outcome
of, both everyday life and macro-level social structures. Finally, the
framings of scale – framings that can have both rhetorical and material
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consequences – are often contradictory and contested and are not
necessarily enduring. (Marston 2000, 221)
The borderlands is a scale that encompasses the dual existence both of a border, but also
accounts for the areas of settlement that are both near and tied to that border. As a scalar
entity it links these places based on their relation to the border, but the implications are,
as Marston points out, not only in the rhetoric of how a place is categorized. Rather, the
implications of the borderlands is that by pointing to the close relationship between these
communities and the border one can see how border and immigration enforcement
practices spur political activism in the borderlands communities. Part of being in the
borderlands means being exposed to border enforcement, however, by creating the scalar
entity of the borderlands, the scalar frame that is created gives the community the chance
to contest the practices of that place. We can see this in the way that the borderlands
exists outside of the established political scales. In this way, we can see that the social
creation of place and the social creation of scale are linked, as place informs scale and
vice versa, so that contesting one can mean contesting the meanings of both.
Adapting Glocalization to the U.S.-Mexico Border and Immigration Context
Glocalization may seem an odd concept to try and adapt to this issue, especially
given that its conceptual intent is to minimize the role of the national in the emerging
framework. As originally presented, the concept states, ―political economic forces
driving globalization that are simultaneously making both the global scale and also
subnational metropolitan regions more important…whereas the national scale is
becoming less important‖ (Sheppard and McMaster 2004, 16). This would seem to be
the opposite of what we are looking for, since with immigration and border issues, rather
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than the national being diminished, the national is dominant. In the application of
glocalization though, we see corporations whose actions are shaped by this process
described as ―intensely local and intensely global‖ (Cox 2002, 86). Here is where we can
find the similarity to immigration and border policy. Traditionally, policy in this area has
been restricted to the national scale, while enforcement and its impacts have been highly
localized, whether in a crossing like El Paso, or even along the entire southern
borderland. It is the intensity of the process conveyed by the term glocalization that we
are after, as it links the two scales, broad and narrow, by the intense focus of the process
in those two particular scales. So rather than glocalization proper along the border, we
have a sort of ‗nlocalization‘, if you will, where the national and local scales are linked
by being the intense foci of border and immigration policy and enforcement decisions. In
the end, the concept of glocalization is not useful because of its application to
immigration and border issues, but rather because it so well encapsulates the symptoms
of the traditional linkages between the national scale and the local scales at which
enforcement operates.
Furthermore, we see patterns of behavior in border and immigration enforcement
much as we see the behavior of corporations described under glocalization. In this
pattern, we see corporations described as ―must be global in reach but must tailor their
products to local tastes‖ (Herod and Wright 2002, 9). We can see similar behavior in
immigration and border enforcement, with examples such as the development of
Operation Hold the Line in El Paso which was specially adapted to the conditions in that
area, and specifically was, in part, an outgrowth of earlier community concerns.
Mirroring this adaptability and focus on the local, we see a focus on the national. Most
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immigration reform, and many restrictionist, efforts have been centered on policy
development and lobbying in Washington D.C., the center of the national level apparatus.
Until very recently, the effort has been to revamp national policy, whether through IRCA,
HR4437, or proposals like the Strive Act, and efforts in this area are still intense.
Additionally, under this framework we see an isolation and exclusion of states, the
middle scalar unit, from developing immigration and border policy, much as we see an
isolation of the national scale, the middle scalar unit in the original usage of the concept.
We can clearly see, in these examples, the holding of that basic pattern of glocalization,
where there is intense action at the broad and narrow ends of the scalar spectrum, with an
un-engaged middle. So even while it is a stretch to apply a strict concept of glocalization,
the similarity in the interactions between the local and the national in immigration and the
local and global that the term describes would seem to present a useful term to describe
the scalar link that we see on the U.S.-Mexican border. By replacing the global in
glocalization with the national and creating ‗nlocalization‘, we can adopt its framework
to describe interactions around border and immigration policy.
Complications from Devolution
This adaptation of the glocalization concept, while it does a decent job describing
historic patterns of scalar interaction between the national and local scales in shaping
immigration and border policy and enforcement, does not hold up quite as well when
looking at the past 15 years. The breakdown in this earlier model comes with the
appearance of devolutionary trends in immigration and border enforcement, just as in
other areas of what had historically been federal responsibility, such as welfare provision,
or prison provision. As discussed earlier, devolution is the process of shifting
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responsibility for service provision from the federal government to state and/or local
governments. This is significant in that it complicates the ‗nlocalized‘ model created
above by doing two things: 1) it shifts focus away from, at least, the federal end of the
national-local relationship postulated above, and 2) part of that focus in turn gets put on
state level authorities, which previously had been disengaged. Both of these
complications represent breaks with the description of ‗nlocalization‘ that had been
adapted to border and immigration policy and enforcement. The above model is not
entirely broken though, since, as noted earlier, the devolution that we are seeing with
border and immigration issues has not seen a falloff in federal involvement. Rather, the
devolutionary process is interjecting three additional relationships to the previous federallocal relationship, a relationship that still holds as the most significant, but not the only
one. These others are federal-state relationships, important both for the administrative
and legislative actions that can be taken and because of the electoral college as a political
arena, state-local relationships, and local-local relationships, the latter two placing a
greater emphasis on the legislative and administrative actions.
Nor is the emergence of these new relationships entirely discordant with the
federal-local relationship that defined ‗nlocalization‘. To some extent, if we follow the
earlier proposal that devolution has followed from local discontent with the results of
federal policy, then we can see the devolution as a result of local action in the
‗nlocalized‘ context. We can draw a similar conclusion about the role of federal action to
promote acceptance of devolution around border and immigration enforcement, seeing
this as a result of federal action under that model. The same actors as were in the prior
framework are here driving the devolutionary processes we are seeing, but rather than
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acting in concert with each other, they are acting in concert with actors newly introduced
to border and immigration issues. The new relationships created through this
devolutionary process muddle the picture, they both open up new avenues for groups,
governmental and non-governmental, active around border and immigration issues to
pursue their interests, but also give them new areas to react in order to protect those
interests. It is worth noting that the ‗nlocalized‘ framework developed above does not
disappear in the presence of devolution, the federal-local relationship is still the most
important in making border and immigration policy and enforcement, since the federal
government is still the largest actor, and the impacts of these efforts are still localized.
What it does though is subsume it into a broader set of inter-related multi-scalar relations,
where that federal-local relationship, while still the largest, is not the only one.
The Current Devolutionized Framework
Mathew Coleman has been at the forefront of laying out the implications of this
scalar devolution of immigration enforcement authority. Coleman particularly notes the
acceptance by federal authorities of local law enforcement as a tool for use in
immigration enforcement as leading to a ―new localized or rescaled geopolitics of
immigration policing‖ (Coleman 2007, 56). This is exactly the emergence of new interscalar relationships discussed above, yet even here it is important to note the federal role
in sanctioning these developments. As Coleman goes on to say, ―my goal is, first, to
refuse the state writ large as the only meaningful scale at which governance regarding
immigration is operative, and second, to explore the local as something more than a site
nested neatly and subordinately within the national‖ (Coleman 2007, 56). While in the
‗nlocalized‘ framework, the hierarchy of influence between the national scale and local
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scale had not been drawn as distinctly, what Coleman discusses doing is complicating the
basic duality of scales it focused on. Admittedly, there are some problems with
Coleman‘s analysis. His argument emphasizes the ongoing process of localization of
immigration enforcement, something that certainly is happening with devolution,
however, by presenting this as an entirely new phenomenon he fails to adequately
recognize the prior localization of immigration and border enforcement in the
borderlands itself. The process Coleman discusses is only new in the context of the
interior. By only emphasizing the role of the federal scale in immigration and border
issues, ignoring its connection to the local, if admittedly a smaller local, Coleman glosses
over the experiences of border communities in addressing interactions with immigration
and border enforcement.
The more interesting, and important point that Coleman is making is that this
change of scales may well provide many more communities with an experience of these
practices. As he says, ―In other words, these new spaces of immigration geopolitics
suggest that the border—and border enforcement—is increasingly everywhere‖ (Coleman
2007, 64). This exposure of the interior to border and immigration enforcement practices
has the potential to drastically change their relationship to the border, and it certainly
seems to make the experiences of communities and activists in the borderlands much
more relevant to the rest of the country. Coleman also notes the emergence of ―an
uneven urban geography of immigration law enforcement which is more strict in some
areas than others‖ (Coleman 2007, 66). This fact that the nature of federal devolution is
uneven, makes the political geography of immigration even more complicated and harder
to read. It is the case though that such an uneven geography offers examples of
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resistance, and seems to increase the ability of communities to contribute to policy
making conversations, in a way not as prominent when the relationships of border and
immigration enforcement were more limited to interactions between the federal
government and the U.S.-Mexican borderlands. While Coleman does acknowledge that
the borderlands continue to be the center of enforcement, even if he otherwise does not
deal with them, he correctly points out that the growth of interior enforcement is a critical
issue facing how we look at geographies of enforcement. Given that this is the case, it
seems of particular import that we look at the experiences of border communities and
activists so that they can help inform other communities in the interior, especially since
devolution does carry an opportunity for resistance.
Webs of Scales
Obviously scale has a significant role in looking at immigration and border issues.
The importance of scalar considerations are made only more evident by the complications
caused by the devolution of immigration enforcement. While prior to this, immigration
and border enforcement had been closely tied occurring along a connection between a
federal/national scale of policy making and localized enforcement/adaptation, devolution
introduces a much broader web of scalar interactions. Further complicating this web is
the fact that the transnational scale also has a significant role here, although one that this
thesis will not explore in depth. This scale serves to inform much of the rhetoric about
human rights, a key concept in the push for ‗progressive‘ reform, and one which exists
outside the concept of the nation-state and the scales that go with it. Furthermore, this
thesis does not discuss the current and potential roles of Mexico in shaping border and
immigration policy, although there certainly is one. While there are scalar interactions
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both up and down that need to be noted, this thesis will only engage those from the
nation-state down.
In that web, one must now pay attention to policy making and interactions
between the national, state, and local levels, a much more dynamic and unclear picture
than in the past. As noted, this has significant implications in where immigration
enforcement occurs, as devolution has delinked it from the border(lands). What we see
then is a picture where the border is no longer as dominant as it once was, a picture where
we must start to pay attention to enforcement policy and practices in states and localities
in the interior. However, this web of interactions is not without opportunity for resistance,
perhaps even stronger, more vocal resistance than has been voiced in the past. In this
context, the experiences of border communities, and border activists, having dealt with
localized enforcement and its impacts, have a great deal to contribute to the places where
immigration enforcement is an emerging trend. Indeed, border experiences become even
more important when the possibility of border-like conditions expands inward from the
margins and looms over everywhere.
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COMMUNITY-GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIPS
Many Actors, One Stage
Even in the limited scope of El Paso, there are a plethora of people, officials, and
organizations interested in shaping the future of the border. While they may not all be in
agreement about the policy they want instituted for border and immigration enforcement,
they do agree on one thing, the people setting that policy should listen to them as they do
so. Key to understanding this situation then is comprehending the forms that these
interactions between non-governmental actors and government take. Worth noting are
how non-governmental bodies engage both with the communities that they represent, and
with the governmental bodies they are trying to influence. Differences in these
approaches can in turn shape the potentials for change that exist as a result of those
efforts. Indeed, as this thesis tries to seek the potential for progressive reforms, having an
understanding of these differences is vital to answering that question. This section then
aims to explore the two main models of interactions between community interests (not to
be confused with Community Organizing, which will be discussed later) and the
policymakers they seek to influence, and the three forms of power that are wielded as
these sides attempt to shape policy.
Two Models of Organizing Community-Government Interactions
There are two broad ways to look at interactions between governments and
community groups, an Interest Group (also called pressure groups) model, and a
Community Organizing model. While most definitions of interest groups would include
the activities covered by the Community Organizing model, there is a literature around
each with notable differences in the group practices they discuss. Unsurprisingly given
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this, the two models are not entirely discrete, and organizations in practice often hold
elements of each. There are important differences between the pure models of the two,
though, both in how they engage the public and engage government officials. These
differences have important implications in shaping both the political activity of these
organizations and their fundamental ability to shape their environments in their preferred
manner. Each model also has its own connotations in the minds of the public,
understandings that in turn shape how effective the groups can be. Interest Groups,
particularly those representing business interests, have drawn significant criticism from
both the public and political figures, while scholars are more mixed (Wilson 1990, 1-6).
Community Organizing can also be seen as achieving more for the community it
represents, but at the same time has a tendency to be seen as needlessly confrontational,
and sometimes, depending on the nature of the organization, even disconnected from the
specific needs of the community it serves (Staudt and Stone in Orr 2007, 105). Among
immigration and border reform groups in El Paso, both styles, and their hybrids are
plentiful, a fact that makes having a basic understanding of each, and the normal forms of
interaction each pursues, critical to understanding the practices and efficacy of those
groups.
Interest Groups
Interest Groups can be defined broadly as ―organizations, separate from
government though often in close partnership with government, which attempt to
influence public policy‖ (Wilson 1990, 1). Obviously this is a very broad definition
capturing a much broader range of behavior than would come to mind for most people
when thinking of Interest Groups. Indeed, even in academic discussions, this broad
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definition does not adequately reflect what most scholars looking at Interest Groups. As
Wilson notes, there is dispute on two ends of the spectrum, with questions of, ―how much
political activity is required before an organization [such as a corporation] which exists
for some other purpose may be regarded as an interest group‖ (Wilson 1990, 6-7) or
alternately,
…not all interest groups are organizations. Writers focusing on social
movements, for example, have argued that both those active in any way in
support of the movement and even those in the population sharing the
relevant characteristics of the movement should be understood as
members of the interest group. (Wilson 1990, 7).
In the end, Wilson resolves these issues by choosing a somewhat more restrictive
definition of Interest Groups than he had started with, stating ―…organizations [emphasis
in original] which have some autonomy from government or political parties and that
they try to influence public policy‖ (Wilson 1990, 8). This is still a broad definition, and
one which that will be further refined going forward.
To make these further refinements, it is important to look at the behaviors that the
literature on Interest Groups associates with that specific term. As with Community
Organizing, the definitions of these forms of political behavior tend to be so broad that
distinguishing them requires one to look at the patterns of behavior and terminology that
the academic literature describes for each. One of the crucial characteristics that we can
notice then about Interest Group literature is the degree to which it focuses on the use of
lobbyists. Coordinated, professional lobbying is not the only behavior we can use to
characterize Interest Groups, but it is a typical behavior of such political organizations.
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Quoting Wilson on the prevalence of lobbying as undertaken by Interest Groups we can
see its significance as a form of political activity, ―It has been said that [professional]
interest group representation is now the third largest industry of the District of Columbia‖
(Wilson 1990, 55). One of the important things to note about lobbying behavior is that it
usually is an unaggressive tactic that explicitly does not seek to challenge the system, or
even threaten the policymaker the lobbyist is trying to influence. As Wilson says,
It might be supposed that lobbyists should remind politicians of what the
politician stands to lose if he or she fails to accede to the interest group‘s
demands…this has generally been seen as an unwise tactic…It has
generally been argued therefore that lobbyists should rely on softer forms
of persuasion. Lobbying itself takes the form of polite presentations of
relevant fact and opinion, not of attempts to intimidate. (Wilson 1990, 55)
Indeed, this desire not to offend the policymakers they seek to influence, this
unwillingness to ‗rock the boat‘ is one of the main things that distinguishes Interest
Groups from their counterparts in Community Organizations.
Community Organizing
Given the broad way in which Interest Groups are defined above, groups using
Community Organizing methods could be described as a subset of that category.
However, it is helpful to distinguish them as the behaviors they employ in interacting
with both governments and the public differ greatly from the predominantly professional
lobbying oriented means discussed above, means that do not require widespread
community bases of support. Community Organizing models of policy activism rely on
the presence of large groups of people to provide a resource base for political change
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(Swarts 2008, xviii-xix). The idea is to activate and mobilize members of a community,
the ‗grassroots‘, around issues in a way that makes up for a lack of the resources needed
for more traditional formal lobbying efforts (Swarts 2008, xviii-xix). As a result, while
Interest Group activity may be reliant on its ability to provide technical information to
policymakers as a means of influencing policy outcomes, Community Organizing seeks
to use the collection of people it is able to mobilize as its main tool to effect such change
(Swarts 2008, xviii-xix).
This is most visible in the means by which groups using a Community Organizing
model pursue policy change in a manner that most effectively takes advantage of that
fundamental resource, people. While the Interest Groups discussed above were notable
for the extent to which their activity was based around making themselves helpful to
policymakers as a means of gaining access and providing input into the policy process,
Community Organizing is much more willing to embrace confrontational means of
entering policymaking (Swarts 2008, xxvi). One of the foremost examples of an
organization that embraces a Community Organizing approach is the Industrial Areas
Foundation (IAF), a national organization developed by one of the leading thinkers about
Community Organizing in the United States, Saul Alinsky. Using the IAF as an example
of the Community Organizing approach we see it described as relying,
on trained organizers to build a faith-based power foundation:
congregations affiliate with the organization, and their members, often
lacking political experience, undergo training to speak publicly, engage
with government, and challenging politicians to be accountable for their
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issues, in public accountability sessions that attract extensive media
attention. (Staudt and Stone 2007, 91)
This is a vastly different approach than we saw described with Interest Groups. Indeed,
while the above describes Community Organizing as challenging existing political
systems to meet the demands of the organization, Community Organizing can even go so
far as to challenge the political system if they see that as a needed step to effect their
desired change (Swarts 2008, xxvi). This is not to say that Community Organizing
always results in actions that come into direct conflict with government officials.
However, we can see why there would be a prevalence of such tactics since this is a
powerful approach possible in a situation where the organization has limited monetary
and technical resources, but large population bases to draw from.
Three Forms of Political Power
We can look to a model of power introduced by Steven Lukes to make a
significant contribution to how we can apply and evaluate these organizational models in
looking at their policy effectiveness in El Paso. In Lukes‘ model of power, we see power
relationships exercised in three areas, the ability of one group to get another to act in a
manner against their own interest, the ability of one group to actively avoid action on an
issue pushed by another, and the ability of one group to limit the boundaries of political
discourse so as to suppress some potential issues (Lukes 2005, 25-29, 36).1 This model
represents a powerful tool for analyzing political activity, and, implicitly, non-activity as
well. Indeed, this is its advantage over other potential models of power relationships,

1

To more easily refer to this typology of forms of power later in the thesis I will borrow the language
Trudeau uses when referring to Lukes‘ work, describing the first form of power as ‗direct‘ power, the
second as ‗indirect‘ power, and the last as ‗hegemonic‘ power (Trudeau 2008, 673).
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such as those put forward by Dahl or by Bachrach and Baratz, the first of which fails to
consider any instances of policy inaction, and the latter which ignores how politics can be
framed to prevent some issues from even coming up (Lukes 2005, 14-25). Furthermore,
while we may associate the forms of power described here only with government, such
ideas of power potentially have as much power in describing the activity of other
organizations seeking to shape government activity.
What should be done then is attempt to think out how these forms of power can be
applied to the policymaking interactions that surround immigration and border reform.
As Trudeau argues about service-providing non-profit organizations,
Drawing on Lukes‘ (2005) conceptualization, the point of extensive state
influence describes how government agencies constrain nonprofits‘
abilities to take action directly through procedural rules and
responsibilities that are embedded in service provision contracts and
indirectly through organizations‘ financial dependency on government
funding. Organizations that experience direct and indirect influence of
government agencies on their activities are likely to see the state as
determining the opportunity structures that define the rules of the game by
which organizations play. (Trudeau 2008, 674)
Such limitations are as applicable in the case of organizations looking to affect
immigration and border reform as they are with the non-profits Trudeau discusses,
especially in the case of the many organizations that both provide services to immigrants
as well as wanting to push for these reforms. However, organizations with a role more
purely centered on advocacy, are not as restricted by government power. Indeed, one of
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the goals of these organizations is to flex their own power, on behalf of border and
immigration reform, against a government that may be resistant. The question in such a
situation then is whether such pro-reform organizations can harness enough power to
overcome resistance, active or otherwise, on the part of opposition groups and
government.
The applicability of this concept to such organizations doing so is somewhat
questionable, since Lukes‘ specifically defines his conception of power as something that
causes the affected group to act in opposition to interests (Lukes 2005, 9-10, 30).
However, this is a useful concept to keep for two reasons. The first is that given the lack
of clear public support for border and immigration reform, interactions between proreform groups and those segments of the population not in support, whether undecided or
opposed, may take on many of these characteristics. Second, interactions between proreform groups and the government, given its deadlock on the issue in recent years, may
well take on characteristics that fall along the lines of what Lukes describes. While
Lukes‘ argument, that there are segments of the public kept from knowing what is in their
best interests through hegemonic power, is the case, it would also seem to be the case that
challenging such power would require the use of similar means by the opposition,
similarly working to shape discourses and perceived interests. As a result we are left
with a situation, where even if this application does not fit his intent to the letter, it still is
useful in describing what we see in practice.
And we can see these forms of power applied, sometimes successfully, sometimes
not, in the immigration debates that have occurred since the passage of IRCA in 1986.
Perhaps most notable is the nativist construction of the border, which attempts, albeit
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unsuccessfully, to produce hegemonic power in the discussion of the border that would
exclude thinking about immigrant rights or progressive reform. We can also look at the
federal maintenance of the status quo by constantly increasing resources devoted to
enforcement as an example of Lukes‘ concept of indirect power through the active
resistance of dealing with issues. Finally, we can think of federal efforts to promote the
devolution of immigration enforcement as an example of direct power, with the monetary
incentives provided by the federal government overcoming the best public safety interests
of those communities. These forms of power are not limited to the anti-immigration
forces of the debate over reform, although to this point, they have been more effective at
using such power. Keeping this typology of power in mind will prove to be a useful
analytical tool in looking at activity around border and immigration reform.
Synthesis—An Organizational/Power Matrix
This section has so far presented two different ways of looking at interactions
between government and activists regarding border and immigration reform. There is no
good reason why these ideas should be left separate though. Rather, they can more
powerfully be imagined as interrelated processes, with specific behaviors emerging from
the intersection of organizational types with the form of power being demonstrated. To
do so, we can envision this as a matrix, with the two organizational types, Interest Groups
and Community Organizing on one axis, and the three forms of power, direct, indirect,
and hegemonic, on the other. Given the differences between the forms of organizing we
can use such a matrix to see the resultant differences in behavior when trying to apply, or
react to, those forms of power. Defining and categorizing these behaviors in an attempt
to determine the efficacy of such actions is one of the goals of this thesis. While it is too
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early to get into the specifics of those cells, we can hypothesize some possible general
patterns of behavior that would fit each cell. This table, found on the next page, will be
returned to in the course of the analysis, allowing us a framework to organize the patterns
of behavior found, and to compare it to what we might expect. Of course, we should
keep in mind that organizations use both Community Organizing and Interest Group
approaches, and it should not be a surprise if the analysis finds overlap within this matrix.
With this in mind, we can generate such a diagram:
Pro-Reform

Direct Power

Indirect Power

Interest Groups

-Lobbying to
promote pro-reform
legislation
-Promoting research
favoring reform

-Working to
divert/prevent
political action
behind the scenes

Community
Organizing

-Mass action/protest
-Community outreach
-Media outreach
-Meeting with public officials

Hegemonic Power
-Lobbying aimed at
changing
government
language around
immigration and
borders
-Action to educate
public about
immigration and
border issues
-Attempt to engage
media
-Attempt to train
community leaders
around issue
-Lawsuits

One hypothesis we can generate as we synthesize the forms of activism and of
power into this matrix, is that the different forms of activism may have different levels of
efficacy when acting or reacting to the different types of power. Given the characteristics
of the forms of activism described above, the focus of Interest Groups on lobbying
governing bodies, may well make those approaches more effective than their Community
Organizing counterparts in dealing with situations involving direct or indirect power.
One might expect this, since those forms of power occur in situations where battles over
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specific pieces of policy have already been engaged, a time when the close ties to
government that lobbying develops would be of particular importance. On the other
hand, Community Organizing, with its relative unconcern about confrontation and
challenges to existing governmental patterns, may be more effective in hegemonic power
situations, where groups would be willing to attack the power structures preventing their
issues from having legitimacy in public discourse. This is not to say that either method
of activism is bad. As discussed earlier, the use of these methods depends as much on the
presence of available resources as anything. Therefore, we may well expect to see proreform groups changing tactics between the two methods as the situations warrant.
Furthermore, we need to account for the interplay between this diagram and scale,
which certainly impacts the situations one sees these different groups facing. Primarily,
one needs to note that while an organization may pursue one set of tactics at a given
scale, a different political situation may cause it to pursue a different approach when
trying to influence a different government body. Additionally, we need to note at an
action or coordinated set of actions can likewise have implications in several of the forms
of power laid out in the diagram. This means that one should not be surprised to see an
organization or coalition of organizations operating with different forms of power at
different political scales. Furthermore, an action taken with specific power implications
at one scale may have different power implications at another scale. With this in mind, it
may well serve the interests of border and immigration reform for those pursuing it to be
able to operate not only with different forms of power, but with these different forms at
multiple scales. Ways to maximize flexibility both in tactics and scalar activity would
seem to be key to the successful pursuit of reform.
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Bureaucracies and Community Groups
While the synthesis above, brings the literature discussed into a form that can be
applied to the rest of the thesis, there are two more connections that should be drawn.
The first brings us back to how the definition of Interest Groups excludes pieces of the
government. This idea, while it generally allows the thesis keep its focus on activists
around these issues, should be complicated somewhat by considering the idea that
government bureaucracies often come to act as Interest Group-like entities, even if they
are technically excluded under the definition. One needs to consider that government
bureaucracies tasked with border enforcement, are in a position where they are likely to
be concerned over maintaining or enlarging the size, funding, and thereby status, of their
organization, a point of view put forward by William Niskanen (Niskanen 1971, 38-41).
Patrick Dunleavy put forward an alternate ‗bureau-shaping‘ theory wherein key
administrators, again acting like Interest Groups within government, would manipulate
their roles in order to generate ―small high-powered strategic agencies divorced from all
the messy problems of implementing policy on the ground‖ (Dunleavy 1994, 12).
Dunleavy, in particular, proposed that defense and police oriented agencies would be
particularly given to this form of behavior, which would seem to also provide some
explanation for devolutionary practices (Dunleavy 1994, 12). As a result, we may expect
them to act like Interest Groups within the government, exhibiting similar behavior,
namely, lobbying for increased resources and authority for their specific bureaucracies.
The second point is to link the idea of hegemonic power, and the potential ability
of Community Organizing as a means to challenge that power, to some of Price‘s ideas
about the formation of place. We can view Price‘s descriptions of place as a material
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form of the hegemonic power Lukes describes, given that each tries to squash other
possible points of view or interpretations, rendering them illegitimate and silent.
However, as Price does note, place is constantly contested, and the possibility does exist
in that contestation, for a more egalitarian envisioning of place to be brought forward. If
we think of place and hegemonic power as two sides of Soja‘s socio-spatial dialectic,
then it is possible that by contesting one, you can effectively contest both. This linkage
means that there is great potential in offering alternatives to the existing ways of thinking
about the place that is the borderlands. This is what makes the willingness of Community
Organizing to challenge fundamental structures of society, such a powerful possibility for
social change. With Interest Groups limited by their close ties to government, and so to
existing organizing structures of place and society, the potential for them to bring such
change is severely limited. Community Organizing, without need for such closeness, and
freer to contest existing structures as a result, offers a much deeper potential for bringing
about a fundamental change in the socio-spatial order. This potential for hegemonic
change can replace the practices that so far have shaped life on the border and have
embedded it with a specific vision of disorder and control in the minds of Americans.
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DEFINING „PROGRESSIVE‟—A RIGHTS FRAMEWORK
Defining ‘Progressive’ in Border and Immigration Issues
While the other three topics discussed here provide an overview of how to look at
the processes that are actively shaping the border now, they do not provide a clear
manner of how to go about judging the results. Earlier in the thesis, the aim of this
project was established as seeking a more ‗progressive‘ future for border and immigration
enforcement along the U.S.-Mexican border. Left open in this is exactly what
‗progressive‘ refers to. This definition is critical, as it sets the guidelines for how the
processes visible on the ground in El Paso are to be interpreted and judged. Thus, this
thesis defines a ‗progressive‘ border and immigration policy as broadly accomplishing
two things: 1) providing for active input from and consultation with border communities
that bear the brunt of these enforcement regimes, and 2) taking into account the human
and civil rights of both migrants and border residents. While specific policy details will
vary from proposal to proposal, this definition seeks to be a means of analyzing and
characterizing more broadly. The goal is not to get bogged down in detail, but rather to
assess the chances for that broader category of ‗progressive‘ action. The need for
‗progressive‘ considerations comes in response to major failings of prior immigration
regulation. In the past, immigration reform has been traded in exchange for increased
border enforcement, often without input from the border communities that enforcement
affects. The presence, or lack, of such input can be measured by comparing current
activity to the models of policy making discussed earlier. This, however, is only part of
what we must look at.
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An Emphasis on Human and Civil Rights
The more pressing consideration, and the one to be discussed in more depth here,
is the application of a human and civil rights lens to looking at the interactions around,
and future of, border and immigration enforcement. Consideration of these factors is
pressing because of the human and civil rights problems that result from current
measures. A border and immigration policy that contributes to the deaths of several
hundred people each year, and that has not been changed, even with knowledge of these
impacts, among other problems, is a gross affront to human and civil rights concerns.
Furthermore, on top of this there are myriad other physical and legal abuses of migrants
and borderland residents alike: illegal immigration checkpoints manned by local law
enforcement, coercive deportation tactics, excessive use of force by immigration
authorities, and more (BNHR 2006). That these violations are wanton, unnecessary, and
that victims currently have little recourse after the abuses simply exacerbates the rights
violations committed.
It is a driving concern of this thesis that we move forward with our border and
immigration enforcement, precisely by including guarantees of human and civil rights as
a cornerstone of any forthcoming policy. In making this a key consideration, this thesis
is heavily influenced both by long standing work on guaranteeing such rights, and by an
emerging concern about human and civil rights in academic work looking at the U.S.Mexican border. Such concerns are shaped by the work of scholars such as Tim Dunn,
who has looked at these issues specifically in the context of past enforcement in El Paso,
Joseph Nevins, who has focused on issues around San Diego, Wayne Cornelius, who has
done some of the most detailed work on fatalities crossing the border, Douglas Massey,
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who has been the most high-profile scholar pushing for immigration reform that
considers these rights issues, and Josiah Heyman, who aims to imagine a morally guided
set of border and immigration policies (Dunn 1996; Dunn 2009; Nevins 2002; Cornelius
2001; Massey 2007; Heyman 1998). While these influences stand out, especially as they
are border related, they are certainly not the sum of influences on this thesis, which draws
from a number of scholars calling for greater consideration of rights issues.
To being with, we can look to Don Mitchell for a strong defense of the needs to
consider and discuss rights issues in geographic work dealing with current topics. It is
true that other scholars have argued that discussions of rights can obscure, and gum up
action towards addressing core moral issues facing society, or that the political
considerations of rights make them more given to cooptation and misinterpretation that
would not occur under more direct calls for societal action (Rorty and Tushnet cited in
Mitchell 1997, 119-123). However, Mitchell makes a strong point addressing these
concerns, noting that ―the state has proved itself—precisely through the
institutionalization of rights—to be [the] key protector of the weak…these fragile
victories, incomplete as they are, counterproductive as they may sometimes be, are
themselves protected only through their institutionalization in the state‖ (Mitchell 1997,
123). As Mitchell goes on to note, making a point vital when applied to the consideration
of rights in the context of the borderlands:
…words can instruct and perhaps restrain that police power; they can help
define other institutions of power that may provide a check on the police
power of the state. In this sense, words can provide an invaluable tool for
restraining power, for arraying it in this way and not that. That is
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precisely what ‗rights‘ do: They provide a set of instructions about the use
of power. (Mitchell 1997, 124)
This is exactly what would seem to be needed at the border, a ‗set of instructions‘
regulating the ‗police power‘ of organizations such as the Border Patrol, or local law
enforcement, to guarantee that we do not have such a situation where people are dying. It
is well within our control as a nation to develop these restrictions, and given the moral
imperative to protect migrants from suffering and death, it would seem to make the
exercise of institutionalizing those protections, as rights, worthwhile. The
institutionalization and the protections and legitimacy that these efforts would gain from
codification as rights, is what we need to address the limitations Mitchell begins by
acknowledging. Mitchell presents a strong reason for us to consider a framework that
seeks the establishment of rights, as we look at addressing problems in society.
From this base we can look more specifically at how ideas of human rights can
be applied to the context of the border. Dunn gives a good overview of human rights as
they should be considered when looking at border issues: ―The human rights perspective,
in contrast, maintains that rights are unconditional … In this view one has rights because
he or she is a human being, and though duties [to the state] are important, rights are not
conditional upon them‖ (Dunn 2009, 9). Particularly relevant to a context where people
are dying as a result, directly or indirectly, of state actions, as they are in the U.S.-Mexico
borderlands, is an idea about human rights that Dunn borrows from Turner, ―He [Turner]
stresses the concept of universal ‗human frailty‘ or vulnerability as underpinning the
human rights framework‖ (Dunn 2009, 9). Indeed, it is hard to think of a situation where
a frame oriented at addressing human vulnerability is more pertinent than one where
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people are dying, the ultimate expression of that vulnerability. To this end, Dunn cites
Sjoberg et al.‘s proposition that human rights can provide ―a crucial means for evaluating
organizations and at least potentially holding them accountable, because they provide
widely accepted standards that transcend a specific nation or organization‖ (Dunn 2009,
9). By using a framework for analysis that has standards that ‗transcend‘ as human rights
do, outside observers can gain leverage in doing analysis of border policy, not simply
limited to governmental press releases touting the newest enforcement innovation against
the threat du jour. Not only does such a lens allow for critical analysis of how
government is meeting its policy goals, but it provides a strong academic footing for
critical analysis of the goals themselves.
Human rights literature also provides insights into some of the political
maneuvering that occurs around immigration issues. Dunn, again citing Sjoburg, raises a
concept of ‗social triage‘ that sees the most powerful pieces of a power structure leverage
their advantage so that societal problems can be addressed, but at the sacrifice of the
well-being of the most marginal groups in that structure (Dunn 2009, 9). Given a place
as marginal as the borderlands, for any number of historic, cultural, geographic, and
economic reasons, this particular element of analysis is well suited to look at how more
powerful actors, such as those based in Washington D.C., interact with the interests of a
place like El Paso. Indeed, in a confirmation of the applicability of this sub-framework to
issues of the border and immigration, Dunn cites Bustamante, who points out, that the
lack of human rights protections for migrants is not the result of a lack of international
attention to their vulnerability, but rather a lack of domestic political will in the countries
that must enforce those rights (Dunn 2009, 10). This would seem to constitute a clear
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3example of a situation where social triage is in effect, the elite simply not finding it
enough in their interests to guarantee such protections.
The point of Mitchell in justifying an emphasis on rights as a goal, and the
implications of a human rights perspective in allowing us a framework to judge state
actions along the border, lead this work to urge that strong emphases on human and civil
rights considerations must be at the core of any border and immigration policy going
forward. While this is not a uniform position across academia, alternative frameworks
lack the power to affect the desired changes in border and immigration policy. This also
presents a sharp break with a view of borders held by the state, that emphasizes its own
sovereignty. However, it is the failures of such a system, as demonstrated by the number
of deaths incurred by migrants, which justifies this desire for change. If we are to address
the death and suffering that occurs on the border, then the choice to adopt a rights based
context, more specifically emphasizing human rights, seems a clear one. We can see the
utility of such a framework drawn clear in one last remark by Mitchell, ―social action—
including oppositional work by social movements—always operates simultaneously to
influence the production of law [including rights] and the production of space‖ (Mitchell
1997, 127).
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SYNTHESIS/CONCLUSION
It is important to realize that these relevant pieces of literature do not just inform
what we know of this topic going in, but inform how we view the topic. Essentially, the
four subsections prior, have provided lenses through which the overlapping scales and
political maneuverings around immigration that happen in El Paso will be analyzed.
Furthermore, these are not separate ways of looking at the issue, they are lenses that are
intended to work together, each overlapping and shaping the view of the others. They
gain power from working in this manner, operating together to provide a clearer, more
nuanced view of what is happening. While there has been some synthesis of ideas within
each of the prior sections, there are key points that should be drawn out and reiterated
now that all four frames are clearly established. Indeed, the points of synthesis between
these frames are the points that this thesis will try hardest to analyze, as they overlap with
the intersections of processes, organizations, and events that shape immigration
enforcement in El Paso. The foremost point of synthesis, and the one that drives the
thesis, is that a geography of progressive political resistance is possible, even under the
status quo. Again, while some of these connections have been drawn in earlier sections,
this section will aim to put all of these connections together into one organized vision.
To reach this vision we need to synthesize points from each of the four prior
subsections. Certainly these four points do not convey the totality of what each
subsection says, but they also allow us to go beyond each subsection‘s own realm and
link them together in a powerful manner, a manner that makes the analysis this thesis
seeks truly possible. We take from looking at scale, the idea that devolution presents an
opening for local activism, particularly resistance, in response to immigration and border
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enforcement activities. From looking at how the border is created and managed, we take
Price‘s point that place is a constantly contested idea and as such is open to
reinterpretation or even a complete reimagination, a transformation in practices and
material realities. From looking at interactions between communities and governments,
we take a notion that we can see different forms of community interaction with
government policy, including, more significantly, the hint that community organizing
approaches have the potential to embrace such a reimagination and transformation of the
places of the border and immigration enforcement as Price suggests. Finally, the last
subsection gives a sense of what must drive such a geography, a basic concern for human
rights and community wellbeing.
What we have when these four points are put together is an idea that a geography
of a progressive political resistance to current border and immigration practices is
possible. Price‘s work on place allows us to understand that the way we imagine the
border, as an increasingly militarized barrier, open only to capital and not to people, need
not be the case. We can imagine a different borderlands, and given that place is not
fixed, we have the potential to actually turn that vision into a reality. Indeed, we can note
that such a process is ongoing as it is, there is significant resistance to an increasingly
militarized vision of the border, and of border and immigration policies. Even as border
and immigration enforcement seeks to permeate into the interior, we see localized acts of
resistance that offer a different understanding of what those places could/should be.
Indeed, the devolution of immigration authority to state and local control, while it can
create an oppressive situation that terrorizes communities of immigrants, also offers
communities opportunities to reject such actions in very public rebukes of those
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operations. These rebukes are the challenges to the existing imagination of place that
Price mentions. Furthermore, we can see that community organizing can be well
formulated to promote such rebukes, and by extension, challenge these definitions of
place, made possible by the fact that they do not have ties to existing governmental
structures or societal structures that have acted to build the status quo. Since they do not
have such strong ties to formal institutions, they are freer to voice a reimagination of a
place by the community that fundamentally changes those institutions, able to better
harness their connections to the community and to local political traditions to work
toward a progressive reform.
What we have then is a vision that the current militarized place of the border can
be challenged and a new place created; that, ironically, the devolution of border and
immigration authority has created a situation where communities can more actively
partake in such challenges by rebuking such activities in their communities; and, finally,
that community organizations may be particularly well suited for organizing and leading
such challenges. What this vision has not yet included, is an alternative vision for the
border, and this is the point where the concept of ‗progressive‘ border and immigration
reform comes into play. Given what has happened as a result of current U.S. border and
immigration enforcement, it is necessary to demand reform. However, generic reform
does not necessarily go far enough. While there are certainly reforms possible under the
current system that would alleviate many of the human and civil rights abuses that have
been perpetrated, these are systemic problems and, fundamentally, their resolution would
require the presence of an entirely different immigration and border enforcement
paradigm. A framework centered upon human and civil rights presents this alternative.
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It gives the activism described in the prior paragraph something to envision, something to
build, not only something to tear down. Moreover, this is an important point, for it is not
the case that the militarized place of the border could be removed without a new
conceptualization of the place emerging. Changing the present is only half the battle; you
need to build a brighter future as well.
This synthesis provides something to look for going forward. The aim of this
research is to see the chances of progressive border and immigration reform emerging as
a result of the interactions of different scales of government and community groups in El
Paso, and now we have a basis on which to judge that. We can now ask if El Paso is
interested in challenging the militarized definition of the border, if they are active in such
challenges, if they have the community based infrastructure for such challenges to be
successful, and if they have an alternative vision of the place that would create a
progressive reform. Indeed, being able to ask each of these questions is a significant
refinement over where this thesis started, but a refinement necessary in order to truly and
accurately judge the situation. This then is a vision, and questions stemming from that
vision, that one needs to keep in mind from here out. This is a vision the thesis will
return to in drawing conclusions about the experience of El Paso, and these are questions
that it will return to time and again in the analysis and conclusions of this thesis. Border
reform sounds like a nice goal, but it is a vague one. Now that we have an idea of what
the geography of a progressive border reform might look like, we can actually evaluate
where we are with regards to that goal, and where we have to go. With that in mind, let
us proceed now to that evaluation.
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CHAPTER FOUR
METHODOLOGY
Methodological Overview
This project was conducted as an exploratory case study, aimed at answering
questions about how interactions between different scales of government and nongovernmental bodies create space for a re-thinking of U.S. border and immigration
policy. Preliminary work began on the project in March 2009, with oversight from
Professor Dan Trudeau, of Macalester College‘s Geography Department. Work at this
point was largely procedural, consisting of getting IRB approval for the interview-based
research that would undergird the heart of the project. Summer of 2009 saw field work in
El Paso, Texas, mainly focused on semi-structured interviews with government officials
and local organizations/activists who work on immigration and border issues. Fourteen
interviews were conducted. Field work conducted over the summer also included textual
analysis, focused on political statements which emerged out of these interactions, as well
as research of local news archives, and participant observation with local immigrant and
border reform groups. These multiple methods of data collection were used in an attempt
to both provide greater depth to the case study, and as a means of ensuring validity.
Writing was done, and some follow-up interviews were conducted, in fall, winter, and
early spring of 2009-2010.
Why a Case Study?
Case studies as a form of academic methodology allow significant focused
qualitative exploration of a topic. They allow research conducted in multiple methods
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and from multiple sources to be coherently, and tightly focused around a central theme.
Furthermore, they provide a means of studying answers to questions that are not simple
quantitative matters, questions such as how or why something occurs. While in the
natural sciences an experiment might provide such answers, in the social sciences,
particularly, where experiments are often difficult, if even possible, to perform, case
studies give researchers an ability to investigate and analyze a phenomenon, and more
importantly, a means of answering those questions of how and why. The flexibility of
case studies is essential to doing so, as they are organized not around a particular
methodology, but rather around a topic of study. Case studies allow the study of current
phenomena by allowing researchers to combine a variety of methodologies that otherwise
might not be combined (Yin, 2003, 1-17). Their strength comes from being able to
combine, as needed, survey methodology, interviews, participant observation, document
research, and more; in the end painting a full, rich picture. Importantly, especially for
research in a field such as geography, case studies place particular emphasis on
considering the interconnectedness between a phenomena and the context in which it
occurs. For all of these reasons, it made sense to embark upon a case study.
Conducting a case study, allowed the research to be focused on the series of
interconnections around immigration and border issues, and on how these
interconnections have changed and can change. Given the emphasis in looking at those
connections at how exactly they were formed and are reshaped in the constantly changing
national and local political environments, the ability of a case study to tackle that
question of how proved to be particularly useful. Indeed, referring back to the question
asked in the title of this thesis, the matter of who draws the line is inexorably tied to the
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process of how the line is drawn. Thus, a research framework was needed that would
look at the underlying processes, and doing a case study fit that bill. Furthermore, the
ability of a case study to actively consider the context in which it occurs, rather than
trying to isolate phenomena, is helpful in doing this research (Yin, 2003, 13). The goal of
this study was to be able to look at the impacts of being in a region that has a long history
of border control and border activism. This is especially important, given the past
failures of border areas to exert significant influence over border and immigration policy
decisions, even while they are heavily impacted by those decisions. The kinds of activity
ongoing, and the kinds of activism that have emerged in El Paso, need to be considered in
the context in which they occur, something a case study allows.
Case Study Specifics
Defining the Project
El Paso is a good case to study for immigration issues as it well combines aspects
of being a typical and unique case. It represents an unusual confluence of community
activists and law enforcement institutions, while having to deal with policies and issues
that are the norm for the U.S.-Mexico border. El Paso brings together a wide variety of
governmental institutions, much more than other parts of the border. It is a regional
headquarters for Customs and the Border Patrol, as well as being home to offices for
other related law enforcement institutions such as the Federal Bureau of Investigations,
and the Drug Enforcement Administration, among others. Additionally, El Paso is home
to resources specific to the U.S.-Mexico border, most prominently Joint Task Force
North out of Fort Bliss, a U.S. Army unit assigned to a drug interdiction mission. On top
of the presence of all of these federal law and border enforcement institutions there are
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state and local law enforcement, this project particularly looking at actions of the El Paso
County Sheriffs‘ Department and the El Paso (City) Police Department. The overlap
between all of these law enforcement institutions makes interactions between them
particularly common, and so makes for a robust view of the competition between
devolutionary and ‗nlocalized‘ scalar frameworks.
In addition to the presence of this breadth of law enforcement, there are a wide
variety of other governmental and non-governmental organizations active around border
and immigration issues in El Paso, a breadth and depth that further makes the city a good
place to study. Local government, both the city and county, have been active around
immigration issues in the past, and remain active today. El Paso is home to organizations
looking both to push for policy reform around border and immigration issues as well as a
significant number of organizations active in providing services such as legal aid to the
local immigrant community, free and detained. As such, with this plethora of
organizations, El Paso is a good place to observe the interactions between these different
institutions, both with organizations of the same type, and across a broader spectrum.
Research based out of El Paso allows one to look not only at what individual
organizations are able to do, but what entire communities of activists, government
officials, and law enforcement have to say, and how they interact in setting border and
immigration practices.
Yet as mentioned before, while the extent of these communities is unusual, the
presence of these communities and the border and immigration issues that El Paso has to
deal with are typical of the U.S.-Mexico border. Indeed, the history of these issues in El
Paso and the extent of prior research done offers a good base of scholarship for this work
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to connect with. It is a scholarship, however, that sets El Paso‘s experiences clearly in
line with those of peer communities along the border. What El Paso is then, is a uniquely
large and clear case of the typical. The breadth and depth of the organizations that can be
studied in El Paso make it an excellent case study for looking at patterns of interaction
and tactics around the pursuit of border and immigration reform that can be then looked
for in other locations in the borderlands.
This is not to say that there are not limitations to the case study. Certainly, a
broader study area would have worked, such as including southern New Mexico. There
would have been a number of reasons for doing so: the El Paso Border Patrol sector
includes all of New Mexico under its domain, many communities in southern New
Mexico function as ―poor peoples‘ suburbs‖ (colonias) of El Paso and depend on El Paso
for relevant services, and interactions with Santa Fe would offer an interesting
comparison to interactions with Austin (Nunez 2009, 74). These are all good reasons,
however, given the practical considerations involved in doing this research, it was
decided to limit the scope of the study by excluding New Mexico and instead focus on
doing a more thorough job of looking at El Paso, Texas. Obviously, however, given the
reasons listed above, it would certainly be interesting, and valuable follow-up work to
this research to add the picture of what is happening in those nearby portions of southern
New Mexico.
Data Collection Methods
As mentioned in the overview, a number of data collection methods were used in
this case study. This has two advantages, first allowing a fuller, clearer picture to be
developed of both processes and actions around border and immigration policy and
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enforcement, and second allowing different sources to corroborate each other, lending a
sense of greater validity to conclusions reached in the thesis. In the end, the project used
three data collection methods specialized to gather qualitative data about the interactions
in El Paso: semi-structured interviews with key actors in government and nongovernmental institutions; some textual analysis of local news reports and other
documents produced about border and immigration issues; and a limited amount of
participant observation. While these sources often repeated the same material, they gave
a clear sense of how the interactions around border and immigration issues have evolved
from 2006 to the present.
With the interviews, particular efforts were made to include as many relevant
people and institutions as possible. Early in the summer, a list of relevant people and
institutions was developed to be contacted for interviews. Obviously, it is unlikely that
all persons contacted would desire to participate, as proved to be the case, but the list
developed attempted to account for this by including some degree of redundancy in the
list of contacts. Doing this, made it less likely that any relevant institution or sector
would be excluded. While an interview schedule was developed to keep the interviews as
uniform as possible, they were left semi-structured to be as responsive to information that
emerged in the interview as possible. Interviews tended to be brief, ranging from 45
minutes to 75 minutes, a result of the tight schedules of those interviewed. Interviews
were held at the place of work of the interviewee. In all, sixteen people were
interviewed, two academics, six figures from local politics, two federal officials, and six
local activists. Anonymity was guaranteed in exchange for participation, and material
from the interviews is cited accordingly.
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One of the strengths of these interviews is that they represent, with one
shortcoming, a reasonable cross-section of key actors around immigration and border
enforcement, with a diversity of roles, opinions, and experiences. The biggest
shortcoming was in interviewing local law enforcement, as both the sheriff‘s department
and police department failed to respond to contacts. Obviously this limits the paper,
particularly in looking at important interactions between local law enforcement and
federal immigration enforcement around institutions such as local jails. However, other
officials from county and city government were interviewed, making up some of that gap.
Particular effort was made to ask these officials about issues around local law
enforcement as a way of trying to make up for this lack of participation from the Sherriff
and Police departments. Obviously, however, reaching out to local law enforcement
would be a valuable piece of follow-up research to accompany this thesis. The project
also benefited from soliciting further interview recommendations from the people
interviewed, something that helped fill in gaps in the original list. In all, the robust nature
of the interview sample allows two things for the analysis: first that consistent patterns
across interviews can be noted and examined, and second that points of difference can be
examined that allow an understanding of broad social and political interactions.
The other data collection methods, while important, were designed to supplement
the interviews, which make up the backbone of the data collection for the project.
Documents amassed for analysis include policy statements or resolutions, the content of
which differ little from the interviews, but provide important public formalizations of
positions. Newspaper and other media sources were observed both as a means of
evaluating the role of media in these interactions, and also to corroborate basic facts and
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timelines. Although no formal technique of textual analysis, such as software, was used,
reading and including these sources presented a useful opportunity to check basic facts,
and look at how these groups actively communicate with the public. Finally, the project
included participant observation of several pro-immigration and border reform events that
occurred over the summer. These events offered an opportunity to observe many of the
strategies discussed by groups pushing for a greater role in the policy making process.
The opportunity arose to attend a meeting between Alan Bersin, President Obama‘s
Border Czar, and a broad coalition of pro-reform persons and organizations, the annual
awards fundraising dinner for one of the most prominent local reform organizations, the
Border Network for Human Rights, and a march and rally held in downtown El Paso by
the Border Network as part of a statewide effort coordinated by a group called the
Reform Immigration for Texas Alliance.
Criteria for Evaluation
The final portion of this section on methodology is an attempt to lay out some
standards by which this project may be judged. As it was conceived, this was not to be a
purely academic project, it was meant to be a document that can elaborate the interactions
going on in El Paso around immigration and border issues, and which can be of use to
concerned groups in that community and similar communities along the border.
Certainly, the end product needs to be a fair and accurate assessment of what interactions
are occurring, what impacts they have, and how effective they are. However, given the
situation, that alone is not enough. This project is quite explicit that it is very
intentionally looking at how pro-reform groups can make themselves heard most
effectively in the course of these interactions. This research holds that it would be
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useless, if not wrong, not to engage the moral implications of what it is looking at, and
that such work has a responsibility to try and create a better world.
This should not be considered bias, for a number of reasons. First, it makes no
sense to inaccurately report the findings of the interviews or other research, especially
since an inaccurate view is potentially harmful to the community this project seeks to
help. The second is, that this is not born out of hostility to border security or to the
people who work for the government to provide that security. Given the fact that several
hundred people die crossing the U.S.-Mexico border, that alone creates a moral
imperative to reform our border and immigration strategies to make them safer and more
humane. This project developed in response to that imperative, and is an attempt to judge
the potential for voices of reform in El Paso to engage in this debate on all scales. With
this in mind, it is important that this project be judged along those criteria, as to judge it
solely on stricter notions dismisses much of its fundamental purpose. Consequently,
there are two things this project should be judged for doing or not doing: reporting an
accurate picture of multi-scalar interactions between governmental and non-governmental
entities in El Paso, Texas around border and immigration reform; and then analyzing
those interactions in terms of the potential they offer for progressive border and
immigration reform initiatives to emerge. While the thesis does adopt a specific
framework for looking at these interactions, it avoids bias in how it interprets them.
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CHAPTER FIVE
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Overview
Having established a clear theoretical framework it is time to tell the story of the
cause of immigration reform in El Paso and the borderlands. It is a story told through
interactions, and the lack thereof. It has a wide cast of characters, government bodies
both in El Paso and elsewhere, both on the border, in Austin, and in D.C. It includes
broad and growing networks of non-governmental organizations coming together to look
for a way to push border and immigration reform, and finding increasing strength in their
numbers and organization. It is a story of conflict, but also of cooperation. It is a story of
obstacles, but also of surprising opportunities. This story touches on the key themes
already established, emphasizing scale, the construction of place, the development,
management, and use of power, and a press for progressive reform. One sees the conflict
between ‗nlocalization‘ and devolution. One sees the need not only to change policy, but
to change place. One sees a reform community that has innovatively and effectively
positioned themselves going forward. And yet, this is also a story that lacks a firm
conclusion. The following section allows one to look at what has happened so far, and to
get a glimpse of how things are positioned to turn out, but it is a glimpse that is far from
certain.
This section is broken into four subsections. The first subsection deals with
interactions amongst community groups and pro-reform activists, focusing particularly on
coalition-building and a division of labor, scaling up, and on how these organizations
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effectively harness and use different forms of power. The second subsection looks at
government institutions in El Paso. This section focuses mostly on how government has
responded to devolution, and touches on changes in how local federal agencies operate,
and also on how government fits that organizational/power matrix. The third looks at
interactions between government and pro-reform activists, at how government has been
harnessed by these coalitions, and at the contest between devolutionary and ‗nlocalized‘
frameworks. It closes by taking another look at impacts of a reduced role for local
federal agencies and at how pro reform coalitions use scaling up as a tactic. The final
subsection looks at the disadvantages and advantages of pushing for reform in El Paso,
noting the marginality of the border and looking at factors feeding that, while at the same
time acknowledging the importance of the border as a site where enforcement is a daily,
lived experience for communities.
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COMMUNITY GROUPS AND ACTIVISTS
A Plethora of Actors, a Plethora of Missions and a Shortage of Resources
El Paso is well situated to emerge as a center for activity around border and
immigration related issues in a number of ways. Its presence on the U.S.-Mexican
Border means that the community at-large, and activists are exposed to daily, on the
ground realities of the various policies and practices at play on the border. This in turn
creates a populace more closely keyed into these issues than a city not so situated,
creating a greater base of interest in, and support for, activism around border and
immigration proposals, which may well have material effects on local residents‘ lives.
Furthermore, it is a regional center for many authorities concerned with enforcing border
or immigration policy. This means that people interested in having a dialogue with such
organizations concentrate their activities in El Paso, and reduce many logistical barriers
to lines of communication with those governmental entities. Indeed, El Paso is home not
only to governmental operations focused primarily on the border or ports of entry, but
also includes any number of support facilities for border and immigration enforcement,
such as detention facilities and immigration courts, that need not be at the border.
Finally, El Paso‘s location across from Ciudad Juarez, the sixth largest city in Mexico
and one of the largest manufacturing centers in North America, makes it well suited, not
only to discussions taking place within the American side of the border, but also to taking
advantage of cross border opportunities for dialogue.
As a result of these favorable conditions, and of the broad range of border and
immigration related issues that are present in the El Paso area, the region supports a large
and diverse population of community and activist groups interested in border and
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immigration matters. At least twelve groups are actively engaged around border and
immigration issues in the El Paso area, including southern New Mexico. They are a
broad set, addressing specifics or not-so-specifics ranging from topics such as the size,
number, and staffing of ports of entry, to the treatment of detained immigrants, to the
border fence, to legal aid, to pushing for comprehensive border and immigration reform.
These groups span a gamut of scales, some associated with large institutions such as the
Catholic Church or the American Civil Liberties Union, and others local, rooted in the
populace of the El Paso borderlands. They range in size from a handful of staff, often
overwhelmed in their work, to hundreds of households that can turn out in unison to
make their voices heard. And simply looking at the organizations present does not do the
picture justice; the landscape of non-governmental activity around border and
immigration issues is also filled with individuals with varying degrees of attachment to
such organizations, yet all wanting to be engaged in this process.
There are some similarities between the non-governmental groups and activists
engaged in discussions about border and immigration issues in El Paso. There are no
organized groups active in El Paso pushing for increased border enforcement or for
greater restrictions on immigration, unlike other parts of the border (fieldnotes). Rather
the groups that are active all support making the border more permeable, be it through
increasing existing mechanisms for crossing, all the way to envisioning a wide scoped
reform of border and immigration policy (fieldnotes). The same is broadly true of the
entire activist community in El Paso, including those operating outside of a larger
organization. Painting with this broad a brush is, of course, not entirely accurate, there
are some individuals who go against this pattern, but their impact locally is negligible.
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Generally speaking, though, when describing those organizations and activists in El Paso
looking at border and immigration issues it is the case that as a group they are highly
receptive to a comprehensive reform, indeed, to a progressive reform. The presence of
such groups would seem to bode well for change, although, they are not without other
limitations, and have not always been present in El Paso.
Still, even though comprehensive reform may be a goal that the activist
community holds as worthy, it is not one they all pursue equally, and not without cause.
The range of missions held by organizations active around border and immigration
reform vary widely, as mentioned earlier. All sorts of border related causes are present in
El Paso, causes that look at a wide range of issues, and take a wide range of actions in
response. Some organizations, such as those of El Paso‘s business community are
primarily concerned about improving and increasing the area‘s ports of entry, which are
critical to the economic health of the region (fieldnotes). As a result, even though such
organizations may be open to, even supportive of, broader reforms, their main goal in
working with government officials is to promote greater investment in infrastructure and
resources for ports of entry. Likewise, a legal services provider may well desire
comprehensive immigration reform as it would reduce the underlying need for the type of
services they provide (fieldnotes).
However, such organizations tend to be so overwhelmed by the demand for their
services, especially compared to the amount of resources they have to work with, that
they simply do not have the personnel or energy to divert away from the task of providing
legal aid. To quote one legal service provider,
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…definitely, my ideal would [be] to have the resources to hire someone
whose job it was to engage more in policy work, coalition
building/organizing, and that would be on the local, state, and national
level. And, I would like to be able to have that person go to all the
meetings I‘m invited to, and have all the discussions, and, you know, do
all that kind of other stuff that I can‘t really do. Because, I think that is an
important piece and we‘re just not able to do it. So, for sure on the
national, and even the statewide level, no we are not enough, we are not
able to engage [policy] enough… (Interview in field)
Indeed, it is simply the case that organizations active around border and immigration
issues in the El Paso area do not have the resources to address all aspects of those issues
and to provide all of the services doing so would entail.
Coalition Building
Nevertheless, even with these limitations, most groups want to both stay engaged
with each other as a community, and stay abreast of the work done by other
organizations, particularly work that may impact them or that they would otherwise
support. While no one group, much less the entire community of border and immigration
organizations, is active in all areas, most groups do recognize that each organization
tends to bring its own piece of the puzzle (fieldnotes). Interacting with other
organizations then, is a way to allow a group to put together the bigger picture of activity
around these issues, without that group having to be engaged in all of it (fieldnotes). By
having such interactions and coordination, organizations can gain some of the advantages
of breadth of focus without having to muster all those resources (fieldnotes). Such
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interactions are not necessarily an easy task in and of themselves, especially for those
organizations that are particularly resource scarce or overburdened (fieldnotes). It is not
the case that groups in such a situation do not want to engage with the broader activist
community, no group interviewed expressed such a desire, but rather are limited in doing
so by the scarcity of their resources (fieldnotes). In the end, even though some
organizations face such hurdles, there has been a distinct move toward interorganizational coalition building among border and immigration activist groups
(fieldnotes).
Many of these coalitions fall within an area of activism. For example, many of
the local immigration legal aid providers have contact both with each other and with
service providers in other portions of the country (fieldnotes). Such relationships allow
these organizations to share information and resources, providing a mutual support
network in times of high activity or crisis (fieldnotes). An instance of such support
would include a period following a series of immigration raids in New Bedford,
Massachusetts (fieldnotes). In this instance, the legal aid provider in Massachusetts that
had taken the case of these detainees contacted local legal aid offices because these
people were being held by ICE in the El Paso area. The El Paso organizations were able
to interview and work with the people in detention, gathering necessary material for the
legal work being done in Massachusetts. As a result of this contact, organizations in the
two places were able to work together, each filling gaps that otherwise would have made
the process much more difficult, if not untenable. Quoting one legal aid provider
involved:
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So we were very involved with those raids, we worked with a lot of the
non-profit organizations up on the east coast where we would actually go
to the detention facilities, interview the detainees, try to help figure out
who had kids, parents who were at home who needed caring for, trying to
get all of that information up to the non-profits on the east coast who were
then working with Senator Kennedy‘s office. It was a coordinated
response to that raid, by a lot of organizations. (Interview in field)
One of the important outcomes of such inter-organizational coalitions and cooperation is
that sharing resources and information allows organizations to be more effective in their
mission than they otherwise would be. However, coalitions are not limited to interactions
within a specific realm of activism, they also allow organizations to effectively expand
their realms of activism to include other activities without need for many additional
resources.
The Border and Immigration Task Force (BITF) is one such coalition, bringing
together individuals and groups to work together around border and immigration issues in
the El Paso area. BITF has been the lead coalition in coordinating policy work around
immigration and border reform in El Paso over the past couple of years, organizing trips,
meetings, documents, and more (fieldnotes). While this group came together to pursue
policy changes at the state and federal levels, it has sought, and been able, to include and
involve a much broader set of groups than only those whose focus is around policy issues
(fieldnotes). As a result, a broad set of issues in need of reform and perspectives on how
to pursue reform are brought to the table. The benefits are mutual with groups interested
in exploring policy reform developing a more comprehensive idea of what should be
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reformed and how, and with groups oriented at service provision able to work toward
systemic changes in issues they encounter, rather than just addressing the symptoms. The
system effectively allows policy reform oriented groups a level of detailed expertise they
would otherwise lack, and it allows service provision oriented groups a level of policy
engagement that they desire without stretching strained resources. By doing this, such
coalition building makes the entire push for reform more robust. It makes for policy
proposals that are able to be rooted in very specific policy concerns, and able to address
the specifics of problems, rather than simply being limited to vague, if well intended,
calls for more humane border and immigration policy. Indeed, by linking the basic moral
imperatives of border and immigration reform to such detailed policy changes, such
coalitions have potential to greatly improve the chances for a progressive border and
immigration reform.
Even though El Paso has seen the emergence of inter-organizational coalitions,
with these distinct advantages for the participating groups, such coalition building in
itself is an intensive process that requires a level of dedication and resources (fieldnotes).
Coalition building as a process is intense for clear reasons, it has to overcome barriers to
participation, intentional or otherwise, on the part of all the organizations that would be
included (fieldnotes). Initially, there must be an individual or organization willing to
dedicate the time, personnel, and resources needed to set up these collaborations
(fieldnotes). Following that, in reaching out to others, several barriers exist:
organizations may need to be convinced of the importance of looking at, and thinking
about, issues outside their immediate areas of expertise, and they likewise need to be
convinced of the value of dedicating their own limited time, personnel, and resources to
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working with other groups (fieldnotes). Finally, once a coalition is established, it needs
to be able to keep members participating, and therefore convinced of the benefits of
participation, particularly important since the greatest advantages of coalition building
come when the coalition can embrace as wide a view of an issue as possible (fieldnotes).
Indeed, the breadth and success of El Paso‘s inter-organizational coalitions are as much a
testament to the hard work and dedication of those individuals and organizations involved
in them as anything else. It is this success at coalition building that makes the
community of organizations active in El Paso around border and immigration issues so
interesting, and gives them such potential, it allows a unity of voice in the polyvocal
effort to recast the places and practices of the border.
The Emergence of a Division of Labor
Coalition building in El Paso has had some other interesting impacts on the
activist community, impacts that have importantly shaped how it pursues border and
immigration reforms. Perhaps the most important of these impacts has been how, above
all, coalition building has reinforced the division of labor between the different
organizations. This seems to fly in the face of the coalition building that was described
earlier, one, on first glance, would not expect that bringing all of these different groups
and their perspectives together would lead to more specialization in what the participant
groups do, however, this appears to be the case. There is, however, a logic to it, as
groups that specialize in service provision can engage in the policy process through these
coalitions and so are able to convey their concerns and recommendations to groups
focused on policy work. Thus, service providers do not feel a need, as they might have
otherwise, to engage in such policy action themselves. Without such a perceived need to
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engage in the policy making process, these groups are able to focus their limited
resources on service provision. Likewise, groups focused on policy work are able to rely
on the input of service providers and so do not have to reinvent the wheel in looking at
potential issues to address. They, in turn, are free to focus their resources more on
engaging officials and community members around the policy making process.
Even with this reinforced division of labor, the advantages of the original
coalition remain. Organizations still benefit from the increased flow of information and
expertise provided by the coalition, indeed, the reinforced division of labor, as described
above, is a result of that. One sees that within the coalition, the participant groups can
become more efficient, and are able to work with other organizations to address more
sides of the issue, without any given organization having to sacrifice their own goals.
This is not to say that a group seeking to venture outside of their area of expertise would
not be able to, but rather that they do not need to, and that the activist community as a
whole may be better served by consistency of focus. While the main distinction made
above was between the two rather broad sets of service providers and policy-oriented
groups, the same advantages of coalitions and the resulting division of labor hold within
those subgroups as well. If one group, say a legal aid provider, is in contact and has
access to the work of another organization that does detention monitoring, they may not
see a need to dedicate their resources to detention monitoring themselves, being able
instead, to call on the work of the second group. To the extent that the activist
community benefits from not having to reinvent the wheel, the ability to form coalitions
and to devise a formal, or informal, division of labor is of critical importance.
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The division of labor also promotes interactions between organizations outside of
the formal connection of a coalition. When there is a clearly known division of labor,
groups are able to take advantage of the expertise of others, while in working on their
own, or on shared, projects. For example, the Border Network for Human Rights
(BNHR), a large community-based organization in El Paso and southern New Mexico,
when confronted with a series of abusive immigration roundups in one of the
communities they serve in southern New Mexico decided that a lawsuit was the best
possible course of action (fieldnotes). The group, which had mainly been active through
protests, community meetings, and policy work, had no experience with lawsuits.
However, because of their participation in BITF they had connections to Paso Del Norte
Civil Rights Project (PDN), a legal aid organization that was able to provide the legal
assistance BNHR needed to pursue a lawsuit (fieldnotes). Similarly, BNHR was able to
use their connections to the community to gather information that PDN needed for the
lawsuit (fieldnotes). In this case neither organization did anything that was particularly
far outside their realm of expertise, yet by combining their two different sets of expertise
and resources they were able to work together to pursue a lawsuit that would have been
much more difficult, if not impossible, for either to pursue individually. Indeed, these
efforts proved successful, resulting in a consent agreement signed by the Otero County
(New Mexico) Sheriff (fieldnotes). It is the power of these sorts of connections that so
greatly expands both the potential and effectiveness of the activist community in El Paso,
and in turn contributes so much to improving the chances for progressive border and
immigration reform, the progressive remaking of the place of the border.
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Scaling Up and Branching Out
Coalitions within El Paso have been an important resource for the local
community of border and immigration activists, but, as alluded to earlier, such coalitions
do not need to be limited to one city or segment of the border. Indeed, with the success
of efforts to develop coalitions of border and immigration organizations in El Paso has
come a desire to expand those connections to include other organizations, both along
other parts of the border and in the interior. This is a process with many potential
benefits for participating organizations, particularly those in the borderlands. It is often
said in the circles of political decision-makers in Washington D.C. that immigration
reform will only happen when the interior ‗is ready‘ (fieldnotes). Reform oriented
coalitions that aim to connect the border to the interior, and especially to activity in
Washington D.C. thereby offer much potential both for engaging the interior in the cause
of border and immigration reform, and in reminding those decision-makers that the
border is not a non-entity whose fate is entirely outside its control. Furthermore, such
regional or national level coalitions offer many of the same advantages to local
organizations as do local coalitions. They offer the same advantages of sharing
experiences, of allowing access to different areas of expertise, of helping organizations
develop relationships and coordinate their activities to do things they may not be able to
do on their own. Still, the barriers to such expansion out of the local are numerous, on
top of the other barriers to coalition building between these groups. Nevertheless, these
barriers are starting to fall in important ways, and border and immigration organizations
in El Paso, and across the borderlands as a whole, are starting to inject themselves into
the national conversation about reform as never before.
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As with the formation of coalitions in El Paso, much of the desire to reach out to
organizations in other locations is centered in activism focused on policy work. As
groups in El Paso have become increasingly concerned with developing a progressive
comprehensive border and immigration reform package, part of the comprehensiveness
that implies is illustrated in efforts to engage other parts of the border in this process.
While the early membership of BITF was rooted in the El Paso area, the vision of this
coalition quickly broadened to include organizations from other areas along the border
(fieldnotes). BITF now includes participants from portions of the border in southern
Arizona, and other areas of Texas (Big Bend country and south Texas) and is working on
continued outreach to groups in south Texas, southern Arizona, and the San Diego area
(fieldnotes). This pan-border organizing offers distinct advantages in working to develop
reform. Like the interactions within the coalition described above, this pan-border
approach allows for groups to take advantage of each others‘ expertise and more
importantly allows a policy making process to more accurately reflect the diversity of
places, and of issues, found along the border. BITF, by including all voices in looking at
reforms, can address concerns about ports of entry in cities like El Paso or San Diego,
while also addressing the crisis of migrants dying in the deserts of southern California
and Arizona or in the Rio Grande in south Texas, in all cases keeping a concern for
human rights in mind.
Indeed, BITF‘s inclusive method of generating and pursuing both legislative and
administrative reforms to border and immigration enforcement has created a coalition
successful in engaging immigration reform groups that had become alienated from the
political process. This ability to draw in such groups simply increases the effectiveness
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of the coalition, an effectiveness that is drawn in large part from its ability to allow the
border to speak with a common voice. Rather than having each part of the border
pressing for reforms that target the specific issues they see in that location, BITF is a
vehicle for the border to pool their concerns and to try and see all of them addressed
through common effort. This cooperation promises to be a more efficient route as it
keeps organizations from effectively competing with other portions of the border for the
attention of the federal government. And this aim to present a pan-border approach to
reform seems to have taken root as recent DHS stakeholder meetings in Brownsville and
San Diego have been successful in drawing organizations from across the borderlands,
presenting a common message, rather than these meetings being more limited in scope to
the issues of the places where they occur (fieldnotes). A generalization of issues is
allowed that makes each region no longer isolated, allowing organizations to pursue
better practices across the borderlands and push Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
for overall rather than piecemeal, sector by sector, reforms.
Likewise, such efforts have begun to garner national attention, and have allowed
El Paso organizations to develop greater national connections. El Paso groups have
drawn such attention for two aspects of their behavior: their pursuit of local and regional
inter-organizational coalitions that have been seen as a model to emulate elsewhere, and
their ability to maintain connections between the organization and the community. This
recognition has led to collaboration by El Paso organizations and activists with two
national organizations, the Rights Working Group, a new national coalition of local
immigration and border organizations, and the National Immigration Forum (NIF), a proimmigration reform group largely centered on policy activism in Washington D.C.
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(fieldnotes). In many ways, the Rights Working Group is similar to a larger version of
BITF, although without the focus quite as much on legislative reform. Indeed, it offers
similar advantages to participant organizations that are able to share information and
resources even more broadly, while similarly allowing for more comprehensive solutions
by embracing the experiences of more places. NIF came into contact with groups in El
Paso, particularly with BNHR, as an attempt to reconnect with border and immigrant
communities in the aftermath of the spring 2006 immigration protests as a means of
trying to harness that energy (fieldnotes). BNHR as a particular example of a community
organization attempting to pursue policy change was exactly the kind of organization that
National Immigration Forum was seeking. This contact has been of particular benefit, as
it has also brought BITF into contact with NIF, allowing a means for reform legislation to
now reflect the thinking not only of organizations in D.C., but also of the border and
immigrant communities most affected.
Scaling up to the national level is of particular concern to groups working out of
El Paso, and the borderlands more broadly, as these are areas that, while
disproportionately bearing the impacts of border and immigration enforcement, have had
very little say in sculpting those policies. Indeed, much of the politics of immigration
reform has been interior oriented, focused on legal immigration reforms around
legalization, asylum, and visas, but largely ignoring issues around enforcement and
community impacts. The natural solution to such a situation then, is for the local proreform groups and activists to try and bring their issues to the attention of national groups
and officials, if not achieving reform, then at the very least to try and get their voices
heard. Indeed, this link between the national and local scales that has defined
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immigration enforcement can clearly be seen in the desire of these groups to scale up as
they are trying to do. In this framework, it makes particular sense that these
organizations are pursuing such national level coalitions, as these coalitions represent a
means for the border to try and reach out to the rest of the country to present its
perspective on what should constitute border and immigration reform. Furthermore, in
response to rhetoric saying that reform cannot happen unless the interior is on board,
these coalitions create the possibility for border groups that they will be able to mobilize
support from the interior for reforms that they propose. Indeed, it is easy to understand
why the borderlands would be eager to pursue such coalitions. The question remains
whether they have been able to gain such benefits from these national coalitions.
El Paso organizations, and the border as a whole, have indeed benefited from
these increased connections, able, as mentioned above, to get more language into
immigration reform legislation that reflects reform not only of the immigration system,
but of the border enforcement system, as well as a broader focus on human rights.
However, as with the local level, there is a division of labor in these regional and national
level coalitions as well, one visible in contrasting the two different forms of reform being
sought. The first type of reform, administrative reforms, are changes in the practices of
those agencies charged with border and immigration enforcement and do not require
congressional action (fieldnotes). This type of reform would have significant impacts on
interactions between many service providers and the government agencies they are
focused on, and as a result, the development of proposed administrative reforms has been
a broad process, attempting to remain open to the concerns of as many groups as possible
(fieldnotes). The development of legislative reforms, on the other hand has been a more
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tightly tailored process, reflecting the degree of an inside game needed to try and get
these reforms through Congress (fieldnotes). As a result, where the administrative
proposals are kept as a more open process, the legislative reform proposals, while based
on broad input, have later stages more limited to people and organizations with particular
experience developing and promoting legislation (fieldnotes). This is not to say that one
type of reform is more important than the other, or that other organizations do not have a
role to play in the legislative process, but rather is a reflection of the advantages of
coalitions and the division of labor they bring. Rather than having organizations with
little experience crafting legislative language take the lead on this process, cooperation
between organizations affords them the ability to have organizations specialized in
writing and promoting legislation lead that part of the reform process.
Another aspect of the division of labor, which is reflected in the coalescing
national coalitions that El Paso organizations find themselves in, is the appreciation of
their ability to mobilize community members in protests or direct actions in support of
reform. While there have been D.C. based organizations like NIF pushing for reform for
some time, they have mainly been focused on interactions with Congress and the
Executive Branch, rather than public demonstrations. Likewise, groups in El Paso have
been able to mobilize the public, but have faced limitations in getting their calls for
reform to people in D.C. Through the formation, however, of these national level
coalitions, we see that organizations in El Paso are able to mobilize people as D.C.
desires and in turn their opinions and calls for specific reforms are heard and relayed by
those organizations in D. C. This example of the benefits that groups in each place can
provide the other is a near perfect demonstration of why organizations pursue these cross-
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scalar collaborations, and why they so increase the potential for a progressive border and
immigration reform.
Community Groups and Activists in the Organizational/Power Matrix
Given the role that community groups and activists play in challenging and
reforming border and immigration enforcement, it is important to try and place their
activities in the organizational/power matrix introduced earlier, as a means of judging
how effective we may expect their activities to be. Notably, the organizations active in
El Paso embrace the entire spectrum of actions presented in the matrix. There are
distinctions between where policy centered organizations tend to fall on the matrix and
where service providing organizations fall, the former tending to act more often like
interest groups and the latter more often under a community organizing style. While
tempting to make such distinctions based on the assumed amount of interaction with
government, where one would think that policy oriented groups‘ work with government
around policy reform would make them more interest group-like, compared to service
providers, who would have less contact with government and more with communities,
this does not hold. Indeed, many of the policy oriented groups are also deeply involved
with the community, drawing from them their agenda for reform (fieldnotes). Likewise,
service providers have frequent, if often antagonistic, contact with the government, be it
in court or meetings with officials to request changes in behavior (fieldnotes). Rather
than trying to characterize between those two sets based on their amount of contact with
government, a better means may well be by the degree of antagonism present in such
contact. One often sees service providers often having more antagonistic relations with
government than their policy oriented counterparts. Still, even with this clarification,
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these distinctions are not hard and fast, and, furthermore, seem to be diminished by the
presence of inter-organizational coalitions that tend to allow groups to use methods of
action that they had not previously pursued.
What exists then truly is a situation where the organizations and activists present
in El Paso have the chance, through the coalitions they have formed, to act in any portion
of this matrix. Through the coalition, service providers that normally would not have
much to do with proposing or lobbying for legislation can become tied to such activities,
opening up much more of the matrix to them than had previously been possible.
Likewise, the ability of a group like BNHR to pursue new, more antagonistic tactics, such
as lawsuits, similarly expands the portions of the matrix available to them. What we see
is that, with coalitions in place, no portion of the matrix is out of reach to any of these
groups, they are able to work together to lobby government just as they are able to hold
protests. They are able to work simultaneously with governments and with communities,
a powerful combination. Furthermore, beyond the ability to just respond to government
actions, coalitions allow these organizations to much more effectively develop and pursue
their own vision of border and immigration policy. By bringing the experiences and
opinions of all these organizations together, it is possible to challenge the hegemonic
power of the status quo and develop a comprehensive progressive alternative that can be
promoted to take its place. Because of this ability to both open new opportunities and to
present an entirely new progressive vision of the borderlands, it is hard to overstate the
benefits that coalitions bring to the activities of organizations pursuing border and
immigration reform.
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What then does this mean for the chances of a progressive border and
immigration reform emerging from El Paso? The mix of organizations present in El
Paso, alone would seem to bode well for the ability of border activists to make a
progressive impact on immigration and border policy, able effectively to promote some
good legislation and practices and to discourage the bad. The fact that we see these
organizations working together improves the potential quite a bit. As mentioned earlier,
it is the coalition building between these organizations, both within El Paso and with
other parts of the country that allows these groups to develop and promote a
comprehensive reimagining of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands. And this comprehensive
reimagining of the borderlands is what is needed to effectively allow these organizations
to challenge the systems of hegemonic power that currently pose such obstacles to
immigrants and border residents alike. While the organizations alone would be able to
make positive steps, by acting together, they hold the possibility of a drastically better
future. Indeed, with these coalitions active, a major step would already seem to have
been taken towards a progressive border and immigration reform.
Government—Friend or Foe?
The question above asks the organizations and activists in El Paso to make a false
choice, there is nothing innate about government that would make it either friend or foe.
And indeed, in looking at the interactions between pro-reform organizations and
governments, we see that these organizations view governments both as friend and foe,
and recognize that they are neither friend nor foe. In many ways there is much potential
for government, particularly at the state or local level, to participate in these coalitions
much as any other organization, and indeed, this participation is the case. However,
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adversarial situations are also possible between organizations and governments,
sometimes even between organizations and governments that are otherwise cooperating.
It is the case though that pro-reform organizations have developed and enhanced, through
things such as coalitions, their ability to interact with government, whether cooperative or
adversarial. These relationships will be explored in more depth in the section looking at
community-government interactions. In the meantime, governments are legitimately
actors in this process in their own right and the next section will explore them.
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INTERGOVERNMENTAL ACTIVITIES
A Melting Pot of Governments
Immigration and border enforcement are political issues and reform entails
significant changes in government policy and practices across a wide swath of
governmental institutions. One of the most straightforward places to begin looking at the
potential for reform then, is to look at how different governmental bodies are interacting
with each other around the issue. Indeed, this is a good starting point as it immediately
engages the issues of scale and devolution of enforcement that have shaped border and
immigration issues to this point. Furthermore, even as the synthesis at the end of the
prior section concluded the importance of a community-led effort to redefine the places
of the borderlands, examining the openness of different political institutions to such a
progressive reimagining is still a helpful exercise in looking at the viability and effort of
any such action. We start with government as it is home of the current policy and will
need to be home of the future policy. In many ways, looking at the interactions of
government sets the table for looking at the actions of the community. Looking at these
interactions tells us how border and immigration enforcement works in the status quo,
and reveals dissonance between different governmental bodies, particularly between
different scales, pointing to opportunities for community activism in shaping policy
reform.
Local Federal Activity—All Roads Lead to D.C.
Although obvious, it is worth noting that Washington D.C. is not on the U.S.Mexican border, nor is it anywhere particularly close to the border. This is notable, not
to point out the obvious but rather, in light of the fact that the past decade appears to have
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seen a centralization of federal immigration and border authority in Washington D.C.
Given past patterns, this is a significant development, and one that certainly has the
potential to greatly shape how governments interact with border and immigration issues
(fieldnotes). As was mentioned in the background section, Operation Hold the Line
(originally Blockade) was developed not by Border Patrol headquarters in D.C., but
rather by officers in the field reacting to the specific situation facing them.
Implementation of such an operation required a significant degree of discretion placed in
the hands of those in the field. Still, a situation where authority becomes concentrated in
Washington D.C. is not an unlikely outcome given the highly negative and hostile
reaction of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) at the time. While the
Clinton Administration eventually embraced the operation for political reasons, it met
with significant resistance on the part of agency administrators, fearful of the change it
brought. This discretion, however, seems to be waning in favor of greater control of
operations by administrators in D.C.
Interviews with a variety of people in El Paso highlight this shift and changes it
produces, not only in Border Patrol operations, but also in how the agency interacts with
other people and institutions. Border Patrol sources described the process of how new
border and immigration enforcement legislation or policy is implemented into practice as
being largely determined by the time it reaches the field (fieldnotes). These sources
described this as so:
The greatest opportunity that the Border Patrol has, before it becomes a
[law], is at markup. That‘s the greatest influence, because, when it‘s a
[law] now, its no longer what do you think of this bill, its execution time.
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And here, out in the field, there may be influence as to how we dictate that
policy, but it is very little. When that policy comes out my job is to ensure
that the policy is enforced, same thing with the law. (Interview in field)
In this situation, there is very little room for interpretation or discretion in the field, with
agency lawyers having already put training programs into place that are intended to set
the path going forward (fieldnotes). It seems doubtful that all of the discretion has been
taken out of the system, certainly the past several years have seen significant changes in
immigration enforcement techniques, but it does appear to have been taken away from
the field (fieldnotes). Rather, there is reason to believe that the discretion in the system
has moved to Washington D.C. Indeed, with the creation of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and the reorganization of the INS and Border Patrol into
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the umbrella agency in the DHS that is
home to Customs and Border Protection (CBP), itself, in turn, home to the Border Patrol,
it appears that this reorganization has been used as a means to concentrate agency
authority in D.C (fieldnotes).
This concentration of decision making and authority in Washington D.C. is
significant due to the relative isolation of D.C. from the border. Indeed, while the
isolation of a place like El Paso from the main decision makers around immigration and
border enforcement is a major limitation, which will be discussed in more depth later, it
is an important factor to note here. This isolation has several implications in shaping
practices around border and immigration enforcement. It puts greater emphasis on the
training developed in response to new policy (fieldnotes). This means that training and
practices developed well away from the border guide enforcement along the border itself,
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with feedback from experiences in the field being relatively marginalized (fieldnotes).
What we find then, is a situation where Border Patrol practices are caught in a place
between what agents find in the field and their instructions from D.C. This appears to be
an untenable position as there are notable gaps between official policies held by DHS in
Washington D.C. and actions taken by agents in the field, particularly around complaint
mechanisms that are often very hard for injured parties to access (BNHR 2006).
Furthermore, such centralized control has potential to make local arms of the Border
Patrol less responsive to community concerns as they see themselves in a position where
they are limited by the policy issued by D.C. and their own lack of discretion. This
would appear to be the case, as several local officials described that they did not have
frequent contact with local federal officials about their concerns, and furthermore did not
see such interactions as being particularly useful (fieldnotes). Indeed, we will further
explore all the implications of this centralized authority when looking more closely at
interactions between communities and governmental institutions.
Devolution in Practice—Immigration and the State of Texas
Devolution of responsibility for border and immigration enforcement has been
one of the major changes shaping the border since the mid-1990s. As discussed earlier,
federal policy passed in 1996 has allowed for greater cooperation between immigration
enforcement agencies and local law enforcement under a provision known as 287(g).
Under this provision, local law enforcement can become certified by the federal
government to enforce immigration law without the presence of federal agents,
something that otherwise would be of questionable legality. This has been a mode of
operation very much promoted by the federal government, particularly since the 2006
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failure of comprehensive immigration reform. Indeed, it is a program quickly expanding
beyond 287(g), particularly emphasizing interactions between immigration enforcement
and local jails. Yet such top down devolution of activity around immigration and border
enforcement has not been alone, state and local governments have pursued their own
ways of becoming involved. Such methods have ranged from local ordinances against
undocumented persons, to state funding for law enforcement operations ‗in support‘ of
federal operations. However, these devolutionary practices are not uniformly embraced;
as discussed earlier, instances of resistance are possible. Indeed, looking at El Paso
entails looking at the intersection both of devolution in practice and resistance to such
shifts.
Leading the charge in favor of devolution in Texas has been Governor Rick Perry,
the longest serving Governor in Texas history. Governor Perry has been active in using
discretionary funding provided to his office through the State Department of Homeland
Security, as well as soliciting federal funding, to fund state and local law enforcement
initiatives aimed at border and immigration issues, clear examples of the devolution
discussed above in practice (Texas Tribune 2009). Some of the projects have been
fiascos, such as a two-million dollar federally funded program to install cameras along
the border that could be watched by volunteering citizens over the internet (Grissom
2009a). This project installed only 17 of the projected 200 cameras and led to only 11
immigration arrests, out of 1200 projected at the start (Grissom 2009b). A larger
initiative out of Perry‘s office have been a series of grants to sheriffs‘ departments in
counties across the border starting with Operation Linebacker in 2005 and continuing in a
series of iterations, the current being Operation Border Star (Texas Tribune 2009). These
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operations were intended to pay for equipment and overtime for departments to patrol
rural areas of the border, particularly to crack down on cross border drug trade and other
criminal activity.
They have taken serious criticism, however, for funding roadblocks, temporary
police inspection points, particularly in El Paso County, where residents were harassed
about their immigration status and held extralegally by the Sheriff‘s Department until the
Border Patrol arrived. Indeed, El Paso County eventually ordered the Sheriff‘s
Department to stop such roadblock activity after they were used to make over seven times
as many arrests of undocumented persons as of criminals (Grissom 2006). What we see
in the programs out of the Governor‘s office are interactions between two scales of
government, state and local, that occur on unequal footing. Local law enforcement, eager
to gain new resources such as vehicles or other equipment, or to pay officers overtime,
are essentially bribed into adopting the strings that are attached. Indeed, such a
relationship is visible to the extent that studies of how money has been spent under this
program show that much of it does not go towards the intended purpose of border
interdiction (Texas Tribune 2009). Furthermore, through a situation where funds are
granted for one cause and not necessarily used for that purpose, it essentially allows state
and local authorities to avoid the jurisdictional issues surrounding immigration
enforcement, at least until someone complains. And, notably, these efforts have met with
resistance from local communities and governments, if not always from law enforcement
agencies. As mentioned above, the El Paso County Commissioners‘ Court, the
administrative body for El Paso County, after repeated community complaint, acted to
restrain the use of these funds by the Sheriff (fieldnotes). Likewise, the City of El Paso,
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both through the City Council and Police Department, used this, among other events, as
an opportunity to reiterate their policy of not using local law enforcement for border and
immigration enforcement purposes (fieldnotes).
While the initiatives undertaken by Governor Perry are symbolically significant,
the State of Texas has notably resisted more substantial action, such as those taken by
Arizona and Oklahoma, to move toward criminalizing undocumented persons on the state
level. Indeed, organized, bipartisan resistance in the State Legislature has been
successful in defeating such legislation, as well as legislation that would have mandated
local law enforcement participation in immigration enforcement activities, in each of the
last two sessions, each time without allowing it to be voted on (fieldnotes). Such actions
have been the result of statewide efforts, organized through conference calls at the start of
each session, that have been successful in guiding legislative leaders to divert and kill
such bills by funneling them to particular committees in the State House and State Senate
that have been charged with halting their forward progress (fieldnotes). To this end, the
2007 Legislative session used the House State Affairs committee to kill 93 pieces of
immigration and border centered legislation, and the following 2009 session used similar
tactics in the Senate Homeland Security committee (fieldnotes). Indeed, supporters of a
‗progressive‘ immigration and border reform recognize that in instances such as these,
killing ‗bad‘ bills can be as important as passing legislation that enacts some of those
desired reforms (fieldnotes). In the long run, the role of the State Legislature may be
limited to being a site of such resistance to devolution, as proponents of reform stress a
desire to emphasize the federal nature of this issue (fieldnotes).
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The general failure of the attempted involvement of Texas in immigration
enforcement is a clear example of resistance to the forms of devolution discussed earlier.
This example seems to be of particular importance because of how Texas straddles the
broader internal gradient between the interior and the U.S.-Mexican borderlands.
Certainly, El Paso, given its situation has been highly involved in these activities, both as
a site of implementation and a site of resistance, and has had highly vocal local
discussions around immigration. What is particularly notable is the participation of
political forces out of El Paso in an organized statewide resistance to such devolutionary
activity, an organized resistance that links borderland communities such as Brownsville
and El Paso with interior political forces from areas like Dallas or Houston. It has been
frequently said that immigration reform is not possible unless ‗the interior‘ is onboard,
even as the border clamors for such reform. It would not be an understatement to say that
much of this talk is an effort to dismiss and quash the concerns of the borderlands in
favor of only paying attention to the interior.
What we see in Texas, however, is that when political activism out of places such
as El Paso is engaged with the interior, coalitions for reform and resistance against
devolution is possible, even on a scale the size of the Lone Star State. El Paso and other
border regions of the state alone would not have had the votes to stop this legislation, and
so had to shift scales, forming a state level coalition to stop devolution. Although this
resistance is, as Coleman says, ‗uneven‘ there are two points that need to be taken from
this experience (Coleman 2007). The first is that even if resistance is not achievable
everywhere, or reform achievable at the national level, it is still possible, a not
insignificant fact. The second is that the experience of Texas shows the importance of
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promoting interactions between the borderlands and the interior, rather than isolating
their experiences from each other. Indeed, the actions of the Texas Legislature in the
2007 and 2009 sessions would seem to be an excellent example to attempt replicating in
other states and in Congress. It is indeed a demonstration that a coalition between the
borderlands and interior is both possible and an effective course of action to be further
pursued.
Immigration Enforcement and Local Jails
Recent federal approaches to immigration enforcement have brought an increased
emphasis on local jails and prison facilities, a semi-devolution of federal immigration
enforcement practices (fieldnotes). This has come in two directions. The first
manifestation is through federal practices of sifting through rolls of inmates in local jails
and pulling out those with immigration violations (fieldnotes). Indeed, such programs
have met generally with favorable responses from communities ICE asks to participate,
including in El Paso (fieldnotes). A county official described the situation as such,
…there had been basically an unwritten policy between our Sheriff‘s
department through Leo Samaniego, our former Sheriff, and that has been
carried over to this day by the new Sheriff, Richard Wiles, to allow, INS
back in those days, and now ICE, to check the status of some of our
inmates back in the jail. So they have a process for doing that…
(Interview in field)
It is not without potential problems, however, particularly as people being held in a
county jail, but having not yet gone to trial, face the possibility of being deported by ICE
before their criminal proceeding has even gone to court or has concluded in court
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(fieldnotes). This would also seem to be in conflict with the spirit of El Paso County
Sheriff‘s Department‘s policy, adopted both internally and set by the county government,
of not engaging in immigration enforcement activities (fieldnotes). Indeed, this
contradiction is noteworthy as it is a policy it has otherwise seemed to adhere to closely,
following gubernatorially funded immigration enforcement campaigns of 2005 and 2006
undertaken by the prior sheriff (fieldnotes). The actual presence of such a conflict is
denied as a result of the fact that no county personnel are directly involved in going
through the roster of people in the jails or in taking selected persons into federal custody,
although one can certainly be skeptical of how much detachment such a scheme actually
represents (fieldnotes). This set of interactions around the jail may expand, as well. As
of the summer of 2009, officials from El Paso County and the Sheriff‘s Department were
exploring the possibility of participating in the Federal Secure Communities Initiative,
which would expand the existing practices (fieldnotes).
The other major avenue of intersection between federal immigration enforcement
and county or other local jails is in the detention of immigrants. The sheer number of
immigrants detained by ICE has led to a pattern for years where federal facilities alone
are unable to handle the number of detainees. As a result, there has been a devolution of
the responsibility of holding persons detained for immigration violations, a role often
filled by county or local jails looking to make money off the situation. While this is not a
practice undertaken in El Paso, it is one with notable manifestations in the area. There
are notable local and county facilities contracted to detain immigrants in neighboring
Otero County, New Mexico (fieldnotes). Furthermore, there are billboards around the
city advertising guard positions with the Reeves County (Texas) Detention Facility, a
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facility whose growth is driven by its holding immigrant detainees (fieldnotes). Even
though El Paso County itself does not participate in such an arrangement, the presence of
these other nearby facilities illustrate the presence of this increasingly important
relationship between the federal government and various local governments.
Local Government’s Response to Devolution
Attempts to devolve responsibility for implementation of immigration
enforcement to local government have not constituted a realm of action only on the part
of the Federal Government. Indeed, it does need to be noted that cooperation with
devolutionary processes, so far, have been at least technically voluntary on the part of
states or local governments. One should keep in mind, however, that the large amounts
of money and resources that go to departments that opt to participate can certainly cause
one to question exactly how voluntary such a process actually is. Nevertheless, we need
to note both the activities undertaken in line with a devolutionary federal policy and those
that either ignore it, or are in outright opposition to it. Indeed, it is interesting to note that
while linked, the devolution of immigration enforcement, and the devolution of activism
around immigration issues, have begun to bifurcate as localities such as El Paso have
begun actively harnessing the local scale as a tool for reform.
To some extent, actions taken against the devolution of enforcement have already
been touched on in discussing those devolutionary activities that were undertaken in El
Paso. While the earlier sections discussed the actions of the county to halt ongoing
immigration enforcement activities undertaken in 2005 and 2006, there is one other event
to discuss, the election of Sheriff Richard Wiles in 2006 (fieldnotes). This is an
interesting event in two respects: 1) it showed the desire of the community to reinforce

125 | H e y m a n

the actions already taken by the county in rejecting such devolutionary activity, and 2) it
narrowed some of the differences between the city and county in how they responded to
devolutionary practices (fieldnotes). While devolutionary practices had already come
under fire in El Paso, the institution of resistance to them, through the election of Sheriff
Wiles marks a watershed moment.
Much of the significance of Sheriff Wiles is symbolic, the Democratic party
runoff, effectively a general election for a county-wide position, was between two
candidates who both opposed the involvement of the Sheriff‘s Department in
immigration matters (fieldnotes). Wiles, however, who at the time was Chief of Police
for the City of El Paso, had been entering both the local, and national, spotlights for his
frequent public criticism of local law enforcement being used to enforce immigration
(fieldnotes). While he had certainly had other accomplishments with the El Paso Police
Department, he was able to use this activism as a means of presenting himself as a clear
break with the actions of the prior Sheriff, Leo Samaniego (fieldnotes). This position met
with strong public support, and resultantly Wiles won in a landslide, as the voters of El
Paso County sought to make sure that such resistance to devolutionary practices was
institutionalized in the form of elected officials (fieldnotes). And, indeed, this approach
to the devolution of immigration enforcement has been put largely into effect in the
county, adopted both at the level of the Sheriff‘s Department, and in the County
Commissioner‘s Court (fieldnotes). Certainly, as the discussion of the role of county jails
got at, there have been gaps between some of the rhetoric and reality, however, the
change in Sheriff did bring significant changes in how the Department related to
immigration violations (fieldnotes). Also importantly, the shift has allowed Wiles an
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enhanced platform as a critic of local enforcement of immigration law, his activism
boosted by the fact that his election was so tied to that outspokenness.
Finally, Wiles‘ election has continued a process by which the governments of the
City of El Paso and El Paso County have begun to enter into greater conversation with
each other about how to approach immigration issues. In many ways, this has meant the
County catching up to the City in terms of making policy of its resistance to the
devolution of immigration enforcement. For example, the El Paso Police Department has
had a departmental policy of not enforcing immigration law active since the late 1990s,
something that the Sheriff‘s Department has only adopted since the election of Sheriff
Wiles, who notably had been Police Chief before being elected (fieldnotes). It is
interesting to note this difference in policy approaches, particularly surprising given how
concurrent the City and County are. A notable cause of this is the fact that there is
relatively little official communication between the City and County around this, among
other, issues (fieldnotes). With the two governmental entities not given to official
discussions, the main routes of communicating action around immigration falls to
informal, often interpersonal connections between local elected officials (fieldnotes). As
a result, when there is a situation where such informal connections exist, organized
resistance to the devolution of immigration enforcement is possible from both
governments. Such has been the case over the past several years where connections
between the two governments have led to similar resolutions denouncing local
immigration enforcement and calling for comprehensive immigration reform being
adopted by both governments (fieldnotes).
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Nevertheless, the differences between the policies of the El Paso Police
Department and the Sheriff‘s Department show the weaknesses of having such policies
tied only to interpersonal connections between the City and County. As a result,
situations can emerge where the policies of the two bodies differ greatly, a clear example
of how the unevenness of the devolution that Coleman describes can emerge. Indeed, it
is notable that such informal connections seemed weak between Sheriff Samaniego and
other local officials around the time of the checkpoints described earlier. Such a lack of
connections may well have facilitated the adoption of such actions in the face of the
standing policy of the El Paso Police Department. This reliance on interpersonal
connections can be countered in two ways, the first by creating official policies, as both
the City and County have now done, and the second by formalizing discussions between
the two bodies around such issues. Certainly, the latter method does not guarantee that
the two governments would adopt the same policy, however, it makes it more likely for
them to be able to easily share ideas about potential policy approaches. Furthermore,
given the overlap between the City and County, it seems reasonable to think that actions
taken by one would make sense as actions to be taken by the other. To the extent that the
uneven nature of the devolution of immigration enforcement is a problem, particularly in
the direction of allowing such local enforcement, such a solution as promoting greater
formal interaction between the two governments seems a reasonable solution.
Countering Devolution—Local Governments ‘Acting Up’
The prior paragraphs have largely described how governments in El Paso have
dealt with devolutionary pressures, effectively, if imperfectly, organizing and codifying
resistance to policies that aim to promote local enforcement of immigration law.
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However, in the case of what was described above, these have always been local
governments acting in response to pressures from above, be it from the federal
government or from the state. While certainly important, this is not the entirety of the
picture of interactions between these levels of government. Indeed, El Paso, along with
many other border communities, particularly those of South Texas, has been highly active
in challenging the policies of those other governments around border and immigration
issues (fieldnotes). And much as these challenges have come from the communities, they
have also come from the governments of these areas. One can look at challenges
occurring in three main forms, lobbying and testimony undertaken by local governments,
lawsuits initiated or joined by local governments, and resolutions or other symbolic
actions enacted by local governments (fieldnotes). Further notable about such activity is
that it has come both from local governments, and often from collaboration between local
governments and community groups. Such activity is of particular importance as it
provides a particularly effective means for communities such as El Paso to express an
alternative imagining of border and immigration policy and resultantly of the
borderlands. While the activities described above are mostly important as creating sites
of resistance, and that is also possible with these methods, the power of ‗acting up‘ comes
from its ability to present a different vision. Indeed, while devolution still largely stresses
the power of outside authorities, and still particularly of the federal government, it is
through ‗acting up‘ that the power of the local in the ‗nlocalization‘ described previously
becomes stressed.
The primary means employed by local governments to interact with state and
federal officials to try and shape their actions in more positive directions, rather than just
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resist unwanted action, are through attempts to lobby legislative and administrative
bodies (fieldnotes). Such lobbying can take two forms, either through formal lobbying or
through the provision of testimony to various governmental panels and committees
(fieldnotes). Both methods are employed by both the City and County governments to
address both state and federal officials, a testament to the perceived effectiveness of these
methods at providing a positive vision for policy (fieldnotes). Of course, it should be
noted that these methods are by no means unique to these governments, and so these
activities aim not only to promote a specific viewpoint to guide actions around border and
immigration issues, but to try and raise border and immigration issues to the forefront of
what even gets addressed. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, these efforts to lobby other
levels of government have made significant inroads, and the impacts have been felt
locally as well as Austin or Washington D.C.
It is easier to discuss the testimony undertaken by local officials, as that often gets
a higher profile both locally and in the target areas, whereas the lobbying is often based
out of Austin or D.C. and is a more behind-the-scene process. Nevertheless, such
lobbying is a process local governments have actively engaged in, the past few years
actively seeking border and immigration issues around which to lobby (fieldnotes).
Lobbying activities are undertaken separately by the City and County governments, again
reflecting the importance of any communication, or lack thereof, between the two bodies
in establishing a coherent vision of what the area desires done around these issues
(fieldnotes). Indeed, one would think that possible incongruities between the lobbying
done by the two bodies has the potential to have a significant impact in reducing the
effectiveness of such lobbying around such an issue should there be significant
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differences in the visions pushed forth by the two different scales of government. In each
case, the topics to be lobbied are determined by the governmental body in the time
leading into each session, and must be formally added to an official legislative agenda by
approval of the City Council or County Commissioner‘s Court respectively (fieldnotes).
There is an interesting difference in how lobbying is prepared between that done in favor
of reform, often which is seeking the same thing every session, until such reform is
enacted, where as opposing anti-immigrant legislation is more variable, based off a
combination of bills from the prior session and chatter about the coming session
(fieldnotes). This is an interesting contrast, one which illustrates the need for a
comprehensive immigration reform occurring in bulk, compared to anti-immigrant
legislation which can be destructive even if piecemeal.
Having local officials meet with and testify before other governmental bodies is
also a frequently used tactic, with any number of officials participating (fieldnotes).
Indeed, the presence of El Paso along the border is often helpful in pursuing such a tactic,
as the testimony of local officials is seen as the kind of expert advice those other
governmental bodies are looking for (fieldnotes). This idea of expertise, paired with the
existing consensus among local officials about the need for comprehensive immigration
and border reform, situates them well to try and push the discussion in that direction.
Indeed, recent years have seen pro-reform local officials actively pursue such
opportunities, both people from the City and County (fieldnotes). Furthermore, such
activity is not without its impacts locally, as well as with the target audience. Certainly,
as mentioned above, his willingness to actively testify against local immigration
enforcement before the House Judiciary Committee helped increase the profile of then
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Chief Wiles, which in turn aided his election as Sheriff (fieldnotes). Furthermore, the
willingness of some local officials to embrace this form of activism has also helped
facilitate connections to community groups active around immigration and border issues.
Nevertheless, there are two limitations to this approach that should further be
noted. The first is that while activity such as providing testimony has helped make El
Paso a more active player in discussions of border and immigration reform, it has not
been sufficient to achieve any such reform, at least to this point. Secondly, it is also a
tactic available, and frequented by other parties, with goals different from, sometimes
opposed to comprehensive reform. Local federal officials, for one, described the benefits
of bringing committee and congressional staff to El Paso to brief them on their view of
the situation at hand, briefings that recalling Niskanen‘s view of bureaucracies, were
likely aimed at reinforcing/enlarging the border enforcement apparatus (Niskanen 1971;
fieldnotes). Likewise, the previous Sheriff had been a frequent witness before a number
of state and federal committees calling for local immigration enforcement (fieldnotes).
The point of mentioning this is not to say that testifying before Congress is not an
effective tool for pro-reform local officials, indeed, its frequent use seems to speak to at
least a perception of effectiveness. Rather, the point is that pushing for reform is not an
easy process. Neither of the tactics described here, nor of those to come is available
solely to the pro-reform community, so one must feel that that leads necessarily to an
approach that intentionally embraces such a wide array of attempts to promote this
position. If the effectiveness of any given means of affecting debate and action around
immigration and border policy is potentially, and usually, blunted by cross traffic from
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the opposition, then it makes sense to invest in a variety of alternatives to provide as
many ways as possible of getting one‘s message through.
Lawsuits are a much less common means of challenging the positions of other
scales of government, however, they are one with particular power to them. Lawsuits,
even when they fail in the courts, do offer a strong and direct rebuke of the actions, or
inactions, of the governmental body being sued. Indeed, because of this one can usually
see lawsuits being used as a form of resistance against government action, more than the
lobbying and testifying mentioned earlier. Such use of lawsuits is well illustrated by El
Paso County‘s suit against the federal government in an attempt to cease construction of
the border wall (fieldnotes). Indeed, even though that particular lawsuit failed to achieve
its desired goal, ceasing construction of the wall, it was a visible sign of displeasure with
the actions of the federal government, displeasure enough to force such a confrontation
(fieldnotes). Furthermore, lawsuits as a tactic are not limited to use in opposition to
action. Lawsuits, or threat of legal action, can be used in attempts to prod the
government into a desired action. An example of this, although notably in opposition to
immigration reform, is Former California Governor Pete Wilson‘s threat to sue the
federal government in an attempt to force them to bear a larger share of the burden for
service provision.
Another means of ‗acting up‘ in attempting to communicate with other
governmental units is through the adoption of resolutions or other symbolic actions
undertaken by local governments. Indeed, with most of the actions that local government
can take in opposition to devolutionary practices already in place, and local officials
attempting to promote positive reforms through lobbying or providing testimony, such
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actions represent a major means for local governments to continue to pursue these issues.
Such actions, as a result have become a significant means for communities to explore and
develop alternative approaches to immigration and border issues, developing both policy
approaches to pursue, and exploring interconnections between different aspects of these
issues. Local governments in El Paso have been particularly active in using this
approach, particularly the City of El Paso, which has held a ‗Mayor‘s Congreso‘
exploring and leading the city council to pass a resolution endorsing comprehensive
immigration reform (fieldnotes). Prompted by the ongoing drug violence in Ciudad
Juarez, the city council has also explored alternative approaches to the ‗war on drugs‘,
passing a resolution calling for the legalization of some recreational drugs, although that
was vetoed by the mayor after it became apparent that such a resolution could anger the
federal government (fieldnotes). Furthermore, given the existing close ties between
people in the city and county governments, resolutions adopted by one body are often
then adopted by the other, a demonstration of a unified vision of how to approach these
issues (fieldnotes).
Placing Local Governmental Actions in the Organizational/Power Matrix
With the means that local governments have to ‗act up‘ described above, the next
step in looking at them seems to be placing them in the organizational/power matrix
introduced earlier. Indeed, with this matrix in mind we can see significant differences
between the methods of trying to influence action, particularly between
testifying/lobbying, bill diversion, and lawsuits/resolutions. The testifying/lobbying
activity undertaken by local governments constitute an Interest Group style applications
both preventing against devolution and harsh border and immigration policy, and
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promoting a progressive series of reforms and is a clear example of the use of direct
power. Bill diversion, on the other hand, a tactic organized between local governments
and legislators around the state, is an obvious use of indirect power as it blocks ‗bad bills‘
from reaching the business of the state legislature. Indeed, these cleanly reflect what
types of actions were projected in the original matrix. What is notable, however, about
either of those methods is that it leaves the responsibility for defining the issue
fundamentally in the hands of those governmental bodies that they seek to influence.
While the information local governments are able to provide through lobbying or
testifying may be able to have some effect in changing the frames of the debate, it is more
likely that it is directed at targeting specific proposed action. What exists then is a
situation where these methods do not significantly improve the chances for progressive
reform, unless progressive reform is the frame for the current debate, as these methods do
not provide the possibility of moving the entire debate towards progressive reform as
such a situation would call for. As is happening in the current frame, they are more used
to prevent regressive action than to allow progressive reform.
Instead, the more interesting methods local governments can use to try and
influence consideration of border and immigration issues is through either lawsuits or
resolutions. The significant difference these offer is that they are not limited to being
reactions to existing proposals, although they may be, and so embrace actions using
hegemonic power, actions that seek to fundamentally redefine the terms of the debate.
Certainly, not every action in these categories is aimed at such redefinition, however, it is
the case that where lobbying or testifying were actions in response to the proposed
actions, and existing frames, of other governmental entities, these are actions that emerge
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entirely from local governments. While a lawsuit may be instigated by the action of
another governmental body, it is undertaken, and the frame it uses defined, by the local
government, and represents their chosen perspective. As a result, even a case such as a
lawsuit aiming to block a fence, which would seem to solely fit the definition of direct
power, may also convey an entirely different perspective around the issue and so
challenge hegemonic power as well. Indeed, this raises an important point, that we need
to note that actions can have implications at several different levels of power.
Resolutions are an even more explicit demonstration of this use of hegemonic power as
they convey the message of a community and a local government, entirely with disregard
to the frames employed by other governments.
It is also the case that in addition to including hegemonic power under their
potential influences, lawsuits and resolutions are the tools local governments have, that
come closest to those of the community organizing model. Looking at the matrix, it is
easy to see resolutions and lawsuits in the role of mass actions and protests, these
approaches seem to be closer to that definition than to the largely behind-the-scenes
processes described as being the stuff of Interest Group approaches. It is the public
nature and potential for public engagement provided through the community organizing
like aspects of these methods, that makes their intersection with hegemonic power so
significant. Both lawsuits and resolutions are means of changing the terms of the debate,
of shifting into a frame open to progressive reform and a reimagination of the
borderlands. However, even if their attempts to urge other levels of government to adopt
such frames do not succeed, it is the case that they expose such alternative frames to the
public. In each case, it seems that in addition to whatever impacts lawsuits and
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resolutions have on other governments, they have the described impacts of educating the
public and engaging the media around an alternative vision of border and immigration
issues. Indeed, it is this engagement that has the potential to make such action so
powerful.
There is one last point to consider here, which again is the impacts of interactions,
or lack of interactions, between the city and county governments. While it is true that an
action taken by one of these governmental entities is not insignificant, there would seem
to be increased power in such action being taken by both. This would particularly seem
to be true of those actions with potential to impact hegemonic power as the ability to
present a cohesive vision of what the area, and both governmental units, see as a new
path forward for border and immigration issues seems particularly important to making it
a strong vision. As a result, the recent trend towards relatively strong ties between the
two governments seems significant as it makes it more likely for a unified, and thereby
more powerful, vision of progressive border and immigration reform to emerge.
However, the fact that such connections are not institutionalized, but rather interpersonal,
and thereby more given to potential change and disruption, is of concern, as was
discussed earlier. While it is nice that there are means of entering into conversations with
other governments that cover all of the described forms of power, the strength of those
actions is also crucial, and so highly dependent on these relationships.
Room for Government-Community Collaboration
Governments, particularly local governments, do not exist in a vacuum. Around
any given, issue there is a community interested in it. As a result, what we see, with both
governments in El Paso interested in pursuing border and immigration issues, and with
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willingness to embrace a variety of means of doing so, and with a well-defined set of
community organizations acting around the issue, is a great opportunity for collaboration
between the two sets. Governmental efforts to lobby for more progressive border and
immigration legislation can benefit from connections to information collected by outside
groups. Likewise, lobbying undertaken by those groups can benefit from being able to
harness officials from local government as ‗experts‘ in their efforts. Such relationships
have begun to emerge over the past several years with government officials beginning to
enter into the division of labor among community groups described earlier. As a result of
these relationships, El Paso has seen the emergence of an organized alternative vision of
border and immigration issues representing a broad coalition of interests and ready to use
any available means of pursuing such a vision. Indeed, as a result of this cooperation we
see the determination for reform reinforced, and the chances of a progressive reform
emerging greatly strengthened. How exactly such relationships operate, however, is the
topic that will be explored in the next section of the analysis.
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Government and Activist Interactions
E Pluribus Unum
While the prior two sections attempted to isolate some of the actions of different
non-governmental and governmental actors within those groups, such distinctions are
artificial. Most actions taken around immigration and border issues, particularly actions
pushing for progressive reform, involve interactions including both governmental and
community actors. Reasons for this are straightforward. Governments control both the
policies and stated practices that define border and immigration policy, and so all efforts
aimed at reform must be at least indirectly targeted at affecting governmental bodies.
Lobbying for change, then, is an example of an interaction between activist groups and
governments. Furthermore, activist groups, or governments, pushing for reform derive
the same benefits from inter-organizational cooperation as was discussed in earlier
sections. Just because the membership of a coalition changes, does not make the
fundamental organizing structure of the coalition any less effective. Of course, not all
interactions with governments are so cooperative as in a coalition, rather interactions
between groups and government provide a site for monitoring and challenging actions
being taken. Meetings, regular or in response to specific events, give organizations a
chance to observe, question, and call for changes in the practices of border and
immigration enforcement. Government held public hearings directly give border
communities a chance to react to what they see and experience. Lawsuits provide a
means of challenging the policies and practices of one governmental body in the presence
of another piece of government.
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The impact of scalar relationships in these interactions needs also to be noted as
well as the interactions themselves. Scalar relationships, especially the push for a
‗nlocalized‘ relationship around immigration reform is both a medium through which
activists and governments interact and the desired outcome of these interactions. Still, it
is important to note that while there is a push for a ‗nlocalized‘ scalar relationship around
immigration this scalar relationship is affected by conditions of devolution that have
become increasingly prevalent. What we can see in looking at the scalar relationships of
the interaction between activist groups and government bodies is an attempt to maneuver
between different scalar patterns, in this case devolution and ‗nlocalization‘ in an attempt
to find the best course to a progressive immigration and border reform. Of particular note
then are the different scales at which government is engaged and the further scales that
these engagements open up.
What we see then in looking at El Paso are a proliferation of interactions between
government and non-governmental organizations (fieldnotes). These interactions are the
openings for reform, while progressive reform will very much be shaped by the ability of
border communities to reimagine the spaces and places of the borderlands, the reform
will only happen when these communities get government behind this vision. How
government does so, in turn, is shaped by the interactions between governments and
community groups. From a pro-reform perspective in looking at these interactions then
are questions of efficacy and balance (fieldnotes). What are effective ways of interacting
with government, of bringing it on board with the reforms being proposed? Furthermore,
how are the needs for interactions with government balanced with the maintenance of
truly progressive border and immigration reform? These are critical questions, as one of

140 | H e y m a n

the main reasons that border and immigration reform is currently such an important issue
in the borderlands, is because the price that has been paid for previous immigration
reforms, have been increased enforcement regimes that disproportionately affected and
burdened border residents (fieldnotes). And that is a particularly extreme example, such
trade-offs exist in much more mundane ways such as whether threatening a government
agency with a lawsuit is worth the resulting antagonism (fieldnotes). Keeping in mind
the importance of scale, one also sees that interactions between activists and government
have bred strange spatial patterns both in the coalitions formed, and in the ways that
reform would change enforcement practices. For example, these patterns can be seen in
local resistance to the devolution of immigration and border enforcement.
Embracing Government Officials in Pro-Reform Coalitions
Organizations in El Paso pushing for border and immigration reform have been
quick to embrace the participation of a number of governmental officials, mostly local, in
their push for reform (fieldnotes). These groups recognize several advantages of such
engagement, officials bring a certain legitimacy to many of the proposals, especially
those related to border security, they can bring connections to other officials or agencies,
and they also provide some degree of expertise both in shaping reforms and pressuring
other governmental bodies (fieldnotes). Likewise, working with these groups presents
significant advantages to these officials, be it through their ability to mobilize the public
in a way otherwise unavailable, by expanding the means by which reform can be
promoted, means that may be limited either institutionally or by practice, or a
consideration that working with these groups may benefit a politician politically.
Notably, this potential political benefit was not a consideration mentioned by any of the
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officials interviewed, although they may simply have been reluctant to mention it, were it
the case. Nevertheless, it seems that the politicians going so far as to work with activist
groups were genuinely dedicated to the goal of reform, not simply seeking political
benefit. With these mutual benefits, local political figures have become key players in
much of the pro-reform activism in El Paso, notably in BITF, which is co-chaired by a
pair of government figures, one from El Paso and one from Arizona (fieldnotes).
Local political figures are a crucial source of legitimacy in the push for border and
immigration reform, not so much because they provide local legitimacy, but rather in
interacting with state or federal governments. While it is not the case that nongovernmental actors are ignored, it is the case that in increasingly ‗security‘ oriented
discussions of border and immigration policy, the ability to have a sheriff or police chief
testify on the behalf of progressive reform, makes a particular impact (fieldnotes). What
we see then is that an organization such as BITF has attempted to include as broad a
range of participants as possible, governmental and non-governmental (fieldnotes).
Indeed, this is a clear extension of the division of labor discussed when these coalitions
were first described, as by including government officials BITF can take advantage of
this particular quality of perceived expertise. This is not to say that government‘s only
role in the coalition is as a tool to achieve the desired ends of these other groups.
Government participation in BITF contributes topics to be addressed, and general
knowledge about those topics, as well as means of addressing them. Nevertheless, the
division of labor in this coalition does clearly favor the involvement of government
officials in policy making and lobbying activities, as is visible when examining BITF‘s
actions.
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Of course, BITF is not the only means for interactions between local
governmental officials and border activists. A significant amount of policy work and
planning has been engaged in, both locally and statewide, about combating the devolution
of immigration enforcement. While BITF was certainly a part of this, it was not the
central coalition, plugging into a series of statewide conference calls, coordinated through
the offices of state legislators, that were already taking place (fieldnotes). Indeed, this
was an interesting circumstance, as state legislators already planning the opposition
sought to harness and mobilize the activists and community groups, a reversal of the
normal pattern (fieldnotes). As it turned out, much of this organizing has proven not yet
needed, as a coalition within the state legislature has been able to kill them rather easily
(fieldnotes). Nevertheless, this example should be kept in mind in the midst of the
numerous examples of interactions through BITF and that were largely originated by the
activist community.
Indeed, Texas has proven lucky to have had a coalition formed out of the state
legislature that has killed the bills, as the highly D.C. focused nature of pursuing reform
does seem to have left many activists unprepared to respond to devolution with coalitions
at the state or local level. To quote a state official on the matter,
We kept this group of 60 people talking about immigration going for about
4 years. And in the last two sessions we have killed the awful bills filed in
the House and Senate with a very dynamic and effective strategy. Last
session we tried to slow them down and stop as many as we could in the
House State Affairs Committee with an unholy coalition between the
Texas Association of Businesses and MALDEF [Mexican American Legal
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Defense and Education Fund]. You never see that coalition get formed on
almost any issue. And whatever was remaining of that came to the Senate
and we killed it in the Transportation and Homeland Security
Committee…and killed every single piece of legislation… This session,
we started in the Senate and killed it all there. (Interview in field)
Indeed, in the cases of Arizona and Oklahoma where the state governments have taken
significant devolutionary action, and where coalitions have largely formed around these
issues after the passage, these coalitions have faced significant difficulty in blocking such
devolutionary action.
One thing to note about BITF‘s activities generally is that at this point, they are
focused on ‗scaling up‘, and inserting the organization, and border viewpoints more
generally, into discussions of border and immigration policy (fieldnotes). This makes
sense in two ways, the first being that the biggest work to be done locally is complete, the
coalition is established, local governments have generally been brought onboard, and
outreach into the community is good (fieldnotes). This is not to say that there is not work
to be done locally, certainly the experiences of Sheriff Samaniego, or in Chapparral, NM,
or with continued state and federal devolutionary pressure, all on top of the mundane
abuses that fuel the need for border and immigration reform, illustrate a need for
vigilance locally. However, enough of a local consensus has been reached about the need
for a progressive reform including both border and immigration issues, and the most
flagrantly abusive local practices have been stemmed to the point that reform locally does
not demand all available resources, particularly from policy oriented organizations. The
second, is that thank to the consolidation, in the federal agencies, of power in D.C., and
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with continued pressure to devolve enforcement, the only way to both push for reform
and combat devolution is to try and scale up. Many of the activities of BITF, whether it
is trips to D.C., policy work aimed at external centers of power such as D.C. or Austin, or
the expansion of the coalition to include organizations and officials elsewhere, should be
viewed in this context.
BITF in Action
In a context of trying to scale up the progress made locally towards progressive
reform, BITF has undertaken a variety of outreach efforts to state and federal scales of
government. This outreach is probably best illustrated by a number of trips BITF has
taken to D.C. bringing in tow a large delegation of local activists and government
officials alike (fieldnotes). These delegations meet with a number of relevant federal
officials, to discuss both combating negative proposals and to push for any number of
legislative and administrative changes (fieldnotes). While these trips have not produced a
critical policy breakthrough that BITF has sought, they are considered a vital step in
trying to inject the perspective of the border into the conversations being held in D.C.
Indeed, they allow BITF not only to inject its perspective, but also to make efforts, at
least to try, to extend the reach of the coalition to officials and activists in Washington
(fieldnotes). These trips have allowed BITF to create connections with officials in DHS
and the White House, connections that have allowed BITF to become intricately involved
in a number of meetings with DHS in areas along the border, helping bridge the historic
gap between D.C. and the border (fieldnotes). Furthermore, these trips have created
relationships between BITF and friendly members of congress, allowing BITF to become
engaged in helping craft many of the recent reform bills that have gone before Congress,
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particularly allowing it to inject border enforcement reforms into bills otherwise
dominated by immigration policy (fieldnotes).
Prompted in part by these outreach efforts to D.C., DHS, under the Obama
administration, has begun to make more of an effort to likewise bridge the gap between
officials in Washington and communities on the border (fieldnotes). This is a welcome
change from DHS under the Bush administration, which had largely disengaged from
discussions with border communities after the legislative failure of comprehensive
immigration reform in 2006, and outright ignored border concerns in the construction of
the border wall (fieldnotes). Indeed, the past year has seen meetings with community
groups, activists, and local officials, by Border Czar Alan Bersin (fieldnotes). It has seen
two ‗stakeholder‘ meetings held by DHS officials in Brownsville and San Diego where
high ranking officials in DHS were brought to the border to hear the concerns of
‗stakeholder‘ groups from across the region (fieldnotes). Additional meetings have been
scheduled for later dates in the spring as well. Admittedly, it is unclear at this point what
impact these meetings will have in improving some of the practices of border and
immigration enforcement. However, these meetings have generally been regarded as
productive by the activist community and are welcomed as a sign of interest in the effects
of enforcement on border communities that has not existed in the past (fieldnotes). It is
hoped that these meetings, undertaken by DHS, are a sign of a desire on the part of D.C.
to bridge the divide between Washington and the borderlands that will finally meet the
like desire of border groups.
While, the section on community groups discussed some of BITF‘s involvement
in crafting legislation, it is important to acknowledge that while that described the process
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internal to BITF, it neglects the important role of external actors, particularly legislators
in Washington. Border and immigration reform has had the advantage of having a
number of dedicated and powerful champions on Capitol Hill in recent years, led in the
House by Chicago congressman Luis Gutierrez and in the Senate by the late
Massachusetts Senator Kennedy (fieldnotes). BITF, through its coalition-building with
NIF has been active in meeting with the staffs of all both, and worked particularly closely
with the staffs of Rep. Gutierrez and Sen. Kennedy on crafting specific legislative
language related to border policy (fieldnotes). These Congresspeople and their staffs
have notably built close relationships with border groups and activists, which are well
outside of their constituencies, relationships which are emblematic of the success of BITF
in this process of ‗scaling up‘ their activism (fieldnotes). Indeed, by creating connections
like this, BITF is able to join the federal government and a handful of other
organizations, such as the ACLU, as being actors in border and immigration issues active
at both ends of the ‗nlocalized‘ framework, and are likely unique among that group as
emerging from the local up.
Bipolar Disorder
One of the key areas in which government officials are heavily involved with
non-governmental activists is in pushing for reform in, and resistance to, the devolution
of border and immigration enforcement. Pro-immigrant activists are heavily opposed to
devolution for a number of reasons, some of which are outlined below, and have sought
to draw sympathetic local government officials into these discussions, if they are not
already engaged. One reason why government officials oppose devolution is that many
of these officials are tied to the governments that would be burdened with such
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enforcement, and so any policy change would naturally draw their attention and make
them more willing to participate in such debates (fieldnotes). Beyond this, however, is
the second reason, that much of the resistance to devolution is heavily centered around
the ability of a community to make an argument that their expertise should guide
whatever policies and practices are implemented (fieldnotes). This is where it gets
complicated, as it is not the case that such expertise is being used to make the argument
that local governments should be involved. Rather, because of their expertise, they know
that government at the local scale should not be participating, that immigration should be
in the hands of the federal government alone. Essentially, they are being asked to argue
in defense of a ‗nlocalized‘ framework of immigration enforcement, and within the
context of that framework in favor of the dominance of the federal pole in enforcement.
This would seem to be in conflict with other arguments the border seeks to make, where
it wishes to leverage its expertise into policy reform. However, given that both
arguments assume this bipolar relationship, arguing to preserve it seems necessary in
order to have a situation where it can be leveraged.
Indeed, in many ways such reinforcement of the bi-polarity of immigration and
border issues is critical to the chances for progressive border and immigration reform.
This is because, by reinforcing this framework, it presents an alternative to the
framework of devolution that can block measures seen as reducing the position of
immigrants, such as local enforcement, or the participation of non-traditional actors such
as interior localities or state governments. Rather, the more traditional bipolar framework
seems to have promise to emphasize the relationship of border communities and the
federal government as the sole actors. What much of immigration and border reform
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seeks to do, is not change the bipolar nature of this relationship, but rather, is to remove
sole policy-making power from the federal pole and redistribute it to emphasize the input
of local immigrant and border communities. In some ways, it could be said that
progressive reform is not opposed to the devolution of immigration, but rather to the
devolution of immigration enforcement. Indeed, such reform is open to devolution if it
means the devolution of policy making to include greater consideration of those
communities‘ views. This is the desired outcome of the scaling up discussed earlier, not
to change the overall framework of relationships around border and immigration affairs,
but rather to change the nature of specific relationships in a manner that better allows for
the input of border communities.
Government officials are well suited to aid this process in two ways. They are
able to leverage their expertise as a means of resisting this slide of enforcement authority
to the local level, such as through the provision of testimony against such action.
Furthermore, they are increasingly using local government as a stage for setting policy,
whether practical or symbolic, around border and immigration issues, actively seizing
part of the policy-making domain of the federal government. This second method is of
particular importance because it provides a significant means for an alternative imagining
of border and immigration policy to emerge in contestation of the existing system.
Resistance to the devolution of enforcement also feeds into this process as it serves to
help assert the ability of localities to participate in the policy making process. In the end,
the final policies may still need to be made at the federal level to avoid the sort of
patchwork that concerns Coleman. However, we should keep in mind that such a
patchwork indicates the ability of localities to inject themselves into policy-making
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discussions around border and immigration issues alongside the federal government.
Certainly one may view a blanket resistance to devolution of immigration enforcement as
favorable, but in a context where the federal government, which so dominates policy
making around border and immigration issues is pushing devolution, even a patchwork of
resistance bears promise for reform.
Limited Time Only—Interactions with Local Federal Officials
While the above paragraphs have told the story of interactions between
community groups and people in government, working together, meeting, discussing, and
even proposing reform, there are surprising limitations to these encounters, particularly
with the local levels of federal agencies. Many activists and local government officials
alike commented that they did not have much contact with local federal officials and that
what contact there was, usually was sporadic, event driven, rather than regularized
(fieldnotes). Part of this stems from contact with local federal officials largely being
driven by service providers who have more contact with these officials, than their policy
activist or local government counterparts (fieldnotes). Indeed, legal aid service providers
in particular had significant contact with the local federal apparatus, not surprising given
that interacting with their clients often must be done through interactions with federal
agencies (fieldnotes). However, another part of this lack of a relationship between local
activists and local federal officials seems to stem from the increased consolidation of
authority in D.C. that happened as part of the transition to DHS in the early part of the
decade. The focus of sole decision making in D.C. has acted to effectively sever
significant relationships that have existed and could exist between local federal officials
and both governmental and non-governmental actors in the communities where they
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operate (fieldnotes). This has also had further complications for activist groups and
organizations as the decreased access to federal officials means that potentially
antagonistic actions need to be weighed for the potential loss of even these reduced
contacts (fieldnotes).
The lack of contact between local federal officials and activist groups has not
always been the case. A prior generation of legal service providers described having
quarterly meetings with local immigration officials to discuss current and potential issues
with detention, service provision, and other aspects of immigration enforcement
(fieldnotes). This source described,
…what I thought was great, you figured out very quickly is what they
were going to budge on and what they were not going to budge on…a lot
of times, not a lot, but surprisingly often, they didn‘t know what they were
doing, and once they knew, they jumped on it. So I would say yes. I
thought they were successful in the sense that you could at least weed out
where they would be willing to make changes, and sort of keep their feet
to the fire on that…The fundamental problem is that we have no
mechanism for input, meaningful input. And this is just sort of the best,
the next best deal is to try to get them to the table, keep talking, and then
advocate with everything you got. (Interview in field)
Yet, even with such regularized, multi-organizational meetings with federal officials
occurring in the past, no organization described such meetings occurring today, even
among the groups that still are more engaged with federal officials (fieldnotes).
Certainly, such meetings take a large amount of effort both on the part of activist groups
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and on the part of federal officials, they are complicated to schedule, and require effort to
prepare for and address the issues discussed (fieldnotes). However, given the effort that
local organizations and activists have put into coalition building, the difficulty of such an
endeavor would not seem to make sense as a reason. Furthermore, there are groups that
do meet frequently, including BNHR and some of the service providing organizations
such as Diocesan Migrant and Refugee Services (DMRS), if not regularly with federal
officials, so it is a possible task (fieldnotes). Rather, there seems to be a specific
avoidance of meetings with local federal officials in favor of meetings with higher level
officials either during trips to D.C. or in intermittent meetings on the border.
This is not to say that one side is at fault for this relationship, rather it reflects the
fundamental change in the role of local federal agencies that occurred with the
reorganization of border and immigration enforcement into DHS. The removal of
operational discretion from the local levels of border and immigration enforcement
agencies has meant that local activist organizations see much less reason to interact with
federal agencies locally, as the only people able to make the desired changes are in
Washington. Whereas then Border Patrol Sector Chief Reyes was able to change
enforcement techniques in response to community activism in 1993, albeit in ways that
similarly raised the concern of activists, it is not the case now that local federal officials
would have the discretion needed to make similar changes. Rather, with the
concentration of power in D.C., efforts to effect change in the practices of border and
immigration enforcement have shifted from the field to the new center of discretion in
Washington, and interactions between activists and field officials have fallen resultantly.
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Likewise, one of the main purposes for the meetings mentioned above was to
convince federal agencies to change their practices by threatening, but with aim to avoid,
a lawsuit, a costly, laborious, antagonistic outcome for both sides (fieldnotes). The
current lack of discretion in the field means that these matters, which could have been
handled locally, now either need to be handled with officials out of D.C. or go to a
lawsuit (fieldnotes). Indeed, it is a distinct possibility that the removal of discretion from
local federal officials, and the subsequent decrease in contact between activists and those
officials, has increased lawsuits against the federal government, and fed antagonism
between activists and federal officials. For example, when the local border patrol, again
under Chief Reyes, attempted to build a fence along the border near Sunland Park, NM in
the mid 1990s, they were force to back away from the idea, at least temporarily, because
of organized community activism (Dunn 2008, 97-124). However, after the
concentration of discretionary power in D.C., when the current border wall was being
proposed, and then under construction, and similarly came up against overwhelming
organized local opposition in El Paso, among other places along the border, the local
Border Patrol was limited to a role promoting the project (fieldnotes). While they would
have been well situated to listen to, and respond to, local concerns, their role in the
project was extremely limited. This, paired with the intractability of Secretary Chertoff
in D.C., led El Paso County to sue the federal government (fieldnotes). Instead of local
federal officials being able to work to address some of the community‘s concerns, the
concentration of power in Washington simply increased antagonism between the border
and the federal government.
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This inability of local federal agencies to respond to locally raised issues has
caused a significant balancing act on the part of some local organizations. Reduced
discretion, as illustrated above, has meant that lawsuits are a more effective means of
trying to effect change in border and immigration practices, than they had been
(fieldnotes). However, the use of lawsuits is not without its own considerations.
Lawsuits often cause a high level of antagonism between an organization and the
particular piece of the government that they engage in the suit. Antagonism, while it may
be an outcome that an organization chooses to bear in certain circumstances can affect the
nature, quality, and frequency of interactions with federal agencies. With these
interactions notably at the discretion of the government, whereby they choose to engage
in these meetings, antagonistic relations can bring them to an end (fieldnotes).
Organizations, particularly those whose work depends on interactions with the federal
government, must balance then the potential benefits of a lawsuit with the antagonism it
generates (fieldnotes). This is not an easy balance to reach, and was one reason that local
activists tried to avoid lawsuits when possible (fieldnotes). With interaction reduced as a
result of the decreased discretion of federal officials, however this has some contradictory
effects. For organizations that now have next to no contact with federal officials, it
reduces a disadvantage of lawsuits, as there no longer is a relationship to maintain. For
those organizations still dependent on interactions with federal agencies, the reduction of
such contacts may make each interaction more valuable, and so reduce the likelihood of a
lawsuit, restricting, for those groups, the set of actions that can be taken in pushing
reform.
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Furthermore, community outreach on the part of local federal agencies has been
hampered as a result of the concentration of authority in D.C. Former federal officials
described that before the move to DHS, federal agencies were relatively unrestricted in
working both with other governmental bodies, and in their community outreach
(fieldnotes). After the creation of Homeland Security in 2003, the situation became much
more centralized, requiring authorization from D.C. to so much as talk to local media,
described in interview as such,
So I continued my media outreach, talking to the media locally, as to what
the plans were, what we were going to do, we now have a security based
organization, we‘re going to be doing more inspections, blah, blah, blah.
Didn‘t take long for headquarters to bring it to my attention that I no
longer had that discretion to openly talk to the media. There was
instructions, written instructions, policy and procedures, how you would
ask for permission to talk to the media. And what you were going to say,
it was all scripted…You‘ll see very limited media contacts from CBP,
even now very limited. It‘s basically only if asked, but not proactive.
And it is a very controlled, centralized process. (Interview in field)
While certainly this has not stopped outreach by local federal agencies, and they have had
public forums in recent years at the behest of local government and community groups, it
has, as described, significantly decreased the level of engagement these agencies
undertook (fieldnotes). With regard to media contact as mentioned above, the situation is
one where rather than agencies reaching out to the media, such contact was now driven
almost entirely by media coming to the agency requesting information (fieldnotes).
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Although, local agencies can conceivably work around it, the consolidation of federal
authority under DHS has placed a considerable wedge between local federal agencies and
border communities. Indeed, if you need the permission of officials in D.C. to speak to
local federal officials, and if D.C. is the place with all the authority anyway, the
movement of activism, even born out of a specific locality such as El Paso, to be centered
on D.C., seems a natural course of action.
It is not the case that all interactions between activist organizations and local
federal agencies have been so limited. One immigrant legal aid organization, DMRS, has
interacted with the local federal immigration apparatus and has established such
confidence, that in strange or difficult detention cases the government will consult DMRS
as to how to best approach the issue (fieldnotes). Essentially, the federal government is
trying to call on the resources and expertise to help with some difficult issues, where
these groups are likely to become involved anyway, leaning on the activist community to
bolster their own limited resources, particularly in the resource scarce areas of migrant
detention and processing. Essentially, this is akin to the consultations groups had with
local federal officials in the past, looking to address potential issues quickly and with
relatively little use of resources or antagonism by either side. Relationships like this are
all too limited however, left unpursued in a situation where centralized control out of
D.C. has limited the ability of local federal agencies to pursue these sorts of alliances, and
where the limits of local discretion make local agencies undesirable as partners for the
local activist community.

156 | H e y m a n

Does Scaling Up Leave a Hole at the Bottom?
It seems then, that the concentration of federal authority in Washington, away
from the localized units that actually carry out border and immigration enforcement, has
limited the kinds of relationships that can exist in local settings. It has handcuffed the
ability of these local agencies to engage their communities, much less the activist groups
present there. Likewise, it has limited the ability, and more importantly the desire, of the
activist community to engage local federal officials. As a result of the sole concentration
of federal decision making authority in D.C., the relationships of reform have become
similarly focused on D.C. Scaling up, while it likely would have occurred anyway, is a
symptom of the nature of how decisions about border and immigration issues are made,
as much as a way of injecting local communities into the discussion. A question then
emerges of whether this scaling up, whether the concentration of authority in D.C. or the
increasing focus of reform organizations in targeting D.C., is leaving a metaphorical hole
at the bottom, and is distracting from efforts that could be undertaken locally. The
examples above seem to indicate that there is an extent to which this is the case, certainly
interactions have existed in the past between local federal officials and activist
communities that have been highly curtailed today.
This is not to say, however, that scaling up is not the right course of action for
activists to be taking. For their part, it is a response to a genuine change in the operations
of the federal government. Furthermore, there are things that scaling up can do that
locally oriented work could not accomplish. Comprehensive reform will need to occur
through the federal government in Washington, providing a level of uniformity across the
border and across the nation that working at the level of localized federal agencies could
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not provide. Furthermore, changes that would need to occur through legislative action
would also have to occur in D.C. for obvious reasons. What is missing, however, with
the removal of many of these contacts between activist organizations and local federal
officials then, is not something that affects the big picture, which as an innate part of its
nature will need to include D.C., but rather is the ability to handle local issues locally.
Thus, we see these issues becoming matters that need to be handled through more time
and effort intensive means, for federal officials as well as local activists. Likewise, by
isolating local federal agencies from the communities they exist in, they may well be
isolated from community concerns that could be otherwise addressed.
What can be done about this hole at the bottom? The obvious solution would be
to restore at least some degree of discretion to local federal officials. This is not
necessarily a perfect solution for achieving reform, however, as this discretion in the past
has been used as much to take actions that have drawn the ire of activists, as to engage
with their concerns. Still, a degree of discretion that would allow local federal agencies
to be more engaged with their home communities, and with activists in those
communities, could be a helpful step, even if otherwise the battles for reform have moved
to D.C. Likewise, it would seem to be in the interest of pro-reform activists not to forget
that they are not solely dealing with agencies in D.C., but that these are agencies with a
presence that is possible to engage locally. This engagement may not be a priority of
activists and reform organizations, but seems unwise to forget either. Immigration is a
big enough issue that the struggle for reform should at least be aware of every possible
path that can be pursued.
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Metaphorical Moats and Bridges
These prior sections have looked at what activists have done working around
reform, tactics they have used, contacts they have made, and the chances this effort has
created for enactment of progressive border and immigration policy. We have seen a
focus on coalitions, a growing focus on Washington D.C., and generally an emphasis on
linking the national and the local. Many of these efforts have been aimed at overcoming
the limitations that individual organizations face in pursuing reform. What exactly these
barriers are, though, has not been a topic discussed in much depth, although the prior
sections began to probe this. Next then comes an exploration of the structural barriers to
working for reform in El Paso, a physically isolated city that lacks large amounts of
resources to pour into any non-profit sector, much less specialized areas such as
organizations oriented around border and immigration issues. However, no look at the
barriers the activist community faces in pursuing such reform would be worthwhile
without also looking at the advantages that operating out of El Paso provides. By looking
at these barriers and advantages, and tying them to some of the behaviors of these
organizations, the picture of immigration and border reform in El Paso is complete. And,
perhaps most importantly, it becomes possible to truly judge whether the border and
immigration reform movement out of El Paso, and the border more generally, will be able
to achieve the progressive reforms they seek.
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Limitations and Advantages
Limitations, Advantages, and Shaping the Possibility for Reform
The prior sections have described some limitations, such as isolation and
marginality, poverty, and racism, to the reform efforts being undertaken in El Paso.
Some of these limitations, such as decreased contact with local federal officials, have
been made clear. Others though, such as the presence of a disconnection between the
borderlands and decision-makers in Washington D.C. have only been implied in the
perceived need for, and resultant pursuit of, ‗scaling up‘ by the activist community on the
border. Given the importance of these limitations in shaping the activities undertaken by
those seeking reform, it is useful to systematically list and analyze these factors,
specifically tying barriers, tactics, and the impacts on reform together. Likewise, the
thesis has mentioned some of the advantages of pursuing reform out of El Paso, or the
borderlands more broadly. These advantages can be just as important in shaping the
behavior of activists and community groups as limitations, and so will be similarly
explored here. Indeed, there are key advantages that organizations looking to promote
border and immigration reform can exploit. What will emerge then, in this section and in
concert with prior portions of the thesis, is a look at the advantages and limitations of
groups and their activities undertaken in pursuit of reform. Where prior sections were
most concerned with cataloguing the activities these groups undertake, this section will
seek to analyze these actions with regard to the important question of how they shape the
possibility of a progressive border and immigration reform. To continue the metaphor
from the end of the prior section, what will be done here is see how many moats the
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bridges cross on the path to a comprehensive, progressive immigration and border
reform, and how many there are left to go.
The Border as a Definition of Marginality—El Paso and Elsewhere
The U.S.-Mexico border, as it has been constructed in the nation-state frame of
the United States, in conjunction with a number of other ongoing social processes such as
racism and poverty. Borders themselves can be tasked with providing exclusion and
often are viewed as important in the core for that purpose. El Paso and other parts of the
border are key nodes in a globalizing economic structure, yet they are marginalized in the
greater whole. The places of the border tend to be excluded, even from decisions that
directly affect those communities. Farmers in South Texas were ignored as they
protested the deportations of the 1950s. Southern Arizona has been ignored as activists
there have spoken out against, and acted to prevent the immigrant fatalities that have
marked the desert for nearly two decades now (fieldnotes). El Paso, and the rest of the
U.S.-Mexican borderlands were ignored in protesting the construction of the border wall
in recent years (fieldnotes). These examples do not even begin to describe the extent to
which Mexican communities impacted by U.S. border policy have been ignored as
policies and decisions have been enacted. The norm is for the border to not have a voice
in policy and practices that affect residents‘ lives, and it has been this way for decades, a
result of the marginality that has been made unavoidable for the border.
This marginality has been constructed in a number of ways far beyond the sheer
location of the U.S.-Mexican borderlands in relation to the centers of power in the U.S.
Many culprits are responsible for the border being ignored and unconsulted. Poverty
certainly plays a role. Many of the border counties, particularly in South Texas, are
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among the poorest places anywhere in the United States, and although richer in
comparison, other portions of the border are certainly not wealthy. Racism also has
played a role in isolating the border. South Texas‘s history is marred by a series of
violent campaigns undertaken by whites against the area‘s Mexican population (Carrigan
and Webb 2003, 415). Similarly, as Joseph Nevins elaborates, largely white San Diego,
fifteen miles from the border, has historically acted to distance itself from Mexico,
culturally, and in the mind of the general public, as a means of not being stigmatized by
association with Mexico (Nevins 2002, 39-59). If, historically, the residents of cities so
close to the border cannot be brought to show an interest in either the border or Mexico,
why would people anywhere else in the U.S. pay attention to those interests? And, as one
would expect, they have not. Furthermore, racism and poverty interact as factors feeding
the marginalization of the border as a site of interest, much as they combine to feed the
marginalization of other populations across the country.
These factors have also been at play at marginalizing the voices of the El Paso
community in the formation of border and immigration policy. To begin with, El Paso is
marginal within its own state, located not only at the U.S.-Mexican border, but at the
western extreme of Texas‘ border with New Mexico. El Paso is highly isolated from the
rest of Texas, several hundred miles from Midland or Lubbock, the next cities of
significance, and about six hundred miles from the state capital in Austin. It is isolated
enough to be in a different time zone from any other major city in Texas. In Texas it is
further marginalized by cultural differences, bearing much more history and tradition in
common with New Mexico than with the Lone Star State. Poverty has also helped isolate
El Paso, as the city has not had the historic wealth to demand the attention of either the
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state or federal governments. Similarly, racism has isolated El Paso, a city that has been
Mexican majority for almost all its history, a history including periods of violence
undertaken by the State of Texas against local Mexican populations, although not to the
extremes of South Texas. The isolation of El Paso has led to significant underinvestment
in the institutions of the community, a fact that has led to its further isolation and to a
further lack of its ability to have input into policies and practices that impact daily life.
And, much as these factors have worked to marginalize El Paso within Texas, they have
worked to marginalize El Paso within the broader United States as well.
Much as El Paso simply typifies the marginalization of the U.S.-Mexico border in
American society, it is also the case that even within that border region there have been
barriers to a pan-border approach. Much of the development on the border can be
typified by placing it into the context of a number of corridors running from key points in
the interior of the United States into the interior of Mexico. As a result the border can be
broken into five broad corridors2, which have some linkages up and down the routes, but
with relatively little connection between them. As a result, community-based pan-border
activity has been largely blocked by this historical pattern of development (fieldnotes).
This has worked to make it harder for the border to present a unified front pushing for
border and immigration reform. In the meantime, it leaves the Federal Government as
the only organization able to operate along the entirety of the U.S.-Mexico border, as it
imposes a unified framework on these places rather than bringing them together. In the

2

The five corridors, as observable from interstate highway corridors, from west to east are 1) between the
two Californias via Tijuana, 2) between Sonora and Arizona via Nogales, 3) between Chihuahua and New
Mexico via El Paso, 4) between Nuevo Leon and San Antonio via Laredo, 5) along the Gulf of Mexico via
Brownsville.
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end, the border is left at a distinct disadvantage in organizing an alternative vision of the
border, having to organize within itself before it can even challenge the existing vision.
Isolation
What these factors combine to do then, is create a situation where almost every
individual and group active around border and immigration issues in El Paso, feel that
isolation is a barrier to their activities. When the interview subjects were asked about
what they felt the disadvantages to operating out of El Paso were, the marginal
relationship of El Paso to the centers of power, be they Austin or Washington D.C., was a
nearly uniform answer, one that cut across organization and ideological lines (fieldnotes).
Isolation was mentioned by federal officials, and it was mentioned by local government
(fieldnotes). Isolation was mentioned by both government and activists alike (fieldnotes).
Isolation, the inability of El Paso, and other places on the border, to bring their concerns
to state or federal attention, is the single greatest barrier to a progressive border and
immigration reform (fieldnotes). Isolation is fed by other barriers, but this is the barrier
that looms largest over the push for reform, the border must make its voice both heard
and responded to in order for positive change to be achieved. Only by getting the rest of
the country to recognize and partake in the alternative vision of the borderlands that these
communities desire can that vision become a practical reality.
Of course, just because all of these groups mention isolation as a factor limiting
their ability does not mean that all of the organizations reporting it are affected equally.
In part, this is a reflection of the intersection of isolation as a barrier and other barriers
present in El Paso. When a federal agency reports that it is negatively affected by being
isolated from officials in D.C. and so has a harder time competing for resources within an
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agency, they are still relatively less hampered than an activist organization seeking
resources. Since the broad national framework for addressing immigration and border
issues is still very much focused on increasing border enforcement, even if El Paso
specifically has trouble being heard, Border Patrol requests for resources fit that
framework and get through. Reform groups, on the other hand need to get both the
overall message heard and then work on getting needed resources to individual
communities, a harder task when inhibited by such marginality. Still, given the recent
federal trend to concentrate discretion in D.C., it would seem that local federal agencies
are in a situation where they are effectively more isolated than they had been before, as
the centralization of authority makes it harder to pass new ideas up the hierarchy. There
is a possibility then, that pro-reform activists may be able to gain allies in local federal
agencies by fighting for increased local resources that could be used in a manner
supporting the practices instituted by various reforms. Indeed, to some extent the
plausibility of such a tactic could be tested in pushing for increased resources for ports of
entry, or similar federal resources that would fit into the goals of reform.
The isolation of the border is as present a barrier today, as ever. One source
described the relationship between her organization and national groups as, ―But as far as
like the national network for immigration rights or…you know, any of those bigger
national groups, um, pretty sure they don‘t know we‘re down here. [chuckles] Except for
that I sign on to their letters, or, you know, go to their conferences, or whatever‖
(Interview in field). Recent difficulties for border communities and activists, such as the
decision of former Secretary Chertoff to ignore border opposition to the wall, or the gap
between national level immigration reform organizations and the community-based
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reform groups of the border, speak to the size and importance of isolation as a barrier to
reform. The ability of these actors to pursue activity around border and immigration
issues without even giving a second thought to input from the communities of the border,
shows the weakness of these communities in their efforts. Indeed, one sees the power of
isolation keeping the border from addressing these issues, from being able to shape its
own daily experiences and future when, to paraphrase the words of President Obama‘s
Border Czar Alan Bersin, in hearing that if people on the border do not understand the
politics of the interior, they will have difficulty in achieving comprehensive immigration
reform (fieldnotes). That statement was not made in passing in Washington, but rather
was a message Bersin intentionally brought when visiting El Paso. That statement is one
of isolation reinserting itself in the conversation, claiming its dominance over the
borderlands, working to marginalize a vision of border and immigration reform, a vision
of communities‘ ability to impact the issues facing them.
It should be unsurprising then to see that most of the activity undertaken by the
governments, organizations, and activists of the border has been oriented at overcoming
this isolation. Coalition building has been a key step in overcoming the limitations of
marginality through the advantages it gives the activist community. The emergence of
pan-border coalition building is a clear example of how these groups have worked to
overcome the historic gaps between border communities and build a truly collective
vision of what the U.S-Mexico borderlands can be. Similarly, the effort that has been put
into ‗scaling up‘ has been an effort to get the vision of reform coming out of the
borderlands to the attention of both the national scale immigration reform organizations
and the federal government. And these efforts are succeeding; the communities of the
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borderlands are on the cusp of truly engaging in the cause of border and immigration
reform. The creation of national level coalitions engaging both organizations historically
active only around D.C. and community based organizations from the border is a
significant sign of progress. Similarly, the work of these coalitions to engage federal
officials in D.C., pursuing changes both through legislation and administrative law, is a
clear demonstration of the success that these efforts have achieved. Indeed, the
interjection of border reform into this conversation alongside immigration reform
illustrates these successes, and only has happened as a result of the border‘s efforts to
overcome its marginality.
Still, even with the significant progress that has been made, isolation should be an
issue of concern to pro-reform groups from the borderlands going forward. In many
ways the way the nation views immigration and border issues reflects a lack of
knowledge, and thereby allows the domination of a wide variety of misconceptions about
both immigrants and border communities, misconceptions that need to be countered to
create the space for reform. Current events are not helping. People correctly see the
enormity of the drug violence in Ciudad Juarez, but they further assume that this violence
will spread into the United States, and that the vector will be immigrant communities.
Neither of the last two is the case, but both are far too commonly believed by the public
and so will take considerable effort to overcome. Part of this space can be created by
doing as border communities are, and proposing an alternative vision of what border and
immigration policy could be like, one that move away from the heavy enforcement
regimes of the present. Still, it seems apparent that this is where the most work remains
for the pro-reform movement. They have built a pan-border organization, they have
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cultivated inter-organizational links across the country, they are working with officials in
D.C. on a number of legislative and administrative changes, and in many ways the
organizational isolation of the border has been overcome. Yet, the dominant attitudes of
hostility and distrust of the border remain as seen in this statement attributed to Senator
Cornyn of Texas, ―the farther I go from the border the more I see it as a threat, but the
closer I get the more I see it as a place of opportunity‖ (fieldnotes).
Local media, particularly El Paso‘s English language newspaper, the El Paso
Times, play a significant role in maintaining this barrier, not because they take action to
oppose reform, but because the local media is surprisingly disconnected from the border.
In the spring of 2006, after highly controversial H.R. 4437 had entered the scene in the
House of Representatives and immigration had begun to emerge as an issue going into
the midterm elections, there was surprisingly little coverage of immigration or
immigration related issues in the paper (fieldnotes). More importantly, what coverage
there was tended to be reprints of wire stories or stories in other papers (fieldnotes). In a
sign of how disconnected the border had become from decisions that bore immediate
relevance to local conditions, the local English language newspaper did not choose to
cover a story with such obvious local implications, instead imposing the perspectives of
other part of the country. It speaks volumes about the degree of effort that must go into
changing nationwide perspectives of the border, if those perspectives have come to
dominated even significant portions of the local media.
Overcoming this attitudinal barrier is a daunting task, but it is needed to fully
allow the pro-reform movement to reach their goal. It is a task that activists on the border
realize needs to be accomplished, but are the least clear of how to pursue. Still, border
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activists have some significant allies in the religious community, which seems to offer the
best way forward, at least for the time being. The Catholic Church has both the resources
and means to reach a large number of people and try engaging them in a more thoughtful
understanding of border and immigration issues. Indeed, the Catholic Church has been a
significant participant in pro-reform efforts in a number of ways, both through service
organizations and activists. What is needed to overcome the attitudinal barriers the
American public has against reform is the willingness for an institution like this to engage
in a long, sustained effort to change attitudes. Other churches offer similar opportunities,
although not on the same scale. Furthermore, there needs to be greater effort to engage
the media and to challenge voices such as Lou Dobbs and Tom Tancredo that have
successfully gone unchallenged in purveying an intentionally hostile, misleading view of
immigration and border issues. While statements, such as Bersin‘s from earlier, work to
marginalize the vision and desires of border communities, it is also true that these
communities cannot expect to achieve the success they desire without accomplishing at
least some change in American‘s attitudes towards immigrant and border communities.
Pro-reform activists from the border see this need to overcome these
misperceptions as a serious issue given their effort to pursue both border and immigration
reform. It is interesting, but notable, that border reform has not always been part of the
reform agenda, but rather was put there only as a result of the hard work of border
activists. Indeed, border and immigration issues are related, but notably not synonymous,
and the fact that border reform has become part of the current push for reform has only
happened because of the success of border activists in overcoming the marginal position
that they started from in this debate. There is fear, however, in the border activist
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community that reform could come to immigration, in exchange for increased border
enforcement, as has happened in the past (fieldnotes). If this were the case, while such a
situation could offer significant improvements to the immigration system, it would come
at the cost both of border communities and immigrants in the borderlands. Such a
tradeoff would essentially negate the progress that border communities have been able to
achieve in overcoming their isolation and being able to address issues of which they bear
the consequences. Furthermore, such a tradeoff would undermine the effect of any
reform in addressing several serious human rights issues, particularly the annual deaths of
several hundred migrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico border. It is critical then, that border
communities and activists continue their work at overcoming their marginality, to ensure
that a progressive border and immigration reform is possible.
Poverty
El Paso is rich in many, if corny, ways. It has a vibrant history, interesting
people, cultural traditions, and a hearty culinary tradition. More relevant to the topic at
hand, it has plentiful and well developed cross border connections, and given its position
has developed a richness of activists and organizations interested in border and
immigration reform. The one thing that El Paso does not have, however, is money, and
while it has these many organizations, they are usually under-resourced. Not only is El
Paso resource poor, but the resources that exist to support immigration and border reform
are detached from the places they are needed most, centered around wealthier cities such
as Dallas, Los Angeles, or New York, while the need for these resources is on the border.
This lack of local resources forces organizations and activists to develop connections to
other places in order to carry out their work. This inability to rely on the local
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community for the basic operating resources needed to do this work has two other
implications: it cuts off a potential avenue for connection between communities and
organizations; and further demonstrates the isolation of the borderlands, limited the
region‘s ability to impact policies that in turn strongly impact the borderlands. Luckily,
the organizations operating out of El Paso have seen their resource situation improve, as
well as very intentionally pursuing strategies that allow for greater pooling and more
efficient use of these scarce resources, and their activities have prospered as a result.
While the lack of local resources is a serious and lasting limitation to pro-reform
activities out of El Paso, it does seem to be one that has been effectively dealt with of
late.
Pro-reform organizations complained broadly about a lack of resources, and
almost all noted a dependence on external funding sources. Service providers,
particularly legal aid providers, particularly noted a lack of resources, especially
compared to the demands they see in the community. Legal practitioners are particularly
in short supply, and as a result, their time and ability is at a premium within these
organizations (fieldnotes). This tends to have a couple of key impacts on their work, the
first being that such organizations often heavily screen potential clients and tend to focus
on specific service areas to try and make certain that their resources are effectively
managed and put to use. However, this places obvious limitations on the impact that
these organizations are able to make in the community. Furthermore, the lack of spare
resources in these service providing organizations puts serious restrictions on their ability
to work with other groups, as mentioned earlier, even in manners that would allow them
to broaden their area of impact. Indeed, one of the interviewed service providers
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expressed a desire to be more active in policy work, and would like to dedicate additional
resources in that direction to compliment the legal work done, but simply lacked the
personnel to do so (fieldnotes). Personnel are not the only area where many of these
organizations must be frugal, as monetary limits also restrict the ability of organizations
to pursue activities such as ‗scaling up‘, which are dependent on the ability of these
organizations to send people to meetings with officials in D.C. and elsewhere.
Overcoming these limitations, especially when faced with a lack of local
resources, leaves these organizations looking elsewhere for the support they require.
Some organizations, such as those tied to the Catholic Church are in good shape in this
regard as they are connected to large institutions, well capable of supporting their
activities (fieldnotes). Other organizations must engage in the process of ‗scaling up‘ not
only a means of trying to bring reform, but first as a means of gathering the resources
they need for that task (fieldnotes). Of course, such a reliance on outside support leaves
an organization‘s operational fate in their ability to hold the interest of those donors,
usually one or a few large foundations. Certainly, such a situation entails more instability
than if that organization were able to derive most of their support from the community
they serve. However, it should also be considered that such activity is not without its
own benefits, even as it entails these risks. Much as scaling up and coalition building
between organizations creates useful connections outside the local scale in terms of
accomplishing policy work, similarly we can see such benefits here. Scaling up the
search for funding allows border and immigration reform organizations operating out of
El Paso to take their message and methods beyond the scale of the borderlands. In itself,
it signals an interest from the interior in pursuing such activity, and indicates that reform
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is not likely to fall only on deaf ears. And at least in the short term, this ‗scaling up‘ has
allowed new opportunities for the reform community in El Paso. Using the example of
BNHR, they have been able to significantly increase their paid staff in recent years, as
well as move to larger offices, as a result of significant funding from the Ford Foundation
(fieldnotes).
Certainly, a lack of resources, paired with the isolation of the borderlands makes
much activism more difficult, or at least more resource intense, plane tickets and hotels in
D.C. do not come cheaply. Furthermore, it is notable to see that the lack of resources
seems to be more acutely felt in the service providing organizations, a reflection as much
of the overwhelming demand for such services, as in a lack of access to resources. What
we see, however, in the broad picture of organizational activity is that this poverty, while
a significant barrier to many communities in the borderlands, particularly El Paso and
south Texas, can be overcome. Furthermore, we see that the ways a lack of resources can
be overcome are means that have significant potential, intentionally or as an added
benefit, to allow these organizations more effective means of pushing for reform. The
much discussed division of labor that coalition building has allowed the pro-reform
community fits well as an example of this. Similarly, we can see the ‗scaling up‘
undertaken in the search for external funding as an illustration of this. In the end,
although there is certainly more that can be done to provide needed resources to these
organizations, we can see the lack of local resources entailed by poverty as a
metaphorical moat that pro-reform organizations have been successful in bridging.
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Politics and Racism
Although not as frequently mentioned as specific barriers to the actions of proreform organizations as the isolation or resource issues mentioned above, it would be
remiss not to mention the presence of both political and racial factors as barriers to such
activity. As Joseph Nevins well documents in looking at San Diego, the Anglo
community there has been heavily motivated to ignore their proximity to Mexico and
their place in the borderlands because of racism towards Mexican and Mexican-American
populations (Nevins 2002, 39-59). Rather, San Diego has consistently tried to orient
itself northward, toward the interior as a means of maintaining a dominant sense of
whiteness in the community. Similar patterns of racism are visible in Texas, with
brutally violent oppression of Mexican-American populations in south Texas common in
the late 1800s. As a result, dominant Anglo populations both in the borderlands and the
interior have intentionally marginalized Mexican and Mexican-American populations and
issues. This pattern has begun to break down as demographics and civil rights extensions
have allowed greater incorporation of these populations into the political sphere,
particularly within the localities of the borderlands. Similarly, the economic
opportunities offered by interaction with Mexico have begun to change the orientation of
places such as San Diego, from away, toward the border, as the border now promises to
be a source of great wealth. Nevertheless, there is significant residual resistance to
reform, and to Hispanic immigrants more broadly, on racial grounds. Many of the
concerns over the failure of Hispanics to integrate into American society are simply an
expression of this, as is the skewed concern over border security on the southern border
compared to the northern border.
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This racial bias is compounded by the political behaviors they have come to
involve. Mexican-Americans as a population are disproportionately Democratic voters,
albeit with low turnout rates. Anglo populations in the United States, although certainly
not uniform, are disproportionately Republican. In the case of the borderlands, which is
largely dominated by Mexican-American voting blocs, we see that places like El Paso are
Democratic strongholds. However, the larger polities of many border states, notably
Arizona and Texas, are dominated by Anglo Republicans. What we see then, is that the
dominant Anglo Republican blocs in these states frequently will ignore the issues and
policies of the borderlands for a combination of political and racial reasons. This simply
tends to increase the isolation of the borderlands, remove it more from the mind of
policymakers and the public, and leave it instead in the realm of stereotype and myth.
Indeed, in many ways, El Paso is more isolated at this point from political activity in
Austin, than it is from D.C (fieldnotes). By fueling the isolation of the border, as well as
creating an atmosphere where interests promoted by Mexican-American populations are
more likely to meet with knee jerk rejection, we can see politics and racism, individually
and together, presenting significant barriers to reform.
Like with isolation and poverty there are things that the pro-reform community
has been able to do to try and overcome these barriers. Foremost have been efforts to
include the business community in the push for border and immigration reform, and using
the influence of those groups to try and build support for reform across both parties
(fieldnotes). Furthermore, there have been efforts to make the cause of reform transcend
racial boundaries as well. Portraying reform as a business or security issue accomplishes
some of this by placing it on generic territory and trying to limit the extent to which it is
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only identified as an issue in the Hispanic community. Likewise, figures in the activist
community that transcend this racial boundary have similarly been used prominently to
try and blunt opposition. A contributing factor to the frequent use of the current El Paso
County Sheriff, an Anglo, to argue against devolutionary practices and in favor of reform
has been to try and show that this is an issue beyond race. In the end, however,
demographics perhaps offer the most hope in the long term as the growing presence of
Hispanics in the U.S. will allow such racist opposition to be overcome.
Advantages of El Paso—Centrality, Experience, and Progressive Reform
Much as being in El Paso poses significant limitations to the ability of the activist
community to effect a progressive border and immigration reform, it does provide certain
advantages as well. Foremost among these advantages are the centrality of El Paso in the
borderlands, and the importance of its place on the frontline of the largely inseparable
practices of border and immigration enforcement. Some of these have been touched on
earlier, particularly the ability of pro-reform groups to harness a level of expertise in
making their arguments. Still, it is important to reiterate these advantages, particularly
after having explored the disadvantages in depth. These advantages have been significant
not only in allowing the pro-reform community in El Paso an ability to overcome these
disadvantages, but also in promoting the development of this community in the first
place. In interviews, the pro-reform organizations and activists felt that even if they were
not personally there, personally involved, there would still be this community, still be this
push for change (fieldnotes). The fact that this is truly a grassroots movement, born from
an experience of place and bearing this alternate vision is the reform community‘s
greatest strength. With this, even in the face of the limitations above, even with
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resistance from policy makers and the interior, the fundamental push for reform coming
from the borderlands will not fade.
Similar to how geographic isolation is a limiting factor in El Paso‘s ability to
shape policy decisions in Austin and Washington D.C., its location at the near center of
the U.S.-Mexico border has had a positive impact on helping shape its role in pan-border
coalitions that have emerged. Approximately equidistant from Brownsville and San
Diego, El Paso stands out as a natural meeting place for activists along the border,
maximizing the ease with which people from all portions of the borderlands can gather.
Indeed, El Paso has notably begun to take on this role as a central hub for pan-border
activity, hosting much of the activity of an expanding BITF and a meeting of the national
scale Rights Working Group (fieldnotes). Similarly, El Paso is an important meeting site
for the various pieces of the federal border apparatus, a reflection of this central location
and the complex of federal agencies that have their regional headquarters in the city
(fieldnotes). This centrality for government officials further contributes to El Paso being
a center of border and immigration activism, since as explored earlier, it makes for easier
interactions with all these pieces of the federal apparatus. The presence of all these
federal agencies in El Paso also feeds into another advantage of activism based out of the
city, the daily exposure to practices of border and immigration enforcement, and the
expertise this conveys in looking to reform policy and practices.
It was repeatedly mentioned, by interviewees, as a limitation of El Paso, and the
borderlands more broadly, that the isolation of the borderlands, and resultant distance of
most of the country from these issues, blinds most people to the full experience of border
and immigration enforcement (fieldnotes). Myths about the borderlands cannot stand,
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however, in the face of lived experience day in and day out. Being right on the border
opens people to how the practices of border and immigration enforcement shape their
lives, and residents see those practices‘ strengths and weaknesses. It forces people to see
the entire picture, border and immigration reform together, distinct, yet in so many ways
inseparable. It allows people to explore alternatives, to both imagine and try and bring
into being an alternative place of the borderlands. Being on the border does not allow
people to escape such thinking, it is constantly around you, in the views of Mexico from
around the city, in the helicopters constantly buzzing, in the license plates of the cars you
see, in the flags flying along the skyline, flags not of one country, but two. Being on the
border means realizing that you never can be isolated, never alone, and this causes you to
see the shortcomings of such thinking. When you exist in a landscape that
simultaneously juxtaposes the need for permeability and the desire for exclusion that
typifies U.S. border and immigration policy, the realization of the need for some reform
comes naturally, such inconsistency is self-defeating, unproductive, and in the long term
cannot stand.
Being in the borderlands means striking this balance between two worlds, but it is
the constant exposure to the realities of daily life on the border, the exposure to the
impacts of border and immigration enforcement that makes the reform movement so
strong. While other attempts at immigration reform have largely been based out of D.C,
and have been removed from the experiences of immigration and border enforcement, the
reform efforts from El Paso and the borderlands are rooted in an experience of place that
cannot be similarly detached. It gives these activists expertise in what they are dealing
with, what needs to be addressed and reformed, what alternatives can look like. This
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expertise is an important strength in looking to shape policy, allowing specific, targeted
reforms that cut to the heart of the issue. It allows the push for reform to put pieces
together in a way that other places could not, realizing that immigration reform should
not be traded for border enforcement, but that border enforcement is a crucial part of the
needed reforms. Where other reforms have lacked the vision of what a border not
oriented around enforcement could look like, the activism emerging from the borderlands
knows better. The borderlands have learned the lessons of prior reforms, prior
enforcement regimes, prior myths of the border, because it has had to, because these
practices originating elsewhere have shaped the lives of this place and of its residents.
It is from this that we see the chance for a progressive border and immigration
reform. It is from these experiences, experiences of people dying in the desert, people
chased through the streets, waiting in long lines in the summer heat to enter the U.S.,
communities where any and all might be questioned about their immigration status, that
this chance emerges. It is true that immigration enforcement is starting to penetrate the
interior as never before, but this simply makes it more important to pay attention to the
experiences of border communities that have had to deal with such enforcement for
decades. It is true that there are serious security concerns at our borders, from terrorism,
from drug violence, from human smuggling, but this makes it all the more important to
see past the myths and fears society holds and to look at the experiences and vision of the
communities that are on the front lines. There is a progressive vision of border and
immigration reform emerging from the borderlands, from decades of encounters with
enforcement and permeability, the border has synthesized the lessons of decades of
practices. These lessons learned are the greatest strengths of those working towards
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reform out of the borderlands. Just and humane practices are what is being worked
towards. With all this in mind, the limitations above do show a long path to go; a path
where it is unclear if the end can be reached. Still, having a progressive vision of border
and immigration reform is the greatest advantage these groups have, and the most
meaningful advantage they could have.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
Building a Better Border
There is much reason to conclude from the findings in this research that the push
for progressive border and immigration reform is in some of the best shape it has ever
been in, not only in El Paso, but across both the borderlands and the country. There are
still great challenges facing any push for reform, some old, such as the persistence of
poverty, racism, and the marginalization of the border, and some new, namely the
constant pressure to devolve federal immigration authority. However, one of the great
ironies revealed by this research is that devolution, this new phenomenon, has effectively
been a mechanism by which not only have pro-reform forces gotten themselves more
organized, but they have also emerged with a more progressive version of border and
immigration reform. Devolution, while it opens up a new front in the battle over
immigration enforcement, also has forced the pro-reform groups to engage on the local
level, something that has proven to be a great strength to the cause of reform. Even
while, this has meant having to engage at three distinct scalar levels, it allows tactics and
forces practices in the pro-reform groups that are highly useful in the broader push for
reform.
Notably, in this regard the movement of activity down to the local level has
allowed the push for reform to expand beyond the agenda set by groups that have
traditionally been focused almost solely on D.C. This has had the crucial implication of
allowing border reform to enter the conversation along with immigration and
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enforcement reform, a crucial step toward progressive reform the importance of which
would be difficult to overstate. The disconnection of border and immigration reform over
the past two and a half decades has led to a series of policies that even when they bring
an immigration reform, and they do not always do so, simply make the enforcement
situation worse, particularly at the border. We have had immigration reforms, which
have made the border a more militarized, violent place, and have notably facilitated the
deaths of thousands of migrants, a human rights catastrophe. The willingness to make
such tradeoffs in the name of reform is starting to change, in no small part, because of
pan-border, and national coalitions that have started to form, prompted in particular by
devolution. Only by demanding reform of border and immigration practices alike, can
the U.S. achieve the progressive set of reforms it needs, and, thankfully, this is
happening, although the possibility of a tradeoff between immigration reform and border
enforcement is a real possibility in the proposed Senate reform.
With this general sentiment in mind, the following section will wrap up some of
the major themes running through the thesis, and assess their effects on the chances for
progressive border and immigration reform. It will start by looking at how pro-reform
organizations are able to respond to the types of power used in debates over border and
immigration policy. Particular attention will be paid to how pro-reform groups are able
to act across the matrix in ways that not only let them resist specific policies, but also
challenge existing frameworks of how these issues are perceived. From there it will
move to look at the contest between ‗nlocalized‘ and devolutionary frameworks of border
and immigration enforcement and draw out the impact of devolution in the face of
increasingly organized local opposition, especially along the border. After this, it will
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attempt to put the two together, and look at El Paso as an example of ‗progressive
nlocalization‘, an attempt, in Price‘s framework, to remake the place by changing its
relation to these issues and to the border. Finally, some conclusions will be reached on
the chances for progressive border and immigration policy going forward, although the
above certainly hints that it is better positioned than at any point in recent years.
Before getting there, however, it would be wrong not to go through some of the
limitations of this work, and potential avenues for future research. In terms of what was
done, while the sixteen interviews provided a good cross-section of the population of key
actors in El Paso, there is significant room to expand. Getting interviews with people in
local law enforcement would be an important addition to this work. Additionally, further
interviews with federal officials, particularly those based out of DC would add insights
that the original interviews lacked. Similarly, the thesis broadly ignored actors both in
Mexico and New Mexico, and adding these additional places would expand the scalar
analysis the thesis provides. Additionally, expanding beyond interviews would allow a
much more detailed depiction of the strategies described here. Participant observation,
while much too time and resource intensive to be practical in this case, would offer a
good method for expanding on the findings presented here. Finally, the story around
immigration and border reform is not over, and repeating this investigation in the future
would add helpful perspective as to how these methods of pursuing reform have
developed.
A Final Reprise of the Organizational/Power Matrix
A straightforward fight for border and immigration reform would be a step in the
right direction, but reality requires the organizations pressing for reform to be adaptive,
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and to be able to actively engage a number of different forms of power at any given time
in order to be successful. In order to achieve their desired change, reformers must be able
to overcome frames of the borderlands that create fear and alienation from the rest of the
country, keep their agenda on the table, and propel it to victory over its opponents.
Further complicating matters, at the same time, these reformers must work to check
practices and policies that would make the situation worse, particularly through
devolution. This would be a lot for any one organization or activist to be able to do, and
no person, organization, or government body observed in El Paso would be able to
navigate all of these activities and forms of power alone. They are not asked to do this
alone, however, and the networks and coalitions that have developed among the entities
pushing for reform allow them more maneuverability across this matrix. Indeed, this
maneuverability is facilitated not only by coalitions at the local level, but also those
networks that have developed across the borderlands, across Texas, and across the nation.
The final story of the organizational/power matrix is one of the victory of coalitions and
the inter-organizational division of labor, a true boon for the cause of reform.
The profiles of government and organizational activities discussed earlier showed
that individual governments or organizations were able to engage the forms of power and
organization presented in the matrix in numerous ways. Individually, these means were
often limited. El Paso County is limited to lobbying and to lawsuits, allowing it to
engage only two of the different forms of power by itself. And this is an example of a
particularly capable entity, while many of the pro-reform organizations active in El Paso
lack a means to affect any of these forms of power, yet they have integral knowledge of
what reform must entail. What allows these organizations efficacy in pushing for reform
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is their ability to form coalitions and harness the talents and knowledge of each
component in a cohesive and organized manner. Through coalitions with officials and
activists around the State of Texas, pro-reform advocates are able to harness indirect
power and keep legislation promoting the devolution of immigration enforcement from
reaching the floor of the state legislature. Through connections to organizations around
the country, pro-reform leaders are able to make effective use of direct power by focusing
everyone‘s activism behind a cohesive set of reforms. By organizing across the
borderlands, reformers have been able to use hegemonic power and effectively change
the conversation about reform to include border, as well as immigration, reform.
This is an interesting point, because it introduces a scalar factor into the nature of
these power relationships. As these organizations scale up, and as they generate
connections between them that allow that scaling up, they are more effective at
negotiating these various forms of power. Indeed, we should take the fact that such
transformations of the national discussion of border and immigration reform have only
started to happen after the emergence of scaled up, pan-border coalitions, as a key piece
of evidence that this is the case. Scaling up then is a critical piece of this matrix, not only
does it allow individual actions such as lobbying, a form of direct power, to be more
effective, but it gives these organizations access to other forms of power that they would
not have had. Indeed, even if nothing happens policy-wise with reform in the short term,
it makes sense to expect the ability of pro-reform coalitions to continue to improve as
organizations further coalesce, and as the division of labor becomes more refined as a
result. In the long term then, we should expect those pushing for border and immigration
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reform to have a better grasp of the forms of power at play in these debates, and
consequently, improved long term chances for reform.
Not all aspects of the organizational/power matrix are equally positioned,
however, and while the combination of scaling up and coalition building, has improved
the position of the pro-reform movement, it is not perfect. Looking back on the barriers
mentioned in the prior section, we see that isolation and marginality are still the largest
forces holding back the ability of the borderlands to push for reform, the strength of
which limits the ability of pro-reform groups to effectively wield hegemonic power. This
is a problem, as overcoming marginality as a barrier to reform, requires the use of
hegemonic power, above all other tactics. To this end, devolution may have been a
blessing in disguise as it allows communities in the borderlands, and across the country to
demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the way that the federal government is approaching
border and immigration policy. Openly and publicly challenging the federal government
around border and immigration policy is a good way to try and move the conversation in
the direction of a progressive border and immigration reform. Progress is being made in
this front, as the discussion of scaling up mentioned and as the mention of devolution
alludes to, but there is still a long way to go. The fight to change the discussion, to fight
the misconceptions held about the borderlands, to change the place of the borderlands
with respect to the rest of the country, is the most important fight remaining. It is the
fight that pro-reform activists must win in order to consolidate any policy victories they
achieve.
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‘Nlocalization’ versus Devolution
The point made in the prior section about the possibility of devolution being a
‗blessing in disguise‘ is a good transition to a discussion that this thesis has engaged in
about a shift of immigration enforcement, and to a lesser extent border enforcement, to a
devolutionary framework. Certainly, it is the case that in important ways devolution is
happening, and is changing the ways that border and immigration reform must be
pursued. It has led to a need for actions oriented as much at defending the status quo, as
in pushing for reform, a strange position for the pro-reform community to find
themselves in. We certainly see that the pro-reform community views devolution as a
step in the wrong direction, that they greatly prefer the traditional ‗nlocalized‘
framework. Nevertheless, it seems that the adaptations devolution forced, have brought
with them some significant benefits for the pro-reform community. Indeed, if anything,
the chances for reform have likely improved as a result of devolutionary pressures, and
while returning to a ‗nlocalized‘ framework is a necessary goal for achieving progressive
border and immigration reform, pro-reform organizations should be careful to preserve
many of the structures they built in order to adapt to the threat of devolution.
Given Coleman‘s correct condemnation of devolution, it may seem absurd to
discuss positive aspects of devolution. To that end, it should be made clear that the
positives associated with devolution have nothing to do with devolutionary policy, but
rather with the strategic choices taken, and means of resistance devolution has led proreform organizations to develop. Having immigration enforcement become a debate at
the local level, created a greater role for local activists and made community pressure
more likely to find expression. It has also, as Coleman points out, made immigration an
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issue across a broader spectrum of communities, opening it to influence from a broader
spectrum of activists. What we see is that while past organizing around immigration
issues in D.C has been described as being top-down, the need for resistance of
immigration devolution at a local scale has led to an increase in the number and power of
locally based community driven organizations like BNHR. Furthermore, the rejection of
these devolutionary practices, especially in relatively high profile places such as San
Francisco, New York City, or even El Paso, is a public show of displeasure with
immigration policy from the pro-immigration side, something that has been largely
lacking in public discussion of immigration.
Looking at El Paso, BNHR stands out as a good example of an organization that
has gained prominence by leading such a successful grassroots pushback against
devolution. They may not have had such a rise in prominence, and thereby ability to
interject their constituent's voices into the national discussion if not, ironically, for the
organizing opportunity presented by devolution. Furthermore, being able to make a
public show of widespread resistance to devolution is helpful, especially because it
pushes things back towards the federal level. Devolution has allowed a much more
grassroots set of organizations, more representative of communities on the ground, and
that have particularly improved representation for border communities, to lead the push
for reform. Obviously, it would be better to not have to fight these battles at all, and
simply keep things at the federal level. However, given that devolution has happened,
making that wish moot, what we see is a sort of lemons-to-lemonade process. Having to
fight devolution at the state and local level has forced pro-immigrant organizations to be
better organized, and more reflective of, and more responsive to, impacted communities
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like El Paso or the border more broadly. This not saying that devolution should be
accepted, or that devolution is desirable, but rather that it has forced responses in the proimmigrant community that seem to improve the chances of progressive reform in the
long-run.
It seems unlikely that reform would come directly from the fight over devolution,
as this fight is really aimed at reestablishing the dominance of a ‗nlocalized‘ framework
rather than directly pushing for reform. However, the indirectness of this does not mean
that the fight to block devolution stands in the way of pushing for greater border and
immigration reforms. Rather, working for reform may well benefit from the strategies
learned in dealing with devolution. Indeed, it seems unlikely that the organization or
effort that has been observed would have occurred without the threat of devolution
looming over the situation. What is important to remember then, is that even though
these practices emerged in one specific situation, they are still applicable and useful in
the broader effort for reform.
El Paso as an Example of Progressive ‘Nlocalization’
The push for reform in El Paso has benefited from its successful resistance to
devolution, but it has also moved beyond that; it has been able to harness these strategies
to shape the more traditional, ‗nlocalized‘ framework for immigration and border issues
in a more progressive direction. In doing so, we see that the groups pushing for reform in
El Paso have not been limited in how they apply the lessons they have learned from
devolution. Coalitions, a highly specialized division of labor, and efforts to ‗scale up‘ the
push for reform have become cornerstones of strategies demonstrated by the
organizations and activists working out of El Paso. Furthermore, the organizations
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operating out of El Paso seem committed to using these lessons not only in their own
efforts, but in promoting and organizing around them with activists in other places.
Doing so makes these strategies more valuable and more effective, for many reasons
discussed earlier. It also serves to broaden the strategies available in the cause of reform,
something that further improves the chances for a reform succeeding.
Of course, the reform that emerges, if any, may not necessarily be sufficient to
address the plethora of human and civil rights concerns that demand attention. However,
applying more broadly the lessons of combating devolution has made for a more
progressive push for border and immigration reform. Coalition building, both locally
and, more importantly, across the country, has allowed discussions of reform to expand in
a manner that addresses the need for both border and immigration reform. It has allowed
service organizations that have generally been disconnected from the activities of
organizations seeking policy reform to help participate in shaping what should be done
and how. Equally important, it has allowed policy reform, so long focused on D.C., to
reconnect with the grassroots support for reform, both adding to the legitimacy of the
push for reform and better addressing the issues that face border and immigrant
communities. At the forefront of this, and hard to overstate in importance, is the fact that
border reform has entered the conversation. This is critical in addressing human rights
issues, especially the deaths that have resulted from U.S. border enforcement tactics. It
has only entered the conversation as a result of the ability of the borderlands, through
places such as El Paso, to inject itself into the national discussions of reform.
This has come through a return to the ‗nlocalized‘ framework, but taking
advantage of the tactics and lessons of devolution successfully to alter this framework so
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as bring the local scale into greater contact with the national. No longer are the localities
of border and immigration enforcement only sites of the imposition of federal power, but
now they are adapting this relationship linking federal and local to allow the local to enter
into discussion about policy. The return to the ‗nlocalized‘ framework puts them into the
position to do this, but it is the tactics taken from fighting devolution that offers the
chance to make the push successful. This combination, by allowing the inversion of the
relationships that have defined ‗nlocalization‘, allows for progressive reform. El Paso, by
leading the efforts both in resisting devolution, and in adopting the tactics from that
effort, has accomplished this and so puts itself in a great position to lead a progressive
border and immigration reform. El Paso has made itself into a center for a progressive
‗nlocalization‘, and by doing so, and by working to spread this, has helped open the
chance for a truly comprehensive, truly progressive border and immigration reform.
Essentially this gets back to the point Price made in discussing the nature of place
as a constructed entity. What the pro-reform movement in El Paso has been able to do is
to reconstruct the place of the borderlands in a fashion that aims to fundamentally alter its
relationship to other places. By altering the nature of the ‗nlocalized‘ relationship El
Paso has to the federal immigration and border policy, this effectively is changing how it
is constituted as a place, no longer to be a site of exclusion and interdiction, and how it
relates to other places, becoming part of the broader conversation around border and
immigration issues. Not only does this work to promote a progressive set of border and
immigration reforms, but because it is premised on this change in how El Paso relates to
other places, it constitutes the development of El Paso as a progressive place. The
implications of this are significant as it signals a willingness in the community to
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challenge how El Paso as a place is constituted and relates to other places, which creates
this progressive ideal, not only around that one issue, but rather as an essential part of
how the place is defined. Furthermore, the attempts out of El Paso to involve the entire
borderlands in this altered relationship between the federal and the local, can be seen as
an attempt to recast the entire region as a progressive place.
Chances for a Progressive Border and Immigration Reform
There is an opening, then, for a progressive reform to occur. This is significant
progress, and there is much to be optimistic about in the fact that such an opening has
emerged. There has been a lot of effort that has gone into creating this opportunity, into
reworking this relationship between the communities of the borderlands and the federal
government, and it seems to be paying off. People have been brought together from
communities, service organizations, policy-making bodies, and academic circles to get to
here. They have come together across cities, across states, across the borderlands, and
across the country to get here. The coalitions have expanded the abilities of those
pushing for reform, the division of labor has made these efforts more efficient, and
scaling up has created conversations that are crucial to reform occurring. The quick
conclusion then is that the chances for a progressive reform are better now than they have
been in some time. Furthermore, significant positive changes have occurred in how
immigration and border issues are viewed, especially on the border and in places near the
border, in ways that would be hard to undo. The significance of this opportunity, and the
potential for permanence in how this issue is dealt with, both bode well going forward.
However, even with this in mind, the path to reform is not entirely clear. As good
as the chances for reform are now, especially compared to what they have been in the
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past, there are significant and difficult obstacles still to be overcome. Foremost among
these, as has been mentioned at length, is the intentional social isolation and
marginalization of the borderlands that works to deny their participation in political
processes, even those involving things that affect those places. The opening that has been
generated so far is a start, and has brought down some of the weakest of those barriers,
such as those keeping border reform out of the discussion, but as the quotes mentioned in
the section on limitations indicated, there is quite a ways to go. Furthermore, this
isolation and marginalization has meant that the borderlands have always been defined in
the eye of the interior on someone else‘s terms, a fact that puts a progressive border and
immigration reform at a disadvantage in public debates. Changing these perceptions will
be a long process, and the ability of reformers to implement some of the most needed, but
farthest reaching changes through legislation will be limited until that change occurs.
Work with administrative changes may be easier to make, as they are not necessarily up
to the same level of public scrutiny as legislation. With this in mind, it seems to make
sense to pursue changes within DHS, at least in the near-term.
What we see then is that the chances for progressive reform in the status quo are
relatively good and improving. Still the remaining barriers to such reform will likely
block the significant changes that need to be made from happening in the short term.
Certainly, it is hard to ask for patience around an issue where several hundred people die
every year, among other things needing to be addressed, but that seems to be exactly
what needs to be done now. The pro-reform movement out of El Paso and the
borderlands seems to have synthesized their experiences into an effective way to bring
about reform, but they need more time to do so. There are legitimate concerns about
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backsliding, about the separation of border and immigration reforms, about what the
political situation will be like in the Congress going forward, all of which press for action
now. And, action should be pushed for now, for maintaining pressure helps keep those
concerns minimized. However, it is unrealistic to expect such pressure to succeed in the
short term. This is not a hopeless situation though, as this paragraph‘s opening sentence
suggests. Considering the successes that these strategies have had, there seems little that
would be able to prevent long term reforms from happening. Given the infeasibility,
impracticality, and inhumanity of current U.S. border and immigration policy, efforts for
reform must be maintained. That these efforts can succeed is a testament to the skill,
effort, and vision of those involved to create a better tomorrow for both the people and
places of the borderlands.
There are important lessons that can be drawn and generalized from the El Paso
case. Foremost, devolution has allowed this sort of immigration and border reform
activity anywhere, and as devolution pursues greater enforcement everywhere, then
resistance to devolution and the pursuit of progressive reform must happen everywhere,
and can succeed anywhere. While resistance to devolution has sought to restore a
‗nlocalized‘ relationship around immigration, it is the case that the results of devolution
mean that this ‗nlocalization‘ must include a much broader swath of localities. It also
calls our attention to the need to reform border policy as well as immigration policy,
informing not only how the pursuit of progressive reforms occur, but also what must go
into a progressive reform. Additionally, the tactics emerging out of El Paso, emphasizing
community driven coalitions, are certainly generalizable, something that can be observed
as these coalitions have spread across the borderlands and even across the country. The
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spread of these will only allow those pursuing border and immigration reform a broader
range of action and a greater chance of success. Finally, the need to address the
misperceptions of the border that drive the current flawed approaches is something that
goes well beyond El Paso. This is a massive undertaking that must look to undo decades
of marginalization, racism, economic discrimination, and more, but that must be
accomplished for reform to be successful.

195 | H e y m a n

REFERENCES

Andreas, Peter. (2000). Border games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico divide. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.
Archibold, Randal C. (2009, October 6). Immigration hard-liner has his wings clipped.
The New York Times, p. 14.
Blumenthal, Ralph. (2006, November 5). Trucker convicted in deaths of 19 illegal
immigrants. The New York Times, p. 20.
Border Network for Human Rights (BNHR) (2006). “BEHIND EVERY ABUSE IS A
COMMUNITY”: U.S./Mexico Border Report to the United Nations Human Rights
Committee Regarding the United States‟ Compliance with the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. El Paso, Texas: Border Network for
Human Rights Staff.
Carrigan, William D. & Clive Webb. (2003). The Lynching of Persons of Mexican
Origin or Descent in the United States, 1848 To 1928. Journal of Social History,
37.2. Retrieved from
<http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_social_history/v037/37.2carrigan.html>.
CBO. (2006). Immigration Policy in the United States. Congressional Budget Office:
Washington, D.C. Retrieved from
<http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/70xx/doc7051/02-28-Immigration.pdf>.

196 | H e y m a n

CBP.gov. (2003). Border Patrol History. Retrieved from
<http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/border_patrol_ohs/h
istory.xml>.
CBP.gov. (2008). Border Patrol Overview. Retrieved from
<http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/border_patrol_ohs/o
verview.xml>.
Coleman, Mathew. (2007). Immigration Geopolitics Beyond the Mexico-US Border.
Antipode, 39(1), 54-76.
Cornelius, Wayne A. (2001, December). Death at the Border: Efficacy and Unitended
Consequences of U.S. Immigration Control Policy. Population and Development
Review. 27(4): 661-685.
Dunleavy, Patrick & Christopher Hood (1994). From Old Public Administration to New
Public Management. Public Money and Management, July-September: 9-16.
Dunn, Timothy J. (1996). The militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border, 1978-1992:
Low-intensity conflict doctrine comes home. CMAS border & migration studies
series. Austin: CMAS Books, University of Texas at Austin.
Dunn, Timothy J. (2009). Blockading the border and human rights: The El Paso
operation that remade immigration enforcement. Austin, TX: University of
Texas Press.
Electronic Privacy Information Center. (2007). United States Visitor and Immigrant
Status Indicator Technology. Retrieved from <
http://mail.privacy.org/privacy/us-visit/>.

197 | H e y m a n

Environmental News Service. (2008, April 4). Environmental Laws Waived to Build
Border Fence. Retrieved from <http://www.ensnewswire.com/ens/apr2008/2008-04-04-092.asp>.
Estrada, Ismael & Keith Oppenheim. (2007, November 5). Oklahoma targets illegal
immigrants with tough new law. CNN.com/US. Retrieved from
<http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/11/02/oklahoma.immigration/>.
Evans, et al. (2003, December 7). Harvest yields loss of lives and money. Palm Beach
Post. Retrieved from
<http://www.palmbeachpost.com/moderndayslavery/content/moderndayslavery/re
ports/day1_main1207.html>.
GAO. (2001). Border Control: Revised Strategy is Showing Some Positive Results
(GAO/GGD-95-30). Washington DC.
Grissom, Brandi. (2006, November 19). Linebacker plan catches more immigrants than
criminals. El Paso Times. News Section.
Grissom, Brandi. (2009a, August 9). Billions on Border: Security, drug war to be
debated at conference. El Paso Times. News Section.
Grissom, Brandi. (2009b, November 11). Broken Border, Part Four: Who‘s Watching?
Texas Tribune. Retrieved from
<http://www.texastribune.org/stories/2009/nov/11/few-patrolling-perrys-borderweb-cameras/>.
Grissom, Brandi. (2009c, September 9). Border Cameras: Take two. Texas Tribune.
Retrieved from <http://www.texastribune.org/stories/2009/sep/09/bordercameras-take-two/>.

198 | H e y m a n

Herod, Andrew & Melissa W. Wright (Eds.). (2002). Geographies of power: Placing
scale. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Heyman, Josiah (Ed.). (1999). States and illegal practices. Oxford, UK: Berg.
Heyman, Josiah M. (1998). Finding a moral heart for U.S. immigration policy: An
anthropological perspective. American Ethnological Society monograph series,
no. 7. Arlington, VA: American Anthropological Association.
ICE.gov. (2007). Section 287(g), Immigration and Nationality Act; Delegation of
Immigration Authority. Retrieved from
<http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/070622factsheet287gprogover.htm>.
ICE.gov. (2008). Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g): Immigration and
Nationality Act. Retrieved from
<http://www.ice.gov/partners/287g/Section287_g.htm>.
Jacobson, David (Ed.). (1998). The immigration reader: America in a multidisciplinary
perspective. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Jimenez, Maria. (2009). Humanitarian Crisis: Migrant Deaths at the U.S.-Mexico
Border. Retrieved from
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/immigrants/humanitariancrisisreport.pdf
Kanstroom, Daniel. (2007). Deportation nation: Outsiders in American history.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Koestler, Fred L. (2010). Operation Wetback. In Handbook of Texas Online. Retrieved
from <http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/OO/pqo1.html>.

199 | H e y m a n

Leiken, Robert S. & Stephen Brooke. (2006). The Quantitative Analysis of Terrorism and
Immigration: An Initial Exploration. Terrorism and Political Violence, 18(4),
503-521.
Lipowicz, Alice. (2007). SBInet struggles through first phase. Washington Technology.
Retrieved from <http://washingtontechnology.com/Articles/2007/08/31/SBInetstruggles-through-first-phase.aspx?Page=1>.
Lipowicz, Alice (2008). GAO: SBI so far nets Boeing more than $1B. Washington
Technology. Retrieved from
<http://washingtontechnology.com/Articles/2008/06/30/GAO-SBI-so-far-netsBoeing-more-than-1B.aspx?Page=1>.
Lukes, Steven. (2005). Power: A radical view (2nd ed.). New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Martin, Philip L. (1994). Good intentions gone awry: IRCA and U.S. agriculture. The
Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science, 534(July), 44-57.
Marston, Sallie A. (2000). The Social Construction of Scale. Progress in Human
Geography, 24(2), 219-242.
Massey, Douglas (2005a). Testimony of Douglas S. Massey before the Committee on the
Judiciary. U.S. Senate. October 18, 2005.
Massey, Douglas (2005b). Backfire at the Border: Why Enforcement Without
Legalization Cannot Stop Illegal Immigration. Trade Policy Analysis.
Washington D.C.: Cato Institute, Issue 29.
Massey, Douglas (2007). ―When Less is More: Border Enforcement and Undocumented
Migration‖ Testimony of Douglas S. Massey before the Subcommittee on

200 | H e y m a n

Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law.
Committee on the Judiciary. U.S. House of Representatives. April 20, 2007.
McCain, John. (2005). S. 1033. Bill presented to Congress. Retrieved from
<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:S1033:>.
McCann, Eugene J. (1999). Race, Protest, and Public Space: Contextualizing Lefebvre
in the U.S. City. Antipode, 31(2), 163-184.
Morse, Ann, et al. (2009). State Laws Related to Immigrants and Immigration: January
1-June 30, 2009. Immigrant Policy Project. National Conference of State
Legislatures. Retrieved from <http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=18030>.
Nevins, Joseph. (2002). Operation Gatekeeper: The rise of the “illegal alien” and the
making of the U.S.-Mexico boundary. New York: Routledge.
Niskanen, William A. (1971). Bureaucracy and representative government. Chicago, IL:
Aldine.
Núñez-Mchiri, Guillermina G. (2009). The Political Ecology of the Colonias on the
U.S.-Mexico Border: Human-Environmental Challenges and Community
Responses in Southern New Mexico. Southern Rural Sociology, 24(1), 97-91.
Orr, Marion (Ed.). (2007). Transforming the city: Community organizing and the
challenge of political change. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.
Orrenius, Pia M. (2001). Illegal Immigration and Enforcement Along the Southwest
Border. Retrieved from
<http://www.dallasfed.org/research/border/tbe_orrenius.html>.

201 | H e y m a n

Peters, Katherine M. (2008, January 4). Staffing shortages at border jeopardize security,
economy. GovernmentExecutive.com. Retrieved from
<http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0108/010408kp1.htm>.
Price, Patricia L. (2004). Dry place: Landscapes of belonging and exclusion.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Ramírez, Marcos ‗ERRE‘. (1997). Toy-an horse y Trojan horse. In InSITE ‘97 exhibit.
Retrieved from <http://marcosramirezerre.com/>.
Ruiz, R. E. (1998). On the rim of Mexico: encounters of the rich and poor. Boulder,
Colo: Westview Press.
Sapkota, S., et al. (2006). Unauthorized Border Crossings and Migrant Deaths: Arizona,
New Mexico, and El Paso, Texas, 2002-2003. American Journal of Public
Health, 96(7), 1282-1287.
Schorn, Daniel. (2006, November 19). Welcome to Hazelton: One mayor‘s
controversial plan to deal with illegal immigration. 60 Minutes. Retrieved from
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/11/17/60minutes/main2195789.shtml>.
Sensenbrenner, James. (2005). H.R. 4437. Bill proposed to Congress. Retrieved from
<http://thomas.gov/cgibin/bdquery/D?d109:3:./temp/~bdgrjG::|/bss/d109query.html|>.
Sheppard, Eric & Robert B. McMaster. (2004). Scale and geographic inquiry: Nature,
society and method. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Solis, Dianne. (2009, October 23). Police chiefs say they don‘t want to enforce
immigration law. Carrollton Blog. Dallas Morning News. Retrieved from

202 | H e y m a n

<http://carrolltonblog.dallasnews.com/archives/2009/10/police-chiefs-say-theydont-wa.html>.
Soja, Edward. (1980). The socio-spatial dialectic. Annals of the Association of American
Geographers. 70(2):207-225.
Staeheli, Lynn A., Janet E. Kodras, & Colin Flint (Eds). (1997). State devolution in
America: Implications for a diverse society. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications.
Stone, N. (2007, September 8). El Paso As Prologue. National Journal. Retrieved
September 15, 2008, from Academic Search Premier.
Swarts, Heidi J. (2008). Organizing urban America: Secular and faith-based
progressive movements. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Texas Tribune. (2009). Operation Border Star. Retrieved from
<http://www.texastribune.org/topics/operation-border-star/>.
Trudeau, Daniel. (2008). Towards a relational view of the shadow state. Political
Geography. 27(6):669-690.
United States Border Patrol. (2004). National Border Patrol Strategy. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Retrieved from
<http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/border_patr
ol_ohs/national_bp_strategy.ctt/national_bp_strategy.pdf>.
U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (U.S.C.I.R.). (1994, July). Illegal Mexican
Migration & the United States/Mexico Border: The Effects of Operation Hold the
Line on El Paso/Juárez. Population Research Center, The University of Texas at
Austin. Authored by Bean, Frank D., et al.

203 | H e y m a n

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2009a). US-VISIT What to Expect When
Visiting the United States. Retrieved from
<http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/editorial_0525.shtm>.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2009b). US-VISIT at the U.S.-Mexico Land
Border. Retrieved from
<http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/usvisit/usvisit_edu_us_mexico_land_border_
info_card_english.pdf>.
U.S. Department of State. (2009). Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative. Retrieved
from <http://travel.state.gov/travel/cbpmc/cbpmc_2223.html>.
van den Berg, Hendrik. (2009, February). Immigration Part II: A Brief History of U.S.
Policy. Nebraska Report, 37(2), 1, 3-4, 8, 10.
Vila, Pablo. (2000). Crossing borders reinforcing borders: Social categories,
metaphors, and narrative identities on the U.S.-Mexico frontier. Austin, TX:
University of Texas Press.
Wilson, Graham K. (1990). Interest groups. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell Ltd.
Yin, Robert K. (2003). Case study research: Design and methods. Applied social
research methods series, v. 5. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

204 | H e y m a n

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Many people helped me with this thesis and although the credit they deserve
comes last in the printed version, without their help, I never would have made it this far.
With that in mind I wish to thank the following people:
Professors Holly Barcus and Alicia Muñoz for their willingness to serve on my
honors committee. I greatly valued the support and feedback they provided.
My Grandmother, Alma, and my Aunts, Adrienne and Leslie, for helping me
afford the educational opportunity to undertake a project such as this.
All of the sixteen people I interviewed in researching this topic. Interviewing you
was an excellent experience and I thank all of you for your willingness to participate in
this effort, and to take time out of your schedules to do so.
My Academic and Thesis advisor Professor Daniel Trudeau. Dan provided the
guidance I needed to choose a topic, develop a proposal, begin research over the summer,
and most importantly, start writing in the fall. Beyond that, he was a careful and
thoughtful editor who provided valued feedback for revisions after the first draft. Dan‘s
advice kept me focused and upbeat through the duration of the project, and both I and this
thesis owe him dearly for the advice and assistance he provided with this task.
My Mother, Merlyn, who patiently assisted me getting to and from interviews
over the summer, and who gave her time to help copyedit this thesis.
Finally, My Father, Josiah, for whose help and support on this thesis I cannot
begin to express my gratitude. Helpful at every stage of the process, from gathering
background information, to sources on organizations and interactions, to suggesting
possible interviewees; from reading, to commenting and suggesting revisions, to helping

205 | H e y m a n

keep me focused; from the beginning to the end, I would not be where I am without his
assistance and support. For all of this I am deeply indebted and grateful. Thank you.

206 | H e y m a n

